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This thesis examines three themes that focus on inter-banking connections and their
impact on modern banking development in the 1930s.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the modern bank sector and highlights the inter-
banking relations. Tracing the shape, structure, and development of links within the sector, I
find that it was characterized by a strong network of interlocking directorates. This network
shows a dominating central cluster, indicating that the sector was characterized by internal
cooperation rather than competition. Similarly, new entrants were usually linked to existing
banks, indicating that entry was driven by the expansion of existing banks rather than the
rise of new competition. Finally, central locations of public banks within the cluster indicate
that the government gained influence over the sector through direct bank ownership.
Chapter 3 investigates how board connections in an inter-bank network affect their cor-
porate policy decisions. I find evidence that corporate decisions of banks are influenced by
their social peers — the more directors two banks share with each other, the more similar
are their corporate strategies. Also, banks with a central position in the boardroom network
make corporate decisions less distinctively. Additionally, the empirical outcomes show that
co-moved corporate policies are mainly driven by banks’ intentions to pursue profits and
eliminate risks, known as profitability and insurance effects.
I further examine whether inter-banking connections based on interlocking directorates
contributed to the overall performance in Chapter 4 . I find characteristics of banks, which
share directors with other banks, are significantly different compared to those of uncon-
nected counterparts. The empirical results elucidate a high positive correlation between
banks’ profitability and their connections with rivals through interlocking directors.
Last but not least, Chapter 5 investigates the development of the interlocking directorate
network between domestic Chinese banks from 1933 to 1936 to understand how financial
institutions structure cooperation within the sector in response to uncertain external envi-
ronments and weak property rights. This part uses a dynamic network simulation approach
to address the reflection problem between bank performance and network formation, illu-
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Chinese modern banks, so modern-style banks modeled on Western practices (corporations
of limited liability, relative impersonal relationships with customers, and mortgage loans)1,
achieved in the face of extreme political and economic turbulence, produced significant re-
sults by the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. As a key characteristic in the sector,
the literature documents that interlocking directorates were widespread, i.e. directors shar-
ing by multiple banks featured prominently (Lan 2014; Cheng 2003; Sheehan 2005)2. The
interlocking director relationships formed explicit connections among institutions, which
potentially created an inter-bank social network with nodes represent the financial institu-
tions and ties symbolize the director-sharing among banks. In the network, a set of nodes
(i.e. banks) are connected with ties, which indicate the links among banks when direc-
tors are shared by them. It could carry considerable impacts on agents’ (i.e. individual
banks) policy decision making and economic performance according to the social network
paradigm in organization research3. However, it lacks both systematic and quantitative ex-
aminations on the consequences of these board connections, and implications for economic
and business development. A number of questions remain unanswered or controversial,
including what shape did the social networks take; were such connections important for
firms’ operation; and how did networks evolve in general in response to unstable external
environments?
1The foreign banks refer to the institutions which handle money and financial business along the line of
Western business methods in China. In 1848 a British-chartered Oriental Banking Corporation opened its
premises in Shanghai, which was considered as the beginning of the banking expansion in China. By 1937
the British group led the foreign money market, with the old Mercantile Bank of India and the Chartered Bank
of India, Australia and China as well as the prominent Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC).
2For example, Sheehan (2005) provides a statistics in 1936 regarding the director-sharing in the Chinese
modern banking sector, showing that of the 122 banks in his sample, 80.3% had at least one interlocking director
on their boards, leaving only 24 banks as independent isolates.
3For a comprehensive review of the inter-organizational network paradigm, see Borgatti and Foster (2003).
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
The aim of the study is to establish an inter-banking social network, based on Chinese
bank interlocking directorates, and carry on a systematic analysis of the inter-bank board
connections using aspects of network theory. Using aspects of network theory for an exam-
ination of inter-organizational networks is a tested method. A voluminous literature, both
from theoretical and empirical aspects, have demonstrated the value in engaging in this sort
of analysis and the opportunity it provides to isolate network implications and distinctive
trends. Although a consensus on what resources or influence of network ties, i.e., the in-
terlocking relations among banks in our context, might convey, recent studies have shifted
toward an informational perspective that sees interlocks as a conduit in which organiza-
tions reduce uncertainties and share information about acceptable and effective corporate
practices (Borgatti and Foster 2003; Shropshire 2010). For example, empirical works include
the corporate acquisition behavior (Rousseau and Stroup 2015), the adoption of accounting
practices and earnings management contagion (Kang 2008; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian 2013), the
option backdating (Bizjak, Lemmon, and Whitby 2009), and innovations (Helmers, Patnam,
and Rau 2017).
The social network in the China context, based on what is called guanxi (social connec-
tions), lies at the heart of economic, social and political life. Guanxi essentially works as a
substitute for formal institutional support (Xin and Pearce 1996). Although contemporary
study on Chinese business suggests guanxi-oriented society does not necessarily imply a
densely interlocked business network (Ren, Au, and Birtch 2009), modern banking in the
1930s featured shared professional values based on common attributes of bankers, such as
native place, classmate, and kinship (Bergère 1989), that leads to a prevalence of interlock-
ing directorates (Lan 2014, p. 171).
I therefore initially provide an overview of the banking networks during the Chinese
Republican era (1928-1937) and the Great Depression, which presented an environment
characterized by economic and political uncertainty and weak property rights. Chapter
2 traces the shape, structure, and development of links within the sector. It shows that the
interlocking directorate network had a dominating central cluster, indicating that the sector
was characterized by internal cooperation rather than competition. Similarly, new entrants
were usually linked to existing banks, indicating that entry was driven by the expansion of
existing banks rather than the rise of new competition. Finally, it demonstrates the central
locations of public banks within the cluster, arguing that this indicates that the government
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gained influence over the sector by linking public banks with private banks throughout the
whole sector. This chapter shows that the domestic financial sector reacted successfully to
the threats of the external environment by weaving a close web of interdependence, includ-
ing with the government.
Next, interlocking theory in management predicts a similarity in organizational behav-
ior (Mizruchi 1989). For instance, Westphal, Seidel, and Stewart (2001) highlights that inter-
lock ties facilitate firms’ imitation of decision process, and recent corporate finance studies
suggest that the existence of shared directors has a deep impact on firms’ corporate behav-
ior4. I follow the logic, exploring how board connections in an inter-bank network affect a
bank’s corporate policy decisions in Chapter 3.
Specifically, I establish bank networks between domestic Chinese banks based on inter-
locking directorates for the period 1933 - 1936, and find evidence that corporate decisions
of banks were influenced by their social peers — the more directors two banks shared with
each other, the more similar were their corporate strategies. The analysis also reveals that
peer behavior affected a bank’s own decisions not only at the bilateral level but network-
wide. Banks with a central position in the boardroom network made corporate decisions
less idiosyncratically and more in line with the whole sector.
I then investigate why banks coordinated their corporate policy through interlocking
directorates. The examination comes to two important points about underlying reasons.
First, I find positive and significant relationships between a number of policy measures and
banks’ economic performance. This finding provides a reasonable motivation for corpo-
rate policy co-movement among bank pairs — that modern Chinese banks coordinated or
imitated the bond/cash/reserve related corporate policies of their peers to achieve better
performance, which I call the profitability effect of board ties. Second, I introduce an em-
pirical model that compares the excess fluctuations of banks’ profitability between banks
with more board connections and those with fewer links. The result shows that more board
connections led to fewer fluctuations in profitability, suggesting that such connections were
associated with banks’ intentions to seek assurance and reduce risk. Overall, the findings
support the view that banks cooperated intimately with each other at board level and in-
terlocking directorates were a critical channel for strategical choices and strategies in the
4A voluminous literature in finance highlights that social connections at board level can serve as a conduit
by which information is communicated or resources are exchanged, for instance, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013),
Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007), Fracassi (2017), and Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran (2014).
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1930s.
Economists have long been interested in the impact of director sharing on firms’ eco-
nomic performance. A natural extension of the policy co-movement across bank pairs is to
examine whether these inter-banking connections contributed to the overall performance
of these modern Chinese banks. In chapter 4, I, therefore, provide a comprehensive exami-
nation of the relationship between inter-bank links and economic performance.
The chapter uses four centrality measures, which are degree, closeness, betweenness, and
eigenvector centrality, derived from social network analysis (SNA) to capture individual
banks’ position and extent of connectedness in the boardroom network. The annual inter-
bank networks from 1933 to 1936, which are used in the empirical analysis, are based on
the board compositions of 209 Chinese banks involving 3,060 individuals collected from
the Bank Annual (1934-1937), an official record of annual financial statistics. This is also the
main source for the bank accounting data used.
The empirical analysis highlights ambiguous results. Closeness centrality was statistically
correlated with banks’ performance, for both Return on Assets and profit per staff member.
In contrast, I find no significant relationship between network location and the performance
of banks once I replace closeness centrality with degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality
as alternative network position indicators. The outcome of the analysis suggests that close-
ness significantly differed from other indicators in measuring individual banks’ position,
indicating that it carried different centrality information compared to other measures and
reflected a more relevant linkage effect than the other network indicators in this historical
Chinese context.
The empirical outcome offers evidence that banks, that were located more centrally as
measured by a higher value of closeness centrality, exhibited better financial performance.
Economically, my results imply that banks with relatively closer links to outside boards
throughout the whole sector achieved a better performance, likely linked to more and better
exchange of information and in particular operational and management know-how.
Chapter 5 pays attention to the evolution of the interlocking directorate network in gen-
eral. I investigate the development of the interlocking directorate network between domes-
tic Chinese banks from 1933 to 1936 to understand how financial institutions structure coop-
eration within the sector in response to unstable external environments and weak property
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rights. This chapter uses a dynamic network simulation approach to address the inflec-
tion problem between bank performance and network formation, illuminating what factors
underlay the network evolution and shaped the structure of cooperation between Chinese
banks.
The evolution of the network is analyzed with a Stochastic Actor-oriented Network
model, the SIENA methodology. This approach specifies an objective function for each ac-
tor, bank, consisting of a set of mechanisms. Each mechanism models a particular factor that
potentially could affect the formation or dissolution of particular ties. The estimation then
simulates the evolution of the model using this objective function and through comparison
with the actual observed network evolution data derives a parameter value for each mech-
anism, including the statistical significance of these parameters. I draw these mechanisms
based on the network structure itself, financial, operational and other bank characteristics.
The empirical results demonstrate that there were network effects, with a tendency to
form triads and a decentralization effect due to a negative effect of the existing number of
ties. A number of operational effects mattered, including the types and ages of two potential
partner banks. Similarly, financial characteristics mattered, in particular, the relative ratio of
two banks’ assets, while size on its own did not have an effect. The involvement of national
public banks5 mattered, with the pattern showing a strong swing from positive to negative
effect with the 1935 financial reforms. Finally, the bank’s financial performance, its levels
of RoE and RoE growth, mattered for its tendency to expand its interlocking directorate
network.
The analysis further explores the issue of endogeneity through including Return on Eq-
uity as another outcome measure, therefore simulating the evolution of both outcomes in
the same model. While this additional analysis confirms the results found in the network
the only estimation they do not lend support the impact of interlocking directorates on the
financial performance of the banks. Potential explanations for this result, in particular con-
straints of the simulation approach, are discussed.
In summary, the thesis stresses the importance, effects, implications, and development
of Chinese banking networks during the Republican Era. As outlined this is organized into
four parts followed by a conclusion. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview and background
5The national public banks, i.e. the central banking group, were performed by a group of four public banks
by 1937, namely the Central bank of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications and the Farmers
Bank of China.
6 Chapter 1. Introduction
of Chinese banking and the business networks. Chapter 3 discusses corporate policy con-
tagion through the network of interlocking directorates. In Chapter 4, I investigate the re-
lationship between the centrality of banks within the interlocking directorate network and
economic performance. Chapter 5 carries out an analysis of the drivers of the evolution and
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Abstract
The Chinese Republican era, in particular also during the Great Depression, presented
an environment characterized by economic and political uncertainty and weak property
rights. Nevertheless I document that the domestic Chinese banking sector flourished dur-
ing this time. Tracing the shape, structure and development of links within the sector I find
that it was characterized by a strong network of interlocking directorates. This network
shows a dominating central cluster, indicating that the sector was characterized by internal
cooperation rather than competition. Similarly, new entrants were usually linked to existing
banks, indicating that entry was driven by the expansion of existing banks rather than the
rise of new competition. Finally, central locations of public banks within the cluster indi-
cate that the government gained influence over the sector through direct bank ownership.
This paper shows that the domestic financial sector reacted successfully to the threats of
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2.1 Introduction
Around the fall of the Chinese Empire the financial sector in China was split between tra-
ditional, domestic financial institutions and international banks. By the outbreak of the
Sino-Japanese war in 1937 domestic Chinese banks patterned on Western counterparts had
risen to dominance over the domestic business comparing to its counterparts(Cheng 2003,
p.75). The emergence of these new financial institutions happened in an external environ-
ment of political uncertainty, weak property rights and limited governmental reach, which
obviously influenced the internal structure of this rapidly developing industry. This paper
focuses on one central aspect of the sector’s response, namely the extent of cooperation,
as well as competition, between its banks. How did they relate to each other while facing
external uncertainty and a weak government?
Cooperation and links between firms, and in particular banks, have been a topic for
economic and financial historians. One important approach to measure formal relationships
is to focus on explicit links created by common personnel. Directors and managers might
work for multiple firms, linking them together through an interlocking directorate. Such
relationships have been shown to influence multiple aspects of involved firms, from access
to capital to formal cooperations and even mergers1.
While most analyses focus on the effects such a link has on individual firms, another
viewpoint is to see that link as one edge of a network formed between the firms in the sector.
This opens up the utilization of tools developed by Social Network Analysis to describe
and understand the internal structure of an industry such as this domestic Chinese banking
sector. This builds on Sheehan (2005), who uses basic cross-sectional network statistics to
demonstrate that the traditional focus of the literature on the influence of cliques is much too
small and a wider, modern business focused approach is more appropriate. Consequently,
I take this up and construct the network of interlocking directorate between relevant banks
for the years 1933 to 1936, which form the end of the Nanjing era, the final decade of the
Chinese Republic leading up to the Sino-Japanese war in 1923 and World War II on a global
scale.
1Mizruchi (1996) provides a nice analysis framework over interlock directorates and the economic impli-
cations in early times. More recently, a voluminous literature stress the inter-firm relations on firms behavior
and economics outcomes, for example, Fracassi (2017), Dass et al. (2014), Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), and
Helmers, Patnam, and Rau (2017).
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Section 2 provides the historical background of China’s political development for the
time period from the fall of the Empire to the Warlord era ending in the Nanjing decade. I
also provide additional detail about the development of the financial sector at large, which
leads into section 3 and a deeper look into these new modern Chinese banks and their rise
over this time period. This includes a categorization into different business models, public
and private ownership, and the geographic distribution of their headquarters.
The technical and methodological background for the network analysis is outlined in
section 4, which provides also more details about the interlocking directorates that form
the network. This includes the reasons and motivations for firms in general and Chinese
banks in particular to institutionalize their relationships with each other in this way. The
section also provides more information about the construction of the network, in particular
the data for and definition of interlocking directorates used in the analysis, setting the stage
for applying network analysis tools.
The initial analysis of the annual networks reveals that the sector was characterized by
a dominant core cluster and a number of essentially unconnected banks. Section 5 demon-
strates this indication of a high level of cooperation in the sector in detail and then focuses
on the characteristics of the core cluster, revealing more aspects of the cooperation between
the banks. Based on different centrality measures from Social Network Analysis I argue that
although larger banks were at the center of this cluster banks at the periphery also formed
a dense network of interlocking directorates with each other, reducing the dependency on
dominant, central institutions. The link patterns of relatively young institutions also show
a surprisingly large number of connections, indicating that new entrants reflected expan-
sionary motives of existing banks rather than new competitors.
Analyzing the characteristics of this core cluster shows also the participation of pub-
licly owned banks. Section 6 traces the governments involvement in the sector and argues
that the relationships of public banks with private banks in the sector were the main con-
trol mechanism the government had to influence the sector and monetary arrangements at
large.
2.2. Historical environment of China in 20th century 11
2.2 Historical environment of China in 20th century
China in the early 20th century: historical background
The period from 1900 to 1937 straddles several sub-periods of a tumultuous era in modern
Chinese history. In the wake of a heavy defeat by the Japanese navy in 1895, the Chinese
Qing empire started on a path towards constitutional reform. Efforts were directly modeled
on Japan’s thorough Meiji reforms. Constitutional reforms covered broad aspects of gov-
ernment affairs including education, with the adoption of a western-style schooling system
and the end of the traditional imperial examination scheme, and the legal system with a
new code and judicial system. Importantly, the so-called "New Policies" recognized the
central role of the private sector for a market economy and paved the way for the introduc-
tion of property rights that contradicted the traditional philosophy about property, which
could be summarized as: Kings have long arms. All the lands and people belong to the emperor.
However, these reform efforts were short-lived and collapsed with the end of the empire in
19112.
From the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 onwards, China was caught in a situation of
internal strife during the era of the Beijing or Northern regime (1911-1928). During this
time span, the country was divided among former military cliques of Qing Army and var-
ious regional factions. The era was characterized by constant clashes and multiple military
conflicts between varying alliances of these groups3.
Although the Beijing government was nominally considered to be the central govern-
ment, actual political power was widely dispersed among local regimes and warlords. Con-
sequently, its influence over local affairs was severely limited, including in law enforcement
and commercial regulations.
In September 1926, the armies of the Chinese Nationalists, the Kuomintang (KMT),
marched into the central Yangzi region, opening their "Northern Expedition" that saw them
prevail militarily over most opposing forces. By the end of 1928 the KMT had successfully
2 For a comprehensive interpretation of the late Qing dynasty, see Fairbank (1978) and Fairbank and Liu
(1980).
3Bonavia (1995) details the warlords and political cliques during the post-Qing era.
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united China. Although resistance initially remained, in particular it flared up with the Cen-
tral Plains War of 1930, the unification marked the beginning of the Nanjing decade (1928-
1937), which a number of historians4 label as China’s "Golden Decade." The era came to an
end in 1937 when tensions with Japan escalated into the second Sino-Japanese War. China’s
political unification under the Nationalist government provided the modern Chinese econ-
omy with a more stable environment for its development, resulting in rapid modernization
in urban areas during these years.
Internationally, the emergence of a unified China coincided with the advent of the Great
Depression. Although its international exposure was limited, China was not fully immune
to the ramifications. One important difference was that China’s monetary system was based
on silver in contrast to the generally prevailing gold standard. Consequently, China’s initial
experience differed, in particular it did not experience a massive price drop in the first years
(Shiroyama 2008, p.2-p.3).
In 1934, however, the US government approved a silver purchase agreement, known as
the Silver Purchase Act, which led to an increase in silver production in the United States
and a rise in global silver prices. It had a significant impact on China both socially and
economically, as China’s currency system was on the silver basis. For instance, credit con-
tractions eliminated firms borrowing from banks, which increased labor unrest and Com-
munist Party penetration among their workers (Braggion, Manconi, and Zhu 2018). Chinese
exports suffered and the simultaneous deflation affected domestic industries as well. In or-
der to shield the economy from the negative effects of silver price fluctuations, the KMT
government implemented a new currency policy, the "Fabi" reform, on November 4, 1935.
It abandoned the silver backing of the yuan and declared notes issued by four publicly
owned banks to be the only legal tender. As former governments had left the management
of silver to private smelting shops and further monetary arrangement to private markets,
this marks the first time in Chinese history that the central government asserted direct con-
trol over the national money supply. These reforms also marked the end of the free banking
era and the start of a more active monetary policy. The consequences of this new currency
policy became readily apparent in the general rise in prices. An index of wholesale prices
in Shanghai rapidly increased from 90.5 during the deflationary period of 1935 to 118.8 by
December 1936 (Commission 1936, p. 4.).
4For example, Bergère (1989) and Xu (2000).
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The Great Depression led to many governments around the globe pursuing more inter-
ventionist economic policies. China experienced a similar shift not only in monetary policy
but also economic issues, though this was driven more strongly by its political unification
than by a reaction to the global crisis. The concentration of power and nationwide control
by the KMT shifted the previously hands-off approach by the central government, which
was admittedly in place due to powerlessness rather than strong "laissez-faire" convictions,
to more directed and committed interventions in the market.
One example was the industrial promotion and rural rehabilitation program, which led
to initiatives like the Raw Silk Improvement Committee (RSIC), created in Jiangsu province
under the aegis of the government’s National Economic Council in 1934. Together with local
organizations like the Silk-Reeling Industry Improvement Committee it targeted quality
improvements5 of silk products, one of China’s leading export goods at the time, and a
reorganization of the marketing of relevant products, including cocoons. To address one
structural problem, namely the issue of tight credit, the government involved a number of
bankers in the committees, most notably Zhang Jiaao, the principal director of the Bank of
China (Okumura 1979). Programs like the RSIC indicate that the government involved the
banks, public and private, in its interventions and the strategic appointment of bankers into
multiple positions was one central aspect of that strategy.
Chinese financial environment in the early 20th century
The Chinese modern financial sector emerged during the first quarter of the 20th century.
It comprised banking institutions, financial organizations, and other associations, public
and private, handling monetary and financial transactions under the laws and regulations
of Chinese authorities while operating along the lines and methods of modern Western
businesses Tamagna (1942, p.5.).
This gave rise to the "Three Kingdoms" structure of China’s financial market (Cheng
2003, p.10), comprised of traditional, native financial institutions, foreign international banks
and the new domestic modern banking sector. Each of the three came to enjoy considerable
autonomy in its specific field of operations and no close, sustained coordination developed
between them.
5As a result of a series of stringent regulations, inferior quality domestic breeds were soon completely re-
placed by Japanese silkworms. Consequently, the percentage of silkworms affected by disease dropped from
6.24% in 1930 to 0.37% in 1935
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The native money market was formed by institutions dating back to the 17th century,
focusing on monetary and financial transactions of traditional Chinese businesses and con-
sumers (Nishimura 2005). They originated as the product of local needs, remained inde-
pendent of support and supervision from authorities and established local self-regulated
guilds which contributed towards maintaining the decentralized state of activities and tra-
ditional methods of management and business (Tamagna 1942, p.5). There is no evidence
they financed foreign trade directly or engaged in exchange business (Tamagna 1942; Cheng
2003).
The foreign banking sector arrived in China during the second half of the 19th century.
Foreign banks located in a few treaty ports with Shanghai developing as the most important
financial hub. Based on concessions by the imperial government to major powers these
institutions were legally exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of Chinese authorities
and operated under the control of foreign powers. Their main business activities were to
provide financing for international trade and the presence of international companies in
China. In Shanghai, foreign-exchange banks also managed the import and export of silver
and international currency transactions. Given these legal and economic conditions, these
banks remained institutionally distinct from the rest of China’s financial system. The sector
expanded substantially after 1891 when China was increasingly pressured to integrate into
the world economy. Additionally, no Chinese financial institutions ever developed into
relevant competitors for this type of business 6.
During the final years of the empire and the begin of the republican era the new domes-
tic banks initially had difficulties breaking into business fields that were traditionally dom-
inated by the other two sectors. Consequently, while traditional, native banks financed do-
mestic trade and foreign banks continued to dominate international transactions the growth
of these new banks was driven by financing governments, including new loan issues and
direct advances to the government Tamagna (1942, p. 45.). Nevertheless, modern Chinese
banks only played a minor role when the KMT took over the central government in 1927.
The fundamental changes to the economy and progressive introduction of new eco-
nomic structures after the KMT’s rise to power created a much more favorably environ-
ment for the modern banking sector. In particular the new modernization policies, which
6An extended description of the sector, and its separation from ther others, is given by Tamagna (1942).
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were linked to the nation’s political unification, opened new business opportunities. Ad-
ditionally, external shocks led to a substantial change in the public perception. In the mid
1920s, several prestigious foreign institutions like the Banque Industrielle de Chine and the
Russo-Asiatic Bank failed, destroying the myth of foreign banks’ force majeure with their
demise. As a consequence, social elites like former imperial officials and influential mer-
chants became concerned about the safety of their assets and started to transfer their wealth
to Chinese banks. According to reports of the "Southern Three" and "North Four", two im-
portant Chinese bank syndicates, the total deposits of these 7 banks expanded from 140
million yuan in 1924 to 240 million yuan in 1926 (Zhaojin 2016, P. 166).
2.3 The modern Chinese banking industry during the Nanjing Decade
Formally, the first Chinese modern domestic bank was established in 1897, more than half
a century after a British bank had set up its first branch in China. The number of banks
slowly increased until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and then accelerated during the
period of the warlords. From 1912 to 1927, despite the political turbulence of this time, a
total of 266 new banks opened for business, around eighteen each year. However, almost
half as many went out of business during the same period shown in table 2.1. Although the
historical statistics used by The National Yearbook of Banks 1937 have sufficient information
to illustrate trends, the exact numbers are somewhat uncertain as details for some banks are
rather sparse.
The Nanjing decade (1927-37), China’s "golden decade" of modernization, saw another
period of strong growth in the number of banks established, though in contrast to the war-
lord era the number of bankruptcies remained considerably lower — a total of 124 new
modern-style Chinese banks was established and 23 liquidated from 1928 to 1937 according
to Young (1971, p. 264). Overall, table 4.1 presents the numerical development of Chinese
modern banks from 1896 to 1937.
However, not only the number of modern Chinese banks increased. Their total paid-up
capital rose from C$167 7 million in 1927 to C$403 million in 1936. From 1927 to 1936, these
banks more than doubled their capital and reserve funds, tripled their loans and total assets,
7C$= Chinese yuan
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TABLE 2.1: Chinese modern bank statistics from 1896 to 1937
year founded bankrupt net change year founded bankrupt net change
1894 1 1 1921 27 18 9
1902 1 1 1922 27 19 8
1905 1 1 1923 25 20 5
1906 2 2 1924 7 5 2
1907 3 3 1925 9 7 2
1908 4 3 1 1926 7 7
1909 1 1 1927 2 1 1
1910 1 1 1928 16 5 11
1911 3 2 1 1929 11 3 8
1912 14 10 4 1930 18 6 12
1913 2 1 1 1931 16 6 10
1914 3 1 2 1932 13 4 9
1915 7 5 2 1933 15 3 12
1916 4 3 1 1934 22 4 18
1917 10 9 1 1935 18 15 3
1918 10 6 4 1936 5 7 -2
1919 16 9 7 1937 3 4 -1
1920 16 14 2 unknown 50 24 26
Total 390 226 164
Source: The department of economic research of China: Quanguo yinhang nianjian (The national yearbook
of banks[1937]), A7-A8, A24-A25.
and quadrupled their deposits as reported by the Bank of China the The National Yearbook of
Banks 1937 and Cheng (2003).
The growth of modern Chinese banks during this decade was unmatched by either tra-
ditional institutions or foreign banks and consequently the sector became the dominant
player in China’s "Three Kingdom " financial structure. As table 2.2 illustrates, by 1936 the
total assets of modern Chinese banks had far surpassed those of native banks and foreign
institutions combined.
TABLE 2.2: Capital power in the Chinese financial market (1936)
Name/Items
Chinese Banks Foreign Banks Native Institutions
Amount % Amount % Amount % Total
Note 1,946.7 87 284.7 13 0.0 0 2,231
Deposits 4,551.3 79 511.2 9 673.6 12 5,736
Capital 402.7 67 113.7 19 84.2 14 600.6
Total 6,900.7 81 909.6 11 757.8 9 8,568
Unit: C$ 1,000,000.
Source: Cheng (2003, P.78)
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Although the emerging modern Chinese banks differed from institutions in the other
two sectors in its focus of operations, they followed their western counterparts by differen-
tiating further along other dimensions. Following a contemporary classification from the
Bank Year Book 1936 the sector was comprised of the following subgroups of banks:
• Central banking group. These were large public banks under the direction and control
of the central government8. They only took on direct central banking functions as
commonly understood with the 1935 "Fabi reforms". Four banks formed this group,
namely the Central Banks of China, the Bank of China, the Bank of Communications
and the Farmer Bank of China.
• Commercial and saving banks. The daily operations of these banks covered commer-
cial and general banking, including savings and investment business. These banks
tended to have a wider branch network while having their headquarters in one of the
major metropolitan areas. Banks in this category comprised the biggest proportion of
modern Chinese banks.
• Province and city banks. These were established by local authorities as a consequence
of political decentralization after the fall of Qing empire in 1911. Their autonomy
from the central government varied with the degree of political control of the KMT
over local governments. Main functions included, but were not limited to, handling
and coordinating monetary transactions at a local level such as tax collection and the
issuing of legal tender notes.
• Farmer and industry bank. Financial institutions categorized into this group were
banks whose business focused on agricultural and industrial loans. The origins of
many banks in this group had a government background, in same cases these had
been established by local authorities with the express purpose of supporting the local
economy.
• Specialized banks. Although the business spectrum of these banks overlapped with
that of commercial and saving banks, they had a special focus on specific fields like
silk, mining, or salt.
8These institutions were not consistently fully owned by the government before the 1935 currency reform,
but it had always maintained a substantial stake in them.
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• Oversea Chinese banks. This refers to banks, whose owners were ethnically Chi-
nese, yet bank headquarters were located outside of mainland China, most notably
the British colony of Hong Kong. Given their position they also functioned as inter-
mediaries between foreign and domestic Chinese banks.
Modern Chinese banks not only differed in their business model but also geographic
locations. Although some of them had extensive networks of branches, they did show a
strong geographic concentration in their center of operations(Tamagna 1942, p121). This
becomes visible in the summary statistics about headquarters and corresponding capital-
ization shown in table 2.3. Shanghai was by far the most prominent financial center; Tian-
jin, a major port in proximity to Beijing, was the regional center in northern China and
Chongqing a counterpart in the south-west. Hong Kong was the leading financial market
in southern China, although it was not territorially part of China. Banks located in other
metropolitan areas fall in the "Others" category.




Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Hongkong others
Central and chartered banks 3 0 0 0 1
Commercial & Savings Bank 62 5 5 6 33
Province & City Bank 2 1 2 0 22
Farmers & Industry Bank 8 1 0 0 25
Specialized banks 5 3 3 0 4
Oversea-Chinese Bank 0 0 0 4 4
Total numbers: 80 10 10 10 89
Total assets (in million C$): 4,264.1 Mil 438.6 Mil 78.3 Mil 228 Mil 1,058 Mil
Avg. assets (in C$): 76,149,984 54,830,870 11,185,961 75,996,639 13,924,984
All figures are based on authors’ calculation and summary.
Shanghai clearly dominated with 80 banks having their operations headquartered there,
a number substantially greater than those of the regional centers in Tianjin, Chongqing
and Hong Kong. The aggregate assets controlled by Shanghai banks were over 4 billion
Chinese yuan, an amount almost tenfold greater than that held by banks in Tianjin, the
most significant financial hub in Northern China. The average bank size in Shanghai was
also the highest with average assets of C$ 76,149,984.
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The table also demonstrates that the type of bank influenced the level of geographic
concentration. Three of four central banking group banks were located in Shanghai, which
despite not being the official capital was the dominant economic, commercial and popula-
tion center. This is also reflected in the locations of Commercial bank headquarters, more
than half of which were located in the city. Banks with a more focused agricultural or spe-
cialist focus were also more likely to be located there, but with shares of a third (Specialized
banks) to a quarter (Farmers & Industry banks) the concentration was substantially less
strong. However, none of the other major centers had anywhere as strong a concentration
in any of these categories. This difference of strength in concentration points towards the
importance of agglomeration forces in the banking sector. Banks with a predominantly
financial focus were strongly clustered while banks with a specialized industry or agricul-
ture emphasis followed their customers more strongly in terms of geographical location.
Similarly, the Province & City banks clearly showed their origins in and links to regional
locations as they were spread all over different metropolitan areas, while Oversea-Chinese
banks were primarily clustered in Hong Kong, the major foreign colony in China.
2.4 Links and Networks
Geographic concentration might be a good indicator for the presence of agglomeration
forces, but it does not necessarily say that much about the level of competition or coop-
eration between individual institutions within the sector.
If cooperation between firms within a particular industry is driven by institutions out-
side of the sector, it is usually banks and financial institutions who act as such third party
coordinators. An important mechanism is the access to and allocation of capital (Holmes
and Ploeckl 2014; Wilson, Buchnea, and Tilba 2017; Rinaldi and Vasta 2005). In the case of fi-
nancial sectors, however, there usually is no such external coordinator, consequently I focus
on the internal relationship structure of the modern Chinese banking sector to understand
how it successfully developed and operated in an uncertain environment.
The idea of strong cooperation within the sector was certainly present in the minds of di-
rectors and managers at the time. Leaders of the major institutions seemingly believed that
only by cooperating would their banks survive the fierce competition and expand further
as detailed in He and Xuan (2015). One practical manifestation of this cooperation mindset
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was the creation of the Shanghai Bankers’ Association (SBA). This industry organization
was established in 1918 in Shanghai with the intent to promote not only the welfare of its
members but also to coordinate their strategic plans. By 1931, the number of member banks
had increased to 29 from the original seven (Cheng 2003).
Practically, cooperation between banks, today as in republican China, can take a number
of different forms. One strong link is ownership and control; one bank might directly own
another or be at least a large enough shareholder to be able to exercise control over it9. Less
strong forms of cooperation are commercial ties and joint projects; banks might cooperate
with other institutions in financing a common investment project, in issuing stocks and
bonds, or in accepting each other’s issued notes. These have in many, though not all, cases
more of an ad-hoc character and not the systematic permanence of ownership and control.
Besides commercial ties banks can also have more social and informal ties, which include
activities on bank-level, for example membership in industry associations such the Shang-
hai Bankers’ Association (Tamagna 1942, p.175), as well as on individual level between
directors or senior managers. The latter includes common background, such as based on a
particular location or educational institution, or common social activities like memberships
in clubs and organizations like the Freemasons. Cliques based on location were clearly an
important characteristic of Chinese financial institutions (Sheehan 2005). Such informal ties,
however, can lead to another, more visible form of linkage that combines firm-level and in-
dividual level ties, namely an interlocking directorate. This means that the same person has
formal roles in two (or more) financial institutions. Roles can vary depending on manage-
ment and governance structures, but it obviously does require the consent of both banks.
Such an arrangement is usually referred to interlocking directorates.
There are a number of possibilities to quantitatively measure the cooperation between
banks within a sector, each with a different focus and reflecting different aspects of cooper-
ation and competition. I chose the network of interlocking directorates as it balances direct,
formal links like outright ownership and informal or commercial cooperation ties. This re-
flects that cooperation arose out of different motives, including direct control, profitability,
9A typical example was the KMT gaining control of private banks through bailouts and resulting national-
izations. For more detail see section 2.6.
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and social ties, all of which are linked to interlocking directorates 10. In addition, interlock-
ing directorates present practical advantages for an analysis due to the relative simplicity of
the measure, its public nature and consequently the comparatively good data availability
over the whole sector.
Interlocking directorates
An interlocking directorate exists between two banks if one employee has recognizable ex-
ecutive roles in both institutions. Although it is possible to restrict it purely to company
directors I utilize a more extensive definition and include besides directors also employ-
ees11 that work in senior management and similar operational roles. There is a substantial
literature in Finance and Financial History that defines and investigates interlocking direc-
torates and the connectedness of banks, for example Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), Fich and
Shivdasani (2006), Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) and El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik
(2015).
As the names of directors and senior management usually became public knowledge
an interlocking directorate had to be based on tacit or explicit permission of both institu-
tions involved. More importantly, it often was based on instigation of at least one of the
banks. One common scenario is that if one banks either outright owns or at least holds a
substantial equity stake then it installs some of its own employees in important roles at the
other bank. This can be done for monitoring and control purposes as well as for operational
and performance motives12. Such an interlock is a link between two firms. This can be
translated into a network structure with the banks representing nodes and the connecting
interlock representing edges. Based on this concept, I am able to construct an undirected
bank network formed by shared directors13. In terms of Social Network Analysis I take
the banks as actors who decide about forming links between them. This implies that edges
are the resulting outcomes of decisions by actors, the nodes, and do not constitute actors
themselves.
10The literature concerning the relevance of interlocking directorates for the analysis of cooperation and cor-
porate governance see for example Anjos and Fracassi (2015), Parker and Cross (2004), Renneboog and Zhao
(2014), and Larcker, So, and Wang (2013).
11For simplicity reasons, in the following I will include these also under directors.
12 This understanding aligns to (Lan 2015, p.171- 183).
13An undirected network assumes that edges between two nodes do not have a direction, so there is no
distinguishing of origin and destination for any link. This also implies symmetry, so bank A is linked to bank
B and vice versa. For formal network construction and description processes, see Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou
(2016)
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The interlocking directorate network illuminates inter-banking relationships which are
reflecting a number of underlying economic intuitions and motivations of corporate be-
havior. An analysis approach with social network analysis tools is adopted by a growing
literature investigating social connection patterns between companies and related implica-
tions both from theoretical and empirical aspects (Jackson 2014; Dass et al. 2014; Parker and
Cross 2004; Fracassi and Tate 2012). Particularly, existing literature highlights some fea-
tures that are important aspects in my setting: bankers on the boards of other corporations
can provide know-how and better access to financial support (Gao et al. 2012); interlock-
ing directors act as monitors and adviser, since those directors are experienced and pos-
sess professional expertise (Fich and Shivdasani 2006; Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan 2013).
Overall, Mizruchi (1996) provides an in-depth examination of interlocks over organizations
and systematically summarizes both explicit and inadvertent incentives for the formation
of inter-firm linkages as collusion, cooptation and monitoring, legitimacy, career advance-
ment for individual directors, and social cohesion. As the various implications of interlocks
may carry as to the corporate governance and management, Brayshay, Cleary, and Sel-
wood (2007) suggests that examination of boardroom networks provides an initial basis for
studies of how inter-organization connections may have influenced firm activity.
Interlocking Directorates of modern Chinese banks
As indicated above, this study focuses on modern Chinese banks in the period 1933-1936,
the end of the Nanjing era before the Sino-Japanese war. This excludes traditional financial
institutions as well as foreign banks. While a number of Chinese banks did interact with
foreign financial institutions, the two banking sectors did remain clearly separated. This is
similar to the clear distinction of these institutions from the traditional financial institutions.
Besides, as I showed earlier in table 2.2 modern-style Chinese banks had risen to dominance
by the 1930s with collective bank capital surpassing that of foreign and traditional institu-
tions combined. Consequently, I only look at domestic Chinese financial institutions that
were patterned on western banking institutions.
The main data source is The National Yearbook of Banks, which was published by the
department of economic research of the Bank of China. The annual issues for the years
from 1934 to 1937 contain summaries about the whole sector as well as accounting and op-
erational data about individual banks including names and positions of their directors and
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managers. I construct the dataset of boardroom composition by extracting information from
the summary descriptions of the sector as well as the included annual reports of individual
banks.
This data, which includes names, positions, and branch locations, is used to identify
interlocking directorates by matching names of listed directors of all included banks. Due
to the structure of traditional Chinese names duplicate names are not a significant concern.
Nevertheless I address this by complementing the basic information about individual direc-
tors with information on middle name, birthplace, and age from various biographies and
other sources14.
For a very small number of institutions the recorded data is substantially incomplete
or inconsistent. I exclude these as they are very small, local institutions and account for
only a minuscule proportion of the full dataset. Consequently, my final sample consists of
an unbalanced panel of 628 bank-year observations for the four-year period from 1933 to
193615. While the coverage is complete for interlocking directorates, some of the operational
and other bank characteristics are missing for a small number of observations.
Table 2.4 presents annual counts of directors and banks involved in interlocking direc-
torates. Despite the unbalanced nature of the panel being responsible for a substantial share
of the fluctuations, a consistent picture emerges that a comparatively small number of di-
rectors were linking together a major share of the whole domestic Chinese banking sector.
TABLE 2.4: Summary statistics of connected directors and banks
Year
# Director # Banks
avg. # busy dirs/bankconnected unconnected connected unconnected
1933 148 1267 101 41 1.04
1934 199 1429 114 45 1.25
1935 243 1459 108 54 1.5
1936 169 1530 104 58 1.04
This table presents a summary statistic of the connected director and banks of the data. Directors
are considered as connected if they affiliate with more than one bank. Column 2 - 3, and 4 - 5
report the number of banks with connected and unconnected director, separately. Avg. # busy
dirs/bank refers to the the number of connected directors each bank on average. See text for the
detailed data source.
Furthermore, the average number of directors per bank involved in interlocking direc-
torates is close to two, implying that many banks were linked in different directions rather
14The major data source I use in the article is based on (Jiang 2014).
15Specifically, the dataset includes board information of 142,159,164, and 163 banks from 1933 to 1936 respec-
tively.
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than just by a single link16. This is confirmed by figure 2.1, which shows the number of
links per bank in 1933. Although there is a substantial number of banks that are completely
unconnected and some with a single link only, the majority of banks formed part of two or
more interlocking directorates. Figure 2.1 also shows the corresponding cumulative capi-
talization/asset distribution for 1933. Banks without connections of the total assets in the


























FIGURE 2.1: Bank network connections and assets cumulative distributions
in 1933
Notes: The figure shows a summary statistics of the network connections as well as the bank assets cumulative
distributions in 1933. The upper part of the figure offers the bar plot for the distribution of board connections
in 1933 as example. The lower part of the figure shows bank assets cumulative distributions in the sample for
the same year. Details refer to the text content.
As table 2.4 indicates the network of interlocking directorate was changing substan-
tially over the four years. Although a certain amount is due to the unbalanced nature of the
panel a good number of banks, according to table 2.5 about a quarter to a third, changed
their board composition during the course of a year. As interlocking directorates are de-
fined by board members, changes in board membership obviously has implications for the
16This also indicates that interlocking directorates are not just representing ownership and control.
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persistence and stability of the interlocking directorate network. Consequently, the network
was clearly not a static, inert structure but was continually adjusted and modified by the
involved banks.
TABLE 2.5: Summary statistics of bank board composition change rate
Bank Type 1933 1934 1935 1936
All base year 0.273 0.293 0.325
Central banking group base year 0.410 0.155 0.221
Local official banking group base year 0.256 0.432 0.438
Ordinary banking group base year 0.272 0.264 0.301
This table provides the change rate of board directors over years with 1933 as the base year. Details refer to
the main text.
2.5 Connections and cooperation
Clusters
The previous section introduced the interlocking directorate network as a representation
of the nature and structure of cooperation within the domestic Chinese banking sector.The
shape of the network reveals and illuminates a number of internal characteristics of the
banking industry. The main aspect I look at here is the question of competition and cooper-
ation. How did the sector structure respond to an environment that despite some progress
in the Nanjing decade still was characterized by uncertainty and weak property rights?
Figure 2.2 gives a graphic visualization of the network in each of the four years with the
banks categorized into three types, namely the central banking group, provincial and city
banks, and regular banks17.
The four panels, as well as the close-up on a subgraph in figure 2.3 reveal the following
about the sector:
• First, the sector was split into one dominant, large principal component with a dense
network between the banks in that component and a set of essentially unconnected
banks.
• Second, the central banking group banks were all at the core of this principal compo-
nent as were a number of regular private banks.
17This groups Commercial & Savings banks, Farmers & Industry banks, Specialized banks, and Oversea-
Chinese banks in one category.
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1933 1934
1935 1936
central banking group local official banking group ordinary banking group
FIGURE 2.2: Bank boardroom network from 1933 to 1936
• Third, many, but clearly not all, of the local and provincial banks were unconnected
outside the central component
These network characteristics lead to some conclusions about the nature of cooperation
in the sector. It was clearly dominated by a central cluster indicating a high level of co-
operation. If the industry were more competitively oriented I would expect a number of
distinct components, groups of banks, in competition with each other without substantial
inter-group links. The absence of smaller clusters and the presence of a substantial number
of unconnected banks is consistent with market segmentation where the central component
integrates the major economic centers while regional institutions captured a specific local
market without strong or even any local competition18.
These two conclusions, cooperation rather than competition and a possible market seg-
mentation at the periphery of the industry, are also consistent with the shown positions of
public institutions. As figure 2.3 shows, the major central banking group banks were not
forming a separate group but were linked widely with private banks. The isolation of local
18This point is currently more of a conjecture, as the data only displays bank headquarter locations. The
existence of branch networks implies that local banking markets could be competitive through the presence of
a number of bank branches.
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and provincial banks, especially the substantial number of unconnected such banks, in lo-
cations outside of major financial centers, is consistent with the hypothesis that these banks
were a public reaction to the absence of substantial private banking services and therefore
a spatial segmentation of financial markets.
The principal component
The "bird view" impression of the sector shows one dominant network component and a
number of isolated banks. This identified principal component of the network represents
a large share and core of the sector, as visible 2.6, so its internal structures illuminate the
nature of cooperation in the sector even further. Consequently,the following looks at the
positions of individual institutions within that central component.
TABLE 2.6: Summary statistics of bank network characteristics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics bank network
1933 1934 1935 1936
#Banks 142 159 164 163
#Links 329 458 424 416
#Isolated Banks 41 45 54 58
Network density 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.032
Panel B: Summary statistics of central component
#Banks 88 89 102 94
Avg. path length 3.026 2.512 3.396 2.903
Diameter 9 8 12 9
Clustering coeff. 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
Panel A demonstrates annual summary statistics of aggregate bank Network from 1933 to 1936. A component
in network is a subset of the network that all its vertexes are inter-connected. Isolated banks are those nodes,
which have no connections to other vertexes in the network. Density is the proportion of observed ties (also
called edges, arcs, or relations) in a network to the maximum number of possible ties. Thus, density is a ratio
that can range from 0 to 1. The closer to 1 the density is, the more interconnected is the network. Panel B
contains statistics summary for the primary component of our bank network. Average path length indicates
the average shortest number of steps among two arbitrary banks (nodes). Diameter is an indicator shows
the longest number of steps between any two nodes in the network, and clustering coefficient describes an
enumeration of the proportion of vertex triples that form triangles, i.e., all three nodes pairs are connected by
edges.
Social Network Analysis provides measures about the relative and absolute positions of
individual actors within networks (Padgett and Ansell 1993). Here I utilize three of these,
namely Degree, Closeness and Betweenness 19.
19Literature using these measures to conduct the analysis including Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) and Fracassi
(2017) etc..
2.5. Connections and cooperation 29
The simplest measure of centrality is called Degree. It is the number of links a node has




where g(a, b) is an indicator that there is a direct link between node a and b.
This measure illuminates the relative importance of actors, banks, within the network.
This can have practical consequences: for example, in terms of information contagion, an
actor who is linked with a larger number of other actors is likely to receive external mes-
sages differently, potentially more frequently and faster, than actors that are relatively less
connected (Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou 2017; Lamberson 2016).
In a network of interlocking directorates the degree measure shows for each bank with
how many other banks it shares a director, so has an interlocking directorate. A well-
connected bank in this way is expected to have more channels for communications and
the exchange of resources.
Table 2.7 shows summary statistics regarding the Degree for central component banks.
The average fluctuates between 7 and 9 over the four years. This high number shows that
the involved banks formed a dense web of connections with other institutions. Although
there are a number of banks with a single link the median value of seven and a lower
quartile value of 3 do show that the cooperation in the sector is not just one dominating
bank linking to everyone else but a substantial set of connections between banks that are not
at the core of this component. This indicates the benefit of cooperations were more evenly
distributed across the whole sector rather than just accruing to a few dominant institutions.
In addition to direct connections I am also interested in how close each one is to every
other bank in the network. This idea leads to the second concept of Closeness centrality.
Mathematically, it is defined as the inverse of the sum of all the distances between a node a
and all other nodes in the network:
closenessa(n) ≡
(1)
∑a 6=b l(a, b)
(2.2)
where l(a, b) is the number of connections in the shortest path between the two nodes a
and b. For comparison across graphs and with other centrality measures, this measure is
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TABLE 2.7: Network and bank characteristics statistics








































1933 88 7.320 0.319 0.025 5.23e07 1924 223 8.7 13.8
1934 89 9.550 0.383 0.019 5.32e07 1924 244 10.2 13.4
1935 102 8.260 0.288 0.026 5.93e07 1924 224 3.7 13.7
1936 94 8.740 0.338 0.022 8.61e07 1924 296 5.4 14.1
Panel B: Descriptive statistics of main bank characteristics in the principal component
Mean St. Dev. Min P25 Median P75 Max
degree 8.470 6.570 1 3 7 12 36
closeness 0.330 0.074 0.115 0.286 0.340 0.380 0.518
betweenness 0.023 0.035 0.000 0.001 0.010 0.029 0.267
total assets 6.36e07 1.96e08 9.65e04 3.07e06 7.55e06 3.53e07 1.80e09
est.year 1924 8.3 1897 1919 1928 1931 1936
# staff 247.000 495.000 6 36 61 205 3,505
# branch cities 6.770 15.200 1 1 2 6 156
board size 13.700 4.690 2 11 13 15 39












































4 21.50 0.35 0.06 7.68e08 1920 1835.25 14.25 23.75
Commercial and
Savings Bank
60 8.93 0.31 0.03 7.68e08 1926 137.04 2.98 13.04
Farmers and
Industry Bank
13 6 0.25 0.02 7.68e08 1922 165.67 4.78 16
Oversea-Chinese
Bank
3 2.67 0.19 0.03 2.74e07 1920 94 2 14
Province and
City Bank
11 5.36 0.24 0.03 4.99e07 1923 228.33 4.17 10.67
Specialized
banks
11 6.82 0.27 0.02 1.96e07 1924 79.11 2.11 12.56
normalized to lie in the interval [0, 1] through multiplication by a factor (Nv-1), where Nv is
the total number of nodes in the network.
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The Closeness centrality measure attempts to capture the notion that a node is "central"
if it is "close" to many other nodes. In the corporate context, if an actor has comparatively
closer ties to more boards, it facilitates better information diffusion and exchange to this
node(Larcker, So, and Wang 2013). As more central actors can quickly interact with many
other boards across the network these nodes find it easier to profit from the benefits of these
connections.
Banks with higher Closeness values are more likely to engage in more exchange of in-
formation, which allows them to operate more profitable as well as a better understanding
of the outside environment. This easier information access implies an advantage for these
banks also in the way they are able to react to changes in an unstable political and economic
environment 20.
The results in table 2.7 shows for the four years the average normalized closeness values
of 0.288 to 0.383, which imply average path lengths of 2.6 to 3.4 connections. The distribu-
tion of the values also shows that they are fairly close between the observations with the
shortest and the longest average path lengths. This implies that pretty much all involved
banks were linked well throughout the whole principal component without subsets having
been only remotely linked to the rest of the cluster.
Thirdly, I look at the Betweenness centrality measure to understand how central an actor
is for the connections between pairs of other actors (Freeman 1977). It highlights the extent
to which an actor performs as an intermediary by investigating how frequently that actor is
a link in the shortest connection between pairs of actors. A formal definition of betweenness






letting gjk denote the geodesic between nodes k and j, where geodesic is the shortest path
between two nodes. gjk(n) denotes the total numbers of shortest paths between nodes k
and j. Analog of the closeness centrality, the value of betweenness can be restricted to the
interval between 0 and 1 through division by a factor of (Nv − 1)(Nv − 2)/2.
A node with a high value of betweenness is prominent, as that actor is in a position
to observe or control the flow of information in the network. In other words, the measure
20Recent studies confirm the information spillover of boardroom network as well as other social connections
among firms, for example, Helmers, Patnam, and Rau (2017), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) and Gao
et al. (2012).
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illuminates how central an actor is as intermediary between other actors. This relies on the
importance of shortest paths, assuming that such paths with the lowest amount of steps,
and consequently going through the least number of actors, are the relevant connections
between two actors in question21.
In the case of banks a more central, intermediary position can provide easier access to
more information relevant for financial operations. A high difference in this measure also
indicates that one bank is substantially more important than another in structuring the sec-
tor as it facilitates more coordination between different banks with the potential to improve
diversification in geographic or operational focus and to influence others according to its
own preferences.
The derived values for this measure as shown in table 2.7 indicate a substantial spread
between banks in the principal components. This points towards a core set of banks that
did sit at the heart of the cluster without however restricting links between other banks.
These more central banks potentially shaped the internal structure more strongly, however
that was predominantly through their influence rather than through direct control22.
Putting the results from the three measures together a more detailed picture of the prin-
cipal component of the bank network emerges. While there was a core of banks within this
cluster, the web of interlocking directorates around that core was fairly strong without clear
sub groups or dependency on the core banks. Consequently, the internal structure of this
principal component indicates that a major part of the banking sector acted in a unified and
coordinated manner rather than outright competition or a separation into linked but dis-
tinct groups. Although the sector looked coordinated, this coordination did not rest on the
dominant position of a single institution.
Network centrality and bank characteristics
Banks not only differed in their centrality but also in size and related characteristics. Does
this differentiation in terms of size not only hold for involvement in the principal compo-
nent, but also for the importance within the component? In short, were larger banks more
21 For a comprehensive summary of the network centrality measure, see Luke (2015).
22By 1934, the KMT government had direct control over two bank institutions, namely The Central Bank of
China and The Farmer Bank of China. But the severe economic recession in the 1930s provided the KMT an
opportunity to eventually carry out the so called bank coup in 1935 by private banks been forced to issue new
shares to the government, and KMT sending government representative directly on bank boards, hence the core
- peripheral pattern of the board network. Details refer to the discussion chapters on silver crisis and economic
depression as well as the banking coup of march 1935 of Coble (1986).
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connected and more central within the principal component?
Panel A of table 2.8 clearly confirms that. It shows summary statistics for quartiles based
on the number of links. Banks in quartile 4, so those with the highest Degree centrality,
were clearly larger in terms of assets, locations, staff and size of their boards than banks in
lower quartiles. This result is not very surprising as larger banks were usually more likely to
have substantial stakes in or ownership of smaller banks, and interlocking directorates were
a related monitoring and control mechanism. Larger banks also operated larger branch
networks in substantially more locations, which offered more opportunities for cooperation
and led to a higher demand for information from geographically more diverse sources.
Panels B and C of table 2.8 confirm the conclusions about the nature of the principal
component. Larger banks not only had a higher degree but also a higher Betweenness
value, so they were sitting more central within this network component. This is consistent
with the existence of a core group of banks within the network and the domestic Chinese
banking sector at large. Closeness however is not substantially correlated with size, which
indicates that smaller banks also formed connections directly with each other all throughout
the network, therefore reducing the average distances between banks within the periphery
of this network component, and consequently their reliance on core banks.
Next to their size and connections, banks in the central component also differed in their
business specializations, their headquarter locations and private or public ownership. Table
2.9 lists statistics about the headquarter locations23 of the banks in the principal component.
The geographic scope of the principal component shows an even stronger focus on
Shanghai than the network at large, which illustrates the dominance of this coastal metropo-
lis for the financial sector in China and the development of a modern banking industry.
The geographic concentration was also closely linked to the different types of banks in
the sector. While the central banking group banks were operating on a national scale as full
commercial banks, the provincial banks were predominantly focused on their local home
market in providing financial services. Consequently in 1935, all central bank group banks
were in the principal component and three out of four had their headquarter in Shanghai,
while only seven out of 27 province and city banks were in the principal component, and
out of those only two were in Shanghai.
23In addition to the cities used above I also list Wuhan. Although it was not a treaty port I include it to give a
more complete picture of locations, in particular with the Farmer Bank of China, a central banking group bank,
located in Wuhan.
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TABLE 2.8: Differences in means with alternative network centrality mea-
sures
Panel A: Difference in means, based on Degree centrality
Quartile size board size # cities sec.asset.ratio # staff
Quartile 1 15.28 11.92 3.27 0.08 96.75
(least connected)
Quartile 2 15.83 12.28 4.42 0.13 126.10
Quartile 3 16.50 13.31 4.78 0.11 216.10
Quartile 4 17.09∗∗∗ 17.89∗∗∗ 15.25∗∗∗ 0.10∗ 582.10∗∗∗
(most connected)
Panel B: Difference in means, based on Closeness centrality
Quartile size board size # cities sec.asset.ratio # staff
Quartile 1 16.04 13.33 9.94 0.10 238.10
(least connected)
Quartile 2 16.56 14.09 5.40 0.12 300.40
Quartile 3 15.78 13.50 3.72 0.12 192.50
Quartile 4 16.23− 14.11− 8.49− 0.09− 260.70−
(most connected)
Panel C: Difference in means, based on Betweenness centrality
Quartile size board size # cities sec.asset.ratio # staff
Quartile 1 15.53 11.92 3.48 0.09 109.00
(least connected)
Quartile 2 16.17 12.51 5.28 0.11 188.40
Quartile 3 15.92 13.74 6.03 0.11 167.70
Quartile 4 16.86∗∗∗ 16.62∗∗∗ 11.90∗∗ 0.11∗ 499.20∗∗∗
(most connected)
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significant difference in means of Quartile 1 and Quartile 4 at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. − indicates there is no statistically differences between
observations in Quartile 1 and Quartile 4. Sec.asset.ratio refers to the ratio of sum of bank security
to the total assets.
The correlation between spatial concentration and bank type not only held for public
banks but also private institutions. Regular commercial banks were overrepresented in
the principal component and were stronger concentrated in Shanghai. Only six out of 34
Farmer and Industry banks were linked into the principal component network, however
all of these were located in Shanghai. This reflects their dual purpose, while some were lo-
cated close to China’s industrial center at the time, the others were spread regionally close
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Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Hongkong Wuhan
Central and chartered banks 3 0 0 0 1
Commercial & Savings Bank 38 3 4 1 1
Province & City Bank 2 2 1 0 1
Farmers & Industry Bank 6 0 0 0 0
Specialized banks 5 2 3 0 0
Oversea-Chinese Bank 0 0 0 2 0
All numbers are based on authors’ calculation from the boardroom network in 1935.
to agriculture. Specialized banks were somewhat more geographically diverse as they were
linked to different specialized industrial sectors, but they were mostly within the principal
component.Their focus on important industries meant that they were either linked to the
central banking group banks reflecting rising government involvement in industrial devel-
opment or to important commercial and savings banks due to the coordination of private
supply of capital to those industries. Overseas-Chinese banks obviously differed in their
geographic locations as their headquarters were outside the Chinese republic. With two
out of four banks located in Hong Kong, both of which where part of the principal com-
ponent network, the British colony represented the main gateway for the domestic Chinese
banking sector to interact with overseas Chinese financial institutions.
Entrants, Competition and Cooperation
The picture drawn in the previous section indicates that the domestic Chinese banking sec-
tor was characterized by a core structure of cooperation that covering all major financial
centers and to some degree banking specializations. And although the network of inter-
locking directorates did show significant turnover, this structure remained consist over the
years in question.
In such a system competition could arise either through a group of banks splitting off
from the central cluster and creating their own cooperation network or through new en-
trants that remain independent of the core cluster. The characteristics of the core network
structure does not show any indication of such a drive towards a breakup, and even more
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TABLE 2.10: Bank age and corresponding linkages statistics
Panel A: 1933
Quartile # bank mean of bank ages mean of degree
Quartile 1 (oldest) 18 20.94 10.11
Quartile 2 24 3.95 7.57
Quartile 3 21 11.79 3.96
Quartile 4 (newest) 25 0.60∗∗∗ 8.32−
Panel B: 1934
Quartile # bank mean of bank ages mean of degree
Quartile 1 (oldest) 17 22.06 12.65
Quartile 2 16 4.88 9.62
Quartile 3 16 12.56 4.88
Quartile 4 (newest) 19 1.32∗∗∗ 11.26−
age not given 21
Panel C: 1935
Quartile # bank mean of bank ages mean of degree
Quartile 1 (oldest) 16 23 11.06
Quartile 2 19 5.94 8.12
Quartile 3 16 13.32 4.26
Quartile 4 (newest) 22 2.18∗∗∗ 10.82−
age not given 29
Panel D: 1936
Quartile # bank mean of bank ages mean of degree
Quartile 1 (oldest) 14 25 13.64
Quartile 2 18 6.61 11.33
Quartile 3 18 14.72 5.39
Quartile 4 (newest) 17 2.71∗∗∗ 8.35∗
age not given 27
The symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significant difference in means of Quartile 1 and
Quartile 4 at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. − indicates there is no sta-
tistically differences between observations in Quartile 1 and Quartile 4.
strongly the low closeness scores also indicate that a large number links would have to be
severed for such a breakup.
The Nanjing decade saw a substantial number of new banks created. Given the shape
of the network, isolated banks and a central core network, these new entrants could ei-
ther increase competition or be part of the cooperation within the sector. If new entrants
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were predominantly isolated, so without interlocking directorates with existing banks, this
would point towards new entrants fostering competition. However, if they started already
as part of the core cluster, so with interlocking directorates with existing banks, then new
entrants were supporting the existing cooperation structure and the rise in bank numbers
points towards an expansion of the cluster in terms of geographic and operational diversi-
fication of the dominating core banks.
To understand which of the two motives, competition or cooperation, characterized the
expansion, I look at the average degree of banks sorted into quartiles according to their
age. Table 2.10 shows the results for each of the four years, including the average age24
of the banks in each quartile, their network degree and the total number of banks in each
quartile. As is clearly visible for each year, newly created banks actually had a large number
of interlocking directorates as many as any of the other quartiles. The number of shared
directors of young banks (Quartile 4) on average was not statistically different comparing
their oldest counterpart through 1933 to 1934. Although the mean of degree (number of
shared directors) was significant smaller in 1935, the value remained still at a high level —
on average, the degree of youngest banks is more than 8.
The high number of interlocking directorates of young banks clearly demonstrates that
new banks were built on the expertise, knowledge and support from existing banks. As
many directors of the new banks remained active with their existing employers this clearly
points towards the entry of new banks as an expansion move of existing banks rather than
the emergence of new competitors or the breakaway of directors from existing core group
of the sector.
This result of new entry being dominated by expansionary motives is also borne out in
anecdotal evidence. For example, in 1935, the Chekiang Commercial Banking Corporation
(CCBC) had been established by Runquan Jin, a financial veteran, who rose to prominence
in the Bank of China after starting his career in 1909 as a branch manager of the Imperial
Bank of Qing, its predecessor (XU, GU, and JIANG 1997). Jin took on over time a number
of director and supervisor positions with several leading commercial banks in the Yangzi-
delta region. Using his social connections and reputation in the sector, CCBC soon attracted
a number of promising investors. The board committee included Zuoting Yu, the principal
24Banks with missing age are primarily small, rural banks. These did not represent an increased competition
as they only operated in their local home markets without competing substantially against principal component
banks.
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director of Wai Chung Commercial & Saving bank and executive director of dozens of com-
mercial banks in Shanghai. The participation of such "big linkers" granted an advantage of
CCBC in gaining internal information and cooperation with other banks. For example, the
total asset of CCBC increased from 2,091,165 Yuan in 1935 to 2,311,154 Yuan in 1936, a 10%
expansion in its first year of operations 25.
2.6 Government and banking cooperation
The presence of the central banking group and provincial and city banks clearly showed an
involvement of government in the sector. More general, government has a choice between
multiple options of how to systematically intervene in the banking sector, most notably
pure regulation, full nationalization and individual bank ownership and cooperation.
After the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 various national governments either had only
a limited geographical reach, so were national in name only, or not powerful and stable
enough to exert sustained control over the financial industry including the rising domestic
bank sector. This political instability explains why despite a series of attempts by various
interim regimes no central government was able to achieve dominance over the modern
banking sector until the political unification in 1928 under the KMT government. This lack
of power and limited geographical reach also explain why only regulation as well as na-
tionalization were not viable options.
Consequently, I argue that the Nationalist KMT government used the partial ownership
of the central bank group to gain influence and even control over the modern financial sec-
tor. Direct control over individual institutions, however, only allows the government to
influence the whole sector if these public banks have substantial links, formal and/or in-
formal, with private institutions. Influence through interlocking directorates corresponds
to the prevailing view among historians that the Nationalists were considerably more suc-
cessful than earlier regimes in gaining control over and enforcing their will on members of
the social elite (Eastman et al. 1991; Fewsmith 1985). Leading bankers, including those that
held interlocking directorates were important members of the social elite at the time (Lan
2015, p. 172).
25Performance data extracts from Bank Year Book 1936 and 1937, page D185 and D110, respectively.
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This growth in influence of the government over financial institutions is very visible in
the fate of monetary reforms attempts. For instance, in 1916 the Beijing government had
attempted to suspend the convertibility of the currency. This move led to fierce condem-
nation from bankers and local elites and to a declaration of independence by the Bank of
China, ultimately resulting in the government abandoning the policy (Cheng 2003, p.55).
In 1935, by contrast, the national government conducted successfully a currency reform by
introducing a legal note, Fabi, which included the suspension of convertibility per se. This
was met with little protest and even with support and promises of cooperation from the do-
mestic banking sector (Young 1971, p.216). Although the sector was substantially smaller in
1916 than 1935, the lower government involvement meant that it wasn’t strong enough to
overcome the banks’ resistance, while the government’s hold over the central public bank-
ing group and that groups influence in 1935 was important enough to convince and bring
along the rest of the sector.
Government involvement with the central/state bank group
The core26 of the national governments influence were above listed four banks in the central
banking group. These were tasked with a number of public functions, including issue of
legal tender notes, control over the foreign exchange and domestic money market, and
handling of the treasure’s funds, with each taking on specific duties(Tamagna 1942, p.121).
For instance, from 1935 the Central Bank of China acted as the depository and fiscal agency
of the treasury, while the Bank of China was the lead bank to handle international exchange.
Besides these, the banks were also operating as regular commercial and savings banks in
competition with private institutions27.
Public ownership, or at least a substantial equity stake, meant that the government ex-
ercised substantial influence or outright control over the appointment of directors of the
central banking group. For example, it appointed the completed board of the Central Bank
of China (Tamagna 1942, p.122). The Bank of China was jointly controlled the Ministry of
Finance and the general meetings of shareholders. The Ministry of Finance was entitled
to appointed the bank chairman, nine out of 30 directors and three out of 10 supervisors
26Although province and city banks had flourished until 1935, their dependence upon the Ministry of Fi-
nance at national level varied with the degree of political control the national government exercised over local
authorities.
27This is a summary of authors based on Tamagna (1942, p.122-130).
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(Tamagna 1942, p.127). The government’s ability to appoint directors implies that the in-
terlocking directorates between central banking group banks themselves as well as with
private institutions were strategic choices by the government. This power allowed them to
systematically place the central banking group banks at the core of the internal network of
the modern banking sector in China. The KMT thereby successfully increased the reach and
strength of its influence on domestic financial institutions and the wider economy through
capturing the elites’ interests rather than through regulation.
Connections with private financial institutions
This reach is evident in the boardroom connection statistics for 1935 in table 2.11. The
central banking group banks, which were fully linked with each other, had 74 interlocking
directorates with private institutions.
TABLE 2.11: Network linkages statistics between bank groups in 1935
bank type # links Central CS FI OC PC SB
Central 86 0.14 0.48 0.14 0.01 0.15 0.08
CS 539 0.08 0.71 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.09
FI 79 0.15 0.51 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.11
OC 8 0.12 0.38 0.25 0.25 − −
PC 61 0.21 0.41 0.10 − 0.20 0.08
SB 75 0.09 0.64 0.12 − 0.07 0.08
These links reflect a motivation to spread the KMT government’s influence over the in-
dustry to control and coordinate the modern financial sector in an uncertain environment —
directly or indirectly — even when its official decrees and regulations were hard to enforce.
This is consist with the theoretical idea suggested by Mizruchi (1996), who argues that
cooptation and monitoring are explicit reasons for the formation of interlocks and conse-
quently the absorption of potential disruptive elements into the organization’s decision-
making structure. Inter-banking social connections can reflect therefore attempts by orga-
nizations to coopt and neutralize sources of environmental uncertainty.
Boardroom influence was also reflected in the government’s willingness to intervene
for individual institutions. In 1935 a number of private banks ran into financial trouble28,
but while three principal commercial banks, — namely, Manufactures Bank of China, Na-
tional Industrial Bank of China, and Commercial Bank of China — obtained advances of
28According to The National Yearbook of Banks 1936, there were 15 modern banks went bankrupt in 1935,
several others ran into economic distress due to the external shock of the global depression.
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CN$5 million each from the national government29 were a number of other banks left to
their own resulting in their bankruptcies. As table 2.12 shows, the three saved banks had
existing interlocking directorates with central banking group banks in the years preceding
1935 while the failed ones did not.
TABLE 2.12: Banks with central bank connections vs. banks without ones
Bank
IDs total IDs with central
bank clique
1933 1934 1933 1934
Panel A: Nationalized bank in 1935:
Manufactures Bank of China 25 26 6 6
National Industrial Bank of China 11 7 1 2
Commercial Bank of China 17 19 0 2
Panel B: Banks went bankrupt in 1935:
Dan Hoo Commercial & Savings Bank 12 7 0 1
The Bank of Lungyu, Ltd. 0 3 0 0
The Bank of Kiangnan Shanghai. 4 0 0 0
The World Commercial & Savings Bank Ltd 2 2 0 0
Hwa Yih Bank,Ltd. 6 2 1 0
The Amoy Commercial Bank, Ltd. 2 0 0 0
Source : see text.
Particularly, both National Industrial Bank of China and Dan Hoo Commercial & Sav-
ings Bank were prestige institutions in Shanghai before the crisis with similar assets, board
sizes and business model. However, the National Industrial Bank of China had been keep-
ing a close relationship at board level with the central bank group, as shown in panel A of
table 2.12, whereas Dan Hoo Commercial & Savings Bank — with a similar magnitude of
interlocks — had only a marginal connection to the state-owned banks. As proposed by
the cooptation and monitoring model of Mizruchi (1996), interlocks were used as instru-
ments of corporate control in an uncertain environment and utilized as monitor over the
connected firms, influencing the responses of the government.
This indicates that interlocks of the central bank group provided an extra conduit be-
yond conventional methods for the government to get operational information of those
linked banks, thus shaping the government’s decision to intervene and ultimately nation-
alize only banks with pre-existing interlocking directorates. The contrast in government
29The government then converted these advances into equity and nationalized these banks in 1937.
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actions reinforces the impression that interlocks between Chinese banks were an influential
mechanism of inter-banking cooperation and control.
2.7 Conclusion
Most studies focus on the impact of interlocking directorates on individual firms, but look-
ing at the network of such links within a whole sector can illuminate its inner workings.
The modern Chinese banking sector rose to prominence during the inter-war years, facing
a volatile external environment with weak institutions. As their network of interlocking
directorate shows, the banks reacted with a strong level of cooperation resulting in a single
large cluster.
The cooperation within the sector covered all relevant financial centers and connected
banks following similar business models as well as those with a different specialization.
Although larger banks were more at the core of the cluster, connections of more peripheral
banks weren’t just to the core but created a close web throughout the periphery. The large
number of links of new entrants and young banks also demonstrate that the expansion of
the sector in number of banks was driven by existing banks expanding their reach rather
than by the entry of new distinct competitors.The network showed a substantial level of
changes over years, the fundamental characteristics of the whole sector network however
remained quite consistent. Nevertheless, the dynamics of the network-formation offers ex-
citing opportunities for further investigations.
The network offers even further insights by reflecting important aspects of the relation-
ship between the sector and government. The central government controlled a core group
of larger banks, and through the strong set of links of these banks it was able to exert influ-
ence on the whole sector. Direct intervention in an industry through ownership of a few key
firms is one particular strategy for government to engage with that sector. The interlocking
directorate network of Chinese banks demonstrates that in an environment with weak con-
tract and rules enforcement the rising central government used this strategy to increase its






I employ a sample of modern Chinese banks in the 1930s to investigate how board con-
nections in an inter-bank network affect their corporate policy decisions. I construct bank
networks based on interlocking directorates for the period 1933 - 1936, and find evidence
that corporate decisions of banks are influenced by their social peers — the more directors
two banks share with each other, the more similar are their corporate strategies. The anal-
ysis also reveals that peer behavior affects a bank’s own decisions not only at the bilateral
level but network-wide. Banks with a central position in the boardroom network make
corporate decision less distinctively. Further, the empirical outcomes show that co-moved
corporate policies are mainly driven by banks’ intentions to pursue profits and eliminate
risks, known as profitability and insurance effects. Overall, the findings support the view
that banks cooperate intimately with each other at board level and interlocking directorates
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3.1 Introduction
Most research on corporate financial policy assumes that capital structure decisions are
made independently1. That is to say that corporate decision making is typically assumed to
be determined only as a function of its economic environment, incentive structure, marginal
tax rates, etc, but not by direct decisions of other firms. Yet in recent years, a growing liter-
ature lays stress on social interactions influencing firms’ economic behavior and outcome2.
Here I demonstrate that links between banks indeed affect their decision making.
Next to endogeneity and reverse causality, there are three further challenges to identi-
fying the effect of inter-firm connections. First, inter-firm links are hard to capture. Cur-
rent research suffers from a lack of the unified standard to identify the social connections
among firms. Consequently, ambiguous or even contradictory results often stem from var-
ious definitions of inter-firm connections3. Second, despite the presence of multinational
corporations and businesses, most research on inter-firm connections is restricted to domes-
tic markets of specific countries. Ignoring cross-border connections runs the risk of mis-
identification in the empirical analysis. Third, sociologists as early as Granovetter (1977)
have noticed that even weak ties can be of particular importance in passing information
through a network, including labor markets (Topa 2011), criminal behaviors (Patacchini
and Zenou 2008), and migration decisions (Giulietti, Wahba, and Zenou 2018). In contrast,
most research on the behavioral consequences of inter-firm relations uses a single type of
link and has coded connections as binary quantities: either present or absent.
1Current studies on capital structure decision making generally assume that the decisions are made at indi-
vidual firm level without considering the inter-firms’ impact. For example, Myers (2001), Robb and Robinson
(2014), and Hackbarth (2008).
2Examples include studies on the impact of firms from same SIC industry on its corporate financial policies
(Leary and Roberts 2014); how social connections in elite networks affect allocation of resources (Haselmann,
Schoenherr, and Vig 2018); whether directors and managers belonging to Freemasonry have impact on the
performance of companies (Braggion 2011); and how director interlocks, as a channel of resource exchange,
produce spillover effects of reputational penalties in cases of financial reporting fraud (Kang 2008).
3Contemporary studies commonly weave the firms’ web by utilizing informal links such as social, educa-
tional, or professional ties among executives and directors. But different proxies for inter-firm relations appear
to lead to different results. For example, using employment history of CEOs and directors, Faleye, Kovacs, and
Venkateswaran (2014) reports CEO connections facilitate investment in corporate innovations, and Dass et al.
(2014) highlights that directors with more links to related industries have a positively impact on firms’ perfor-
mance. Contrary to the research, Kuang and Lee (2017) suggests that directors’ personal networks have a "dark
side", reducing the likelihood of fraud detection, which is harmful to the economic performance. Fich and Shiv-
dasani (2006) confirms the outcome by showing that firms with busy directors (directors that serve on multiple
boards) have lower market-to-book ratios, weaker profitability, and lower sensitivity of Chief Executive Officer
(CEO) turnover to firm performance.
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This paper highlights the issues by investigating the effects and implications of the inter-
bank network in the 1930s China. Besides enriching our understanding of the historical, in-
stitutional development of the financial sector in China, I believe that the context provides a
limpid environment for analyzing firm-level connections where the confounding effects of
the aforementioned challenges are minimized. The underlying reasons are as follows. First
of all, the Chinese inter-bank linkages based on director sharing have the advantage of easy
and full tractability in a way where the connections serve the need of a universal indicator
for network embeddedness. This is because the board level connections depended highly
on personal relations (as called Guanxi), which arise from exogenous factors, i.e. "common
shared attributes" including kinship, coworkers, classmates, sworn brotherhood, surname,
and teacher-students relations (Sheehan 2005). Interlocking directorates, as tractable for-
mal relations among banks, are bound to be adequate, universal indicators for inter-bank
relations, which, in turn, reflect the complex personal relations among bankers. This idea is
not bizarre and supported by literature, e.g. Granovetter (1985) and Mizruchi (1996), as they
claim that interlocks can be used as proxies of network embeddedness. Second, the Chinese
financial sector was split into traditional financial institutions, modern domestic banks and
international banks during the republican era (Cheng 2003). Each of these enjoyed auton-
omy in its special field of operations, and no close coordination developed between them
(Tamagna 1942, p. 5)4. This separation provides an ideal environment in which to test for
the effects of business relations among banks without missing international and other out-
side links. Lastly, the resources of Chinese banks were heavily concentrated in a few major
metropolises where banks and bankers could maintain close relations (Tamagna 1942, p.
121). This proximity led to clearer social patterns of relationships5, which were well re-
flected in interlocking directorates and therefore easily captured by a single indicator. This
validates the use of homogeneous links as is common in this body of literature.
4The traditional Chinese financial institutions had developed in decentralized units without national coor-
dination. Their business was the result of local needs, such as handling deposits, lending, remittances and the
exchange of money. Foreign banks were institutions and organizations which handled monetary and financial
business under foreign, colonial control. Their activities were directed towards the financing of foreign trade
and foreign investment in China. Chinese modern banks in this paper refer to financial organizations and as-
sociations handling monetary transactions along the lines of modern Western business methods but under the
laws and regulations of the Chinese authorities. Refer to Section 3.2 for a detail description of the background.
5Different types of relationships are mentioned above, but Sheehan (2005) shows that all of them get re-
flected in identical interlocking directorates. A good literature review, discussing network link strength and
homogeneous connections, is Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou (2017).
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In this paper, I provide systematic empirical evidence about the effect of inter-bank con-
nections on banks’ corporate decision making. To track inter-bank ties I use one important
network in finance — the interlocking directorate network between banks formed by shared
board directors6. Using a sector-wide dataset of 209 Chinese public and private institutions,
I am able to establish annual interlocking directorate networks between 1933 and 1936. I use
these to evaluate the impact of social connections on various measures of corporate deci-
sions in three categories: bond-related, cash-related, and reserve-related policies. With a
two-stage econometric model, which helps to measure the influence of social neighboring
banks on a firm’s corporate policy, I determine that bank managers were significantly in-
fluenced by their social peers when making corporate decisions. Since banks do not choose
directors at random, I discuss also alternative interpretations and include a number of ro-
bust tests to address potential endogeneity concerns.
A social network such as the Chinese banks could be an effective tool to diffuse word-of-
mouth information in an environment, where directors and managers faced making corpo-
rate decisions without full information about benefits and costs of possible choices. Direc-
tors might therefore rely on informal information sources, like word-of-mouth knowledge
to make corporate decisions. Under such circumstances, firms’ decision making is de facto
influenced by their social peers via interlocks. Here I test if such channels had indeed such
an impact on banks’ corporate decision making.
The annual inter-bank networks from 1933 to 1936, which are used in the empirical anal-
ysis, are based on the board compositions of 209 Chinese banks involving 3,060 individuals
collected from the Bank Annual (1934-1937), an official record of annual financial statistics.
This is also the main source for the bank accounting data used. I introduce a two-stage
model to identify whether corporate decisions were affected by peer banks. I use seven cor-
porate indicators as outcome policy measures, which are categorized into three groups.The
first contains bond-related policies, since the development of local banking sectors relied
heavily on government financing and speculation in government bonds7. The second and
third include measures for bank risks; I use both cash and reserve related measures, to cap-
ture banks’ corporate behavior from the perspective of liquidity risk.
6A growing literature in finance utilizes interlocking directors as proxy to study the inter-firm relations and
their implications. For example, Kang (2008) and Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013).
7Refer to Section 3.3.2 for details
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In the first stage of the empirical estimation I regress corporate policies of individual
banks on common controls, supported by existing literature, to determine the unexplained
policy part (excess) shown in the residual for each bank. For the second stage I create an
indicator called policy dissimilarity for each possible pair of banks, which captures the sim-
ilarity in excess policy between the two banks. This measure is then linked to the extent to
which the two firms are connected via interlock directorates. The empirical results show
indeed that banks linked by shared directors made more similar policy decisions. Further-
more, the extent to which bank pairs are linked, as measured by the number of common
directors, is positively related to the extent of policy similarity.
Studies of social networks and their implications suffer problems of endogeneity. Shar-
ing directors with other banks could be correlated with unobservable manager or bank
characteristics that have a direct impact on banks’ corporate decision making. This endo-
geneity issue with social networks is a major concern for all empirical work in this body
of literature, and this paper is no exception. However, as the literature hasn’t solved this
problem yet, I address this concern with various robust tests and extensions ruling out al-
ternative interpretations of my findings. To rule out the possibility that empirical results
are driven by the homogeneity of banks (that is a director tends to sit on boards with anal-
ogous characteristics, so that the outcome is only the reflection of the similarity between
bank pairs), I examine the attributes of all possible bank pairs linked by interlocks. The
outcome exhibits a heterogeneous linking pattern: individual banks tend to link with di-
vergent counterparts differing in major characteristics. I also control for regional effects by
selecting the bank pairs only from different regions, which potentially faced different po-
litical and economic environments. Again, the results are persistent indicating it is highly
unlikely that my results are affected by homogeneity of bank pairs.
Another plausible alternative causal explanation of the policy co-movement between
linked banks is corporate control. One bank might be able to control another, so the policy
similarity of the pair may be a reflection of decisions unilaterally imposed by one on the
other. I carry out a series of tests to explore this alternative hypothesis by restricting the
sample to bank pairs that consist of young banks only, where corporate control is unlikely.
Results still show the policy co-movement between these banks, indicating that direct con-
trol was not the main driver.
Up to this point, the analysis has focused on pairs of banks. Yet individual banks were
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not only linked to another bank, they were embedded in a boardroom network of the whole
sector. A plausible consequence is that the bank’s global position in the network also influ-
enced its corporate policy. I test for this by introducing another empirical framework and
the use of network centrality measures to capture the position in the network. I find strong
evidence that banks with more connections have less unique or idiosyncratic cash and re-
serve fund related policies.
The final part of the analysis investigates incentives and motivations for Chinese banks’
choice to be involved in interlocking directorates. I examine the correlation between the
economic performance of a bank, measured by RoE and profit per capita, and the corporate
policies I use in the prior analysis (i.e. bond-related, cash-related, and reserve-related poli-
cies). The outcome shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between the
policy measures and banks’ economic performance, suggesting that modern Chinese banks
coordinated or imitated the bond, cash, and reserve related corporate policies among their
peers in order to affect financial performance, which I call the profitability effect. This aligns
with recent research of spillover effects of the social network among firms. e.g. Haselmann,
Schoenherr, and Vig (2018) and Chiu, Teoh, and Tian (2013). I also test whether being con-
nected results from banks’ intentions to seek assurance and eliminate risk. For this purpose,
I use a similar two stage model to that used in the main regression to indicate the excess fluc-
tuation of profitability, and compare it for banks with more board connections to those with
fewer links. The empirical test highlights that banks with more board connections have less
excess fluctuations of profitability than do banks without links. This result suggests that
the connectedness of a bank had an impact on the fluctuation of its profitability, which, in
turn, indicates that the motivation of a financial institution to establish board connections
was influenced by risk concerns.
This paper advances research in the following areas. First, it contributes to the literature
that explores how inter-firm connections influence corporate behavior and firm decisions.
Bouwman (2011) finds that firms interlocked with each other share similar governance prac-
tices, which is confirmed by studies demonstrating that directors and managers with social
connections are influenced by their peers when making corporate decisions Fracassi (2017),
determining corporate capital structures and financial policies Leary and Roberts (2014),
or designing compensation and acquisition behavior Shue (2013). In contrast I contribute
a focus on a particular sector, modern Chinese banks, which presents a much cleaner and
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clearer case to determine the influence of peer institutions that are also direct competitors
and peers in a strategic sense. In the Republican Era, banks had close links and often shared
directors with each other, ensuring that the shared directors were actively involved in daily
operations. In the empirical analysis I identify policy similarities in a number of strategic
policy choices, which provides evidence that the influence was widely pervasive through-
out banks’ operational decision-making.
My paper further adds to the more specific literature on interlocking directorates. Al-
though existing studies of interlocking directorates and their implications have grown in
volume (e.g. Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber 2012; Bouwman 2011; Kuang and Lee 2017), the
literature has not yet reached a consensus whether these interlocks are a clear channel for
exchanging resources and information among firms8. I provide systematic empirical ev-
idence to firmly support that interlocking directorates are a useful channel to propagate
managerial practices, which change how firms act in an economically and politically risky
environment.
Finally, my research contributes to the financial history of China9. There is limited re-
search on the development of modern Chinese banks in the pre-communist era. Ma (2016),
in a vanguard work, looks to understand the successful development of the modern Chi-
nese financial sector in Republican China (1911 to 1937) from an institutional perspective.
Sheehan (2005) also adds to the body of literature by highlighting the network of formal and
personal relations in the modern domestic banking sector but does not look quantitatively
at their impact. Therefore, Sheehan (2005) calls on successive studies to answer to what ex-
tent operations and capital holdings followed the structures of interlocking directorships.
I contribute to an answer by establishing comprehensive inter-banking networks based on
shared directors from 1933 to 1936 - the most critical period in the Nanjing-Decade - and
use methods derived from social network analysis (SNA) to show the bank coordination
and diffusion of corporate decisions through interlocking directorates.
I divide the paper into six parts followed by a conclusion. Section 3.2 provides a brief
8For instance, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) argues that shared directorates between two boards act as chan-
nels of information or resource exchange and that better-connected firms end up achieving better economic
results. Similar studies look at corporate governance spillover (Bouwman 2011), facilitating investments in cor-
porate innovation (Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran 2014),and information diffusion (Shropshire 2010). On
the other hand, however, the existing literature also highlights several reasons why having a well-connected
board may adversely affect firm performance (e.g. Kuang and Lee 2017; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian 2013; Fich and
Shivdasani 2006).
9Section 3.2 provides background about republican China and banking in the pre-communist era.
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survey of the historical background and economic record for this era. Section 3.3 and 3.4 de-
scribe the data and discuss identification issues as well as econometric methods. Section 3.5
offers robustness tests, while Section 3.6 explores the overall network effects of interlocking
directorates on corporate policies. In Section 3.7, I investigate economic motives of policy
coordination among banks through inter-firm connections.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 China in the early 20th century
In the wake of a heavy defeat by the Japanese navy in 1895, the Chinese Qing empire started
on a path towards constitutional reform. Efforts were directly modeled on Japan’s thorough
Meiji reforms. Constitutional reforms covered broad aspects of government affairs includ-
ing education, with the adoption of a western-style schooling system and the end of the
traditional imperial examination scheme, and the legal system with a new code and judicial
system. Importantly, the so-called "New Policies" recognized the central role of the private
sector for a market economy and paved the way for the introduction of property rights
that contradicted the traditional philosophy about property, which could be summarized
as: Kings have long arms. All the lands and people belong to the emperor. However, these reform
efforts were short-lived and fizzled out with the end of the empire in 191110.
From the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911 onwards, China was caught in a situation of
internal strife during the the era of the Beijing or Northern Regime (1911-1928). During this
time span, the country was divided among former military cliques of Qing Army and var-
ious regional factions. The era was characterized by constant clashes and multiple military
conflicts between varying alliances of these groups11.
Although the Beijing government was nominally considered to be the central govern-
ment, actual political power was widely dispersed among local regimes and warlords. Con-
sequently, its influence over local affairs was severely limited, including in law enforcement
and commercial regulations. Meanwhile, treaty ports like Shanghai International Settle-
ment, became de facto foreign enclaves, being legally exempt from the jurisdiction and
regulations of the Chinese authorities Ma (2016).
10 For a comprehensive interpretation of the late Qing dynasty, see Fairbank (1978) and Fairbank and Liu
(1980).
11Bonavia (1995) details the warlords and political cliques during the post-Qing era.
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In September 1926, the armies of the Chinese Nationalists, the Kuomintang (KMT),
marched into the central Yangzi region, opening their "Northern Expedition" that saw them
prevail militarily over most opposing forces. By the end of 1928 the KMT had successfully
united China. Although resistance initially remained, in particular it flared up with the
Central Plains War of 1930, the unification marked the beginning of the Nanjing decade
(1928-1937), which a number of historians12 label as China’s "Golden Decade". The era
came to an end in 1937 when tensions with Japan escalated into the second Sino-Japanese
War. China’s political unification under the Nationalist government provided the modern
Chinese economy with a more stable environment for its development, resulting in rapid
modernization in urban areas during these years. As a result, by the end of the first ten
year (1928-1937) of the National Government, the money market had undergone extensive
changes. One the one hand, the modern Chinese money market experienced a transforma-
tion from the free-banking era to a government dominated market13. On the other hand,
foreign banks lost their absolute control over cost-less and cheap resources, becoming a
"necessary cooperation" with Chinese financial institutions, though they remained a deci-
sive factor in international finance (Tamagna 1942, pp.197-198).
3.2.2 Chinese financial environment and modern banks in the early 20th cen-
tury
The modern Chinese financial sector emerged during the first quarter of the 20th century.
It comprised banking institutions, financial organizations, and other associations, public
and private, handling monetary and financial transactions under the laws and regulations
of Chinese authorities while operating along the lines and methods of modern Western
business Tamagna (1942, p.5.).
This gave rise to the "Three Kingdoms" structure of China’s financial market (Cheng
2003, p.10), comprised of traditional, native financial institutions, foreign international banks
and the new domestic modern banking sector. Each of the three came to enjoy considerable
autonomy in its specific field of operations and no close, sustained coordination developed
between them.
12For example, Bergère (1989) and Xu (2000).
13It featured a gradually concentrated market through chains of branches, interlocking directorates, public
participation, etc (Tamagna 1942, p.121). For details, refer to Section 3.2.2 and a summary from (Tamagna 1942,
p.198).
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The native money market was formed by institutions dating back to the 17th century,
focusing on monetary and financial transactions of traditional Chinese businesses and con-
sumers (Nishimura 2005). They originated as the product of local needs and remained
largely independent of support and supervision from authorities, but established local self-
regulated guilds which contributed towards maintaining the decentralized state of activi-
ties and traditional methods of management and business. There is no evidence that they
financed foreign trade directly or engaged in exchange business. The bulk of funds was
invested in loans and advances, mostly to business firms (Tamagna 1942, p.5, p.70), and
seldom to industrial project.
The foreign banking sector arrived in China during the second half of the 19th century.
Foreign banks were located in a few treaty ports with Shanghai developing into the most
important financial hub. Based on concessions by the imperial government to major pow-
ers these institutions were legally exempt from the jurisdiction and regulations of Chinese
authorities and operated under the control of foreign powers. Their main business activities
were to provide financing for international trade and the presence of international compa-
nies in China. The sector expanded substantially after 1891 when China was increasingly
pressured to integrate into the world economy. Additionally, no Chinese financial institu-
tions ever developed into relevant competitors for this type of business 14.
The rise of the modern banks as the third pillar of China’s financial system was espe-
cially strong during the Nanjing decade (1927-37), China’s "golden decade" of moderniza-
tion. It saw strong growth in the number of modern banks established, though in contrast
to the earlier warlord era the number of bankruptcies remained low— a total of 124 new
modern-style Chinese banks were established and 23 liquidated from 1928 to 1937 accord-
ing to Young (1971, p. 264)15. Overall, Table 3.1 presents the numerical development of
Chinese modern banks from 1896 to 1937.
However, not only the number of modern Chinese banks increased. Their total paid-
up capital rose from C$167 16 million in 1927 to C$403 million in 1936. From 1927 to 1936,
these banks more than doubled their capital and reserve funds, tripled their loans and total
14An extended description of the sector is given by Tamagna (1942).
15The reason of the liquidation mainly resulted from the worldwide recession and stagflation of the global
economy particular during 1933 to 1937. A summary and brief discussion of the bank liquidation can be found
in Economic Research Office (1937, A.22- A.24).
16C$= Chinese yuan
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TABLE 3.1: Chinese modern bank statistics from 1896 to 1937
year founded bankrupt net change year founded bankrupt net change
1894 1 1 1921 27 18 9
1902 1 1 1922 27 19 8
1905 1 1 1923 25 20 5
1906 2 2 1924 7 5 2
1907 3 3 1925 9 7 2
1908 4 3 1 1926 7 7
1909 1 1 1927 2 1 1
1910 1 1 1928 16 5 11
1911 3 2 1 1929 11 3 8
1912 14 10 4 1930 18 6 12
1913 2 1 1 1931 16 6 10
1914 3 1 2 1932 13 4 9
1915 7 5 2 1933 15 3 12
1916 4 3 1 1934 22 4 18
1917 10 9 1 1935 18 15 3
1918 10 6 4 1936 5 7 -2
1919 16 9 7 1937 3 4 -1
1920 16 14 2 unknown 50 24 26
Total 390 226 164
Source: The department of economic research of China: Quanguo yinhang nianjian (The national yearbook
of banks[1937]), A7-A8, A24-A25.
assets, and quadrupled their deposits as reported by the Bank of China in the The National
Yearbook of Banks 1937 and Cheng (2003).
The growth of modern Chinese banks during this decade was unmatched by either tra-
ditional institutions or foreign banks and consequently the sector became the dominant
player in China’s "Three Kingdoms" financial structure. As Table 3.2 illustrates, by 1936
the total assets of modern Chinese banks had far surpassed those of native banks and for-
eign institutions combined, highlighting the central role of these banks for China’s nascent
economic development.
TABLE 3.2: Capital power in the Chinese financial market (1936)
Name/Items
Chinese Banks Foreign Banks Native Institutions
Amount % Amount % Amount % Total
Note 1,946.7 87 284.7 13 0.0 0 2,231
Deposits 4,551.3 79 511.2 9 673.6 12 5,736
Capital 402.7 67 113.7 19 84.2 14 600.6
Total 6,900.7 81 909.6 11 757.8 9 8,568
Unit: C$ 1,000,000.
Source: Cheng (2003, p.78)
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3.3 Data and variables
3.3.1 Sample construction and sources
My study focuses on modern Chinese banks, which I take to include modern Chinese fi-
nancial institutions, organizations and associates, handling monetary transactions under
the laws and regulations of the Chinese authorities and along the lines of modern busi-
ness methods17. This excludes foreign banks and traditional native institutions, however,
as indicated above they did not systematically interact with modern Chinese banks.
The data contains 209 Chinese public and private institutions, resulting in 628 firm-years
for the period 1933-1936. This is not a random sample, but covers the whole sector. Table 3.3
lists the annual sample size in total and by bank types. The total number of banks increased
from 142 in 1933 to 163 three years later. The distribution over bank types was fairly stable
during the time period, though the number of farmers and industry banks jumped from 19
to 34, an increase of nearly 80%18.
TABLE 3.3: Bank annual summary statistics
year total obs.
obs.
CB CS FI OC PC SB
1933 142 3 84 19 4 20 12
1934 159 4 87 28 6 20 14
1935 164 4 84 31 6 25 14
1936 163 4 78 34 7 26 14
Notes: This table shows summary statistics for the annual bank sample in total and by bank type. Based on
Economic Research Office (1936, A5 - A15),I classify the modern banks into six types, which are central and
chartered banks (CB), commercial and savings (CS), farmers and industry (FI), Oversea-Chinese (OC), province
and city (PC), and specialized banks (SB). Refer to the main text for the detailed explanation.
Information about banks is hand-collected from the Bank Annual (1934-1937) published
by the Economic Research Office of the Bank of China, an official annual of financial statis-
tics containing bank-specific information, including accounting data, directors and board
members. The resulting dataset lists for each director their name, the position she/he held
in the respective institution, the city, and the branch of the bank, for which she/he worked.
Due to the structure of traditional Chinese names, duplicate names are not really a problem.
17As there is no formal definition of modern banks in literature, the definition used here is from Tamagna
(1942, p. 121).
18Based on my data sample, the increased number of farmers and industry banks was partly a policy-driven
result, however, the incremental fraction largely consisted of those which located in rural areas with small
capital. Therefore, the increased bank number in this group does not affect the composition and balance of
banks in each bank category.
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To be fully sure, however, I complement the individual director information with middle
names, birthplace, and age, which are collected from various biographies and sources19.
Appendix A.3 offers excerpts from my primary sources to illustrate how I collected data
from various archives.
Utilizing the board data and the full universe of banks, I constructed an undirected and
unweighted boardroom network formed by shared directors to track the informal interbank
connections at a senior level20. Specifically, shared directors are defined as follows:
• Two banks are considered connected if they share at least one director on the board.
• Two banks are considered not linked if they do not share a director on the board.
As an example, Figure 3.1 represents the bank boardroom connections via interlock direc-
torates in 1935 based on the definition. The node represents the individual financial institu-
tions, and the edge indicates that two banks share board directors with each other.
As shown, the major banks are heavily concentrated in the central area, as the core, while
small commercial and rural institutions are surrounded, representing a core-periphery struc-
ture. Based on Economic Research Office (1936, A5 - A15), I classify Chinese modern banks
into six groups, namely, central and chartered banks, commercial and savings, farmers and
industry, Oversea-Chinese, province and city, and specialized banks. The figure also dis-
plays the inter-bank connections with this classification21. The figure helps to convey the
architecture of the boardroom network among banks, which I will use extensively in the
following sections.
Further, I aggregate the network data, building a symmetric adjacency matrix each from
1933 to 1936 at bank-pair level, as it lists which nodes (banks) are linked to each other.
The matrix represents the interlocking connections existing among the entire universe of
Chinese banks in each sample year. The value in each cell represents the number of shared
directors between any two corresponding banks, with the value of zero indicating that the
19The main biographical source I use in this study is an online open database named the Mod-
ern and Contemporary Persons Integrated Information System. This database contains various bi-
ographies of individuals who worked in the banking sector. For detail of the database, see
http://mhdb.mh.sinica.edu.tw/mhpeople/index.php .
20According to Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), an undirected network is one in which boardrooms are either
connected or not. There is no modeling or assumptions imposed on the direction of the flow of information
and resources. An unweighted network is one that does not model or take into account the intensity level of
connections between firms. Refer to Jackson (2008) for the detail of network specifications.
21For an comprehensive introduction of the bank classification and the network structure, see Kong and
Ploeckl (2018c).
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1935
Central and chartered banks
Commercial & Savings Bank
Farmers & Industry Bank
Oversea−Chinese Bank
Province & City Bank
Specialized banks
FIGURE 3.1: Bank boardroom network 1935
Notes: The figure represents the network of bank boardroom connections via interlock directorates in 1935
based on the sample. The node represents the individual financial institution, and the edge indicates that
two banks share board directors with each other. Different shape of nodes represent bank types. Based on
Economic Research Office (1936, A5 - A15), I classify Chinese modern banks into six groups, namely, central
and chartered banks, commercial and savings, farmers and industry, Oversea-Chinese, province and city, and
specialized banks.
bank pair is not linked. I define the value in each cell as the board link strength (BLS) to
capture the extent to which any bank pair link with each other. Taking 1935 for instance,
the dataset includes 164 banks and 1631 directors, I thus have a 164-by-164 valued matrix,
where the value indicates the BLS. As the adjacency matrix is symmetric, the annual number
of bank pairs equals the number of cells in the upper or lower triangle of the matrix. So the
total bank-pair observation is the the number of cells in the upper matrix, which is 13,366
((1642 − 164)/2).
Table 3.4 tabulates the BLS at bank pair level by years. Columns 2 to 4 report the BLS in
the sample range with mean and standard deviation, while columns 5 to 8, and columns 9 to
12 tabulate the summary statistics for bank pairs of the same/different bank type with their
headquarters in the same/different region, respectively. On average, there is more than a
5% chance that two banks are connected through interlocking directorates. The connecting
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TABLE 3.4: Board link strength (BLS) summary statistics
year total obs. mean s.d.
mean—bank type mean—region
obs. within obs. across obs. within obs. across
1933 10, 011 0.05 0.31 3,922 0.06 6,089 0.05 1,720 0.24 8,291 0.02
1934 12, 561 0.06 0.36 4,421 0.08 8,140 0.05 1,905 0.31 10,656 0.02
1935 13, 366 0.05 0.34 4,363 0.07 9,003 0.04 1,600 0.31 9,131 0.02
1936 13, 203 0.06 0.35 4,007 0.07 9,196 0.05 1,282 0.37 7,763 0.03
Notes: This table shows statistics on the main inter-bank connection variable — board link strength (BLS) at
bank-pair level by years for the full sample ( 2nd to 4th columns), for bank pairs with the same bank type and
within the same region (5th to 6th and 9th to 10th columns), for bank pairs not with the same bank type and not
in the same region (7th to 8th and 11th to 12th columns). The corresponding sample observations (obs.), mean,
and standard deviation (s.d.) are reported. Refer to the main text for detail.
rate is steady during the sample period, not showing any visible trend (column 3). Banks of
the same type are more likely to share directors with each other relative to banks of different
types. However, the difference is minor in magnitude (7% versus 5% on average as shown
in columns 6 and 8).
Similarly, banks with headquarters in the same region are bound to have more connec-
tions compared to bank pairs located across regions — any two banks as a pair in the same
region share on average 0.3 director compare to just 0.02 of bank pairs with headquarters in
different regions. The contrast is driven by the fact that networks after all are geographically
bounded: the major banks, which had board links at substantial levels, were concentrated
in Shanghai and peripheral areas. That said, the concentration is less likely to have a con-
siderable impact on my empirical results, since the observations in the subset are relative
small (around 1,500 within the same region versus around 9,000 across regions).
3.3.2 Measures of corporate policy
The richness of the balance sheet data permits a wide range of measures of corporate pol-
icy decisions. This study classifies corporate decisions into three categories, namely, bond
related, cash related and reserve fund related policies.
The bond-related policies are the main corporate finance measures in the analysis. This
results from the generally received view that the expansion of modern Chinese banks dur-
ing the 1930s was mainly due to their close connections with government, including specu-
lating on government bonds. Modern institutions relied heavily on government financing,
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and that business became one of their important operations as early as 191422. As Wang
(1981) points out, Chinese banks charged a significantly higher interest rate by issuing gov-
ernment loans and purchasing government bonds at considerable discounts. Corporate
decisions then became crucial for the prosperity and longevity of modern-style financial
institutions. Another benefit of having government bonds in the portfolio is that they were
not only an investment, but also served as reserves against notes in circulation prior to
the currency reform in late 1935. As a result, government obligations and government-
guaranteed bonds constituted the bulk of securities in the vaults of banks Tamagna 1942,
p. 136. The bond policy of individual banks reflected the decisions made by principal ex-
ecutives and approved by board members, who could have been influenced by their peers
from other banks according to my hypothesis. Consequently, corporate decisions may in-
clude potential impacts from other boards, with which the bank shared directors. Based on
this line of thought, I propose three ratios to capture banks’ operational decisions on bond
holding and purchasing: bond.deposit, bond.loan and bond.SH.
bond.deposit is the ratio of bond value to the total deposit. It shows the extent to which a
bank speculated in the government bond market. Similarly, bond.loan, which is the ratio of
bond value to the total loan, gives the idea of what proportion did individual bank choose
their portfolio to investment into the government bond market comparing to the holding
level of total loan. As a complement, I add a third measure into the bond policy group
— bond.SH, which presents the fraction of bond value over shareholder’s equity. Table 3.5
shows the summary statistics of the three bond policy measures. I drop a few observations
of regional banks due to missing bond purchasing data. The number of bank-year observa-
tions ends up being 427. The distribution of bond policy is widely dispersed, ranging from
nearly zero to 123% for bond.deposit. This dispersion implies that policy adoption varied
dramatically between these Chinese banks.
The most significant weakness of the Chinese credit system, according to Tamagna
(1942, p. 200), was the lack of commercial paper and the nonexistence of a bill market. Chi-
nese institutions were not able to make slow assets in the portfolios liquidatable, despite the
attempt by the Shanghai bankers association in 1932 to establish a joint reserve board. Con-
sequently, banks were extremely careful in coping with the liquidity risk particularly in the
22Existing literature stresses the consensus with ample evidence from different sources. For example, Tam-
agna (1942, p. 44-45), Rawski (1989, p. 137), and Ho and Li (2013).
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TABLE 3.5: Corporate policy measures
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
bond-related:
bond.deposit 427 0.157 0.146 0.0002 0.053 0.215 1.231
bond.loan 427 0.175 0.222 0.0001 0.048 0.229 2.628
bond.SH 427 1.113 1.621 0.0003 0.173 1.399 16.401
cash-related:
cash.deposit 488 0.134 0.221 0.001 0.034 0.134 2.900
cash.loan 489 0.164 0.567 0.0003 0.029 0.122 8.292
reserve fund-related:
reserve.loan 437 0.047 0.073 0.0001 0.013 0.055 0.775
reserve.deposit 436 0.071 0.274 0.0001 0.014 0.062 4.700
Notes: This table provides a statistical summary of the corporate policy measures in this article. Policies are
classified into three categories, namely bond, cash, and reserve fund related policy. N refers to the number of
observations. For details refers to the main text.
banking sector, where confidence and trust was uppermost. Managing their cash holding
became an important part of the banks’ daily operations in an insecure environment like
China in the 1930s.
As the next set of measures, I therefore introduce policy indicators regarding the banks’
liquidity risk. In particular, two measures are used to evaluate these cash related policies,
which are cash.deposit and cash.loan. The measures are defined as the ratio of cash holding
over the aggregate deposit and loan, respectively. As Table 3.5 reports, the cash-related
measures are widely distributed, from zero to 2.9 for cash.deposit and 8.3 for cash.loan.
A concern about these cash related measure is that they may not precisely reflect the
liquidity risk as major Chinese banks, not just limited to the central banking group, enjoyed
the privilege of note issue before the currency reform in late 193523. As a consequence,
they could issue legal tender notes when cash reserve run low. I thus introduce another
measure to gauge bank liquidity risk by calculating reserve fund related indicators. I use
reserve.loan (the ratio of reserve fund of a bank to its total loan) and reserve.deposit (the ratio
of reserve fund of a bank to its total deposit) as a reflection of such managerial decisions.
Their definitions are akin to that of cash-related measures, but the numbers vary within a
more acceptable range (from 0 to less than five) as the table (last two rows) presents.
23At the end of 1934, the right to issue notes was still granted to commercial banks. For detail of note issue
and the currency reform in 1935, refer to Section 3.2 and Young (1971, Part Three).
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TABLE 3.6: Bank level controls
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Bank basics:
est. year 585 1926 7.649 1897 1936
# staff 471 180 393 5 3505
# cities 469 5.5 12 1.000 156
if.connected 628 0.69 0.46 0 1
board size 470 12.8 4.701 1 39
total assets (in millions) 489 41.43 153.13 42.1 1803
Performance measures:
net profit 468 327,636 1,275,358 15 17,095,868
RoE 468 0.130 0.373 0.0003 7.950
profit per capita 455 1,543.8 1,925.9 2.5 19,076.3
Operational variables:
reserve fund 437 748,192.300 2,023,860 30 23,903,709
deposits all kinds 488 27,927,641 103,351,102 4,970 1,206,305,176
loans all kinds 489 23,062,044 85,427,107 32,033 962,871,078
paid in Capital 489 2,682,052 8,757,515 32,650 100,000,000
cash on hand 489 4,149,788 21,474,528 137 307,865,614
total expenditure 483 484,004 1,303,923 1,391 11,422,324
total income 486 789,728 2,297,073 1,959 25,964,686
investment in securities 427 4,155,334 16,021,991 28 252,904,406
Notes: This table lists the bank level characteristics in summary. The calculation is based on the sample cross all
years in the dataset. N refers to the number of observations. Variable definitions and descriptions are provided
in Appendix A.1.
3.3.3 Control variables
Estimating the pair model requires two sets of control variables, one set designed to explain
the variation within bank pairs, while another one, based on firm characteristics, controls
for bank level variation. I detail the variables and provide descriptive statistics in the fol-
lowing table.
Bank characteristics
Descriptive statistics on the controls are provided in Table 3.6 . Firm characteristics are
listed under three headings: bank basics, performance, and financial measures. Appendix
A.1 describes the definitions of the variables.
The set of basic bank variables includes variables describing the main characteristics;
est. year reports the year in which each bank was founded. The modern bank sector was
relatively young, as the first institution was founded in 1897 and the mean year of estab-
lishment is 1926. I also include two variables (# staff and # cities) to capture the sizes of
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individual banks. Further, I add two board level controls to capture governance and con-
trol characteristics with the number of directors (board size) ranging from 1 to 39. The board
connection (if.connected) dummy serves as a proxy to catch potential external influence. It
takes the value of 1 if, as defined above, the director of a bank was serving as director in at
least one other bank.
Tamagna (1942, p.121) argues that the resources of modern banks were heavily concen-
trated and its centers were located in the modern commercial cities. This claim is largely
supported by the variables in the basic bank variable set. The variations of staff number (#
staff ), cities in which banks do business (# cities), number of board directors (board size), and
total assets are extremely high. The Bank of China alone had the largest number of staff
(3505 employees), board size (39 directors on the board) , assets (over CSD $1.8 billion) and
its business/branches covered 156 cites in China, while some small and local institutions
had retained a family-scale pattern (as shown in the Min column of Table 3.6).
The performance measures are net profit, return on assets (RoA), and return on equity
(RoE). Net profit is an absolute gauge of bank performance. The variation of the measure is
substantial, ranging from nearly zero to over CSD 17 millions. Surprisingly, I do not observe
any institution which ended up at a loss during the sample period (the minimum net profit
is CSD 15). I confirm the result by cross-checking the existing literature and consulting
with historians. The only information available about the issue is from Economic Research
Office (1937, A7-A8, A24-A25), which shows that 29 modern banks went bankrupt from
1933 to 1936. However, the details of the financial status of those bankrupted banks are not
available. The second measure of performance (RoE) is profitability measured as returns
(net profit) over equity. Profits are computed after taxes and interest. Average RoE ranges
from 0 to 795%, which presents a disparate profit margin in the sector, again consistent with
the resource concentration argument mentioned in the earlier section. Third, in view of
worker productivity, I add profit per capita as a supplementary performance measure . It
indicates the average efficiency per employee as net profit over # staff. Due to the missing
data issue, the number of observation declines slightly to 455 as compared to 468 for both
net profit and RoE.
Additionally, Table 3.6 provides summary statistics of the operational variables that I
will use in the empirical section. These variables are comprised of accounting items ex-
tracted from banks’ balance sheets. The variables are mainly used to quantify the corporate
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policy, as detailed in section 3.3.2. All values are in Chinese silver dollars (CSD).
Bank pair level controls
One feature of the study is that I propose a two-stage firm pair model to evaluate the in-
fluence of board connections on the similarity in banks’ corporate policies. To carry out the
analysis, I need not only bank characteristics as controls, but also variables at the pair level.
Table 3.7 reports summary statistics of the included variables for the model. Panel A high-
lights the key indicators which I use to measure the policy dissimilarity among bank pairs,
while Panel B lists the intra-pair controls used in the regressions. These are variables that
combine the characteristics of both banks. The characteristics of the pair of banks includes
the number of board directors, whether two banks belong to the same type, asset size, RoE,
total staff number, and the cities in which they set up branches. Appendix A.1 provides the
details of the variable definitions. Section 3.4.1 discusses the variables further as part of the
introduction of the pair model.
3.4 The impact of inter-bank ties on corporate policy
In this section, I investigate the influence of inter-bank connections on banks’ corporate
policies. I introduce a model to carry out the quantitative analysis which examines the
similarity in various policies between bank pairs, and then report the results.
3.4.1 The empirical framework: Pair model
I propose a pair model to examine the influence of interlocking directorates on banks’ oper-
ational behavior. The model is inspired by and derived from Fracassi (2017). The analysis
is based on each possible pair of banks in the sample as the unit. For instance, given 142
banks from the data set in 1933, this leads to over 10,000 distinct pairs under examination24.
For each pair of firms, I measure the strength of their connectedness through interlock di-
rectorates according to the number of directors shared by the two banks. This basic model
setup is then used to test whether two banks linked though board interlocks have similar
or dissimilar operational policy/ corporate decision.
24I use a symmetric matrix to represent the boardroom connections between any two banks, with each cell
indicating the number of shared directors. The number of possible bank pairs in 1933 then equals the number
of cells in the upper or lower triangle of the matrix, which is (1422 − 142)/2 = 10, 011.
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TABLE 3.7: Bank pair level variables summary
Panel A: Policy dissimilarity
Variable N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
bond related policy measures
bond.deposit 39,238 0.072 0.075 0.000 0.022 0.096 0.702
bond.loan 39,238 0.107 0.120 0.000 0.032 0.137 1.146
bond.SH 39,238 0.410 0.354 0.000 0.147 0.586 2.483
cash related policy measures
cash.deposit 47,048 0.062 0.084 0.000 0.015 0.075 0.781
cash.loan 47,048 0.116 0.240 0.000 0.023 0.106 2.139
reserve fund related policy measures
reserve.loan 41,054 0.025 0.043 0.000 0.005 0.025 0.380
reserve.deposit 41,054 0.041 0.110 0.000 0.008 0.040 1.115
Panel B: Bank-pair level controls
agg.dir 47,048 25.706 6.651 2 22 29 66
diff.dir 47,048 4.918 4.483 0 2 7 38
same.type 47,048 0.330 0.470 0 0 1 1
diff.asset 47,048 2.243 1.701 0.0001 0.873 3.268 9.977
diff.RoE 47,048 0.268 0.572 0.004 0.144 0.283 8.533
agg.staff 47,048 384.848 575.565 13 82 405.2 5,823
diff.staff 47,048 269.902 513.096 0 24 271 3,499
agg.city 47,048 11.339 24.798 2 2 10 312
diff.city 47,048 7.233 15.778 0 1 7 155
Notes: The table shows a summary statistics of the variables at bank pair level. Two banks are considered as
a pair when they linked through interlocking directorates. N refers to the number of observations. Panel A
reports the certain policy dissimilarity measures between any two pair, while panel B gives a statistic summary
of the pair controls using in the regression.
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The estimation is comprised of two parts. In the first stage, I account for a bank’s corpo-
rate policy using common controls. For each bank-year, I obtain a residual, which contains
the excessive policy that is not explained by the included control variables. I compare these
residuals (or excessive policy) for each pair of banks to derive a indicator of policy dissimi-
larity. The second stage then examines whether inter-bank board relations are related to the
similarity in policy between the bank pair.
More specifically, I run a regression of individual bank i’s operational variables at year
t on control variables Xi,t, as proposed by the existing literature, in the first stage, as shown
in equation 3.1:
Corporate policyi,t = α0 + α1Xi,t + FEi + FEt + εi,t. (3.1)
As the corporate policy outcome variables, I classify seven measures into bond, cash, and
reserve-related groups as discussed in section 3.3.2. As controls, I add year and bank fixed
effects to control for bank and time invariant factors. The residual εi,t includes the idiosyn-
cratic part of the corresponding corporate decision that have not been captured by the con-
ventional factors, as Xi,t in the equation 3.1. Table 3.8 reports the result of the first stage
according to equation 3.1. The coefficients of the controls are in line with results from the
existing literature.
For each possible pair i and j, I then define corporate policy dissimilarity as the absolute
value of the difference in their residuals:
Policy dissimilarity = |εi,t − εj,t|. (3.2)
The measure describes how different are the corporate decisions that have been adopted by
the pair of banks. A larger value of this dissimilarity measure indicates more differences in
the policies chosen by those two banks, and vice versa. This proxy is used to compare the
potential policy deviation among any pair of banks.
The second stage of the model assesses whether and how inter-banking connections
influence banks’ operational behavior. I regress the log of the policy dissimilarity over the
lagged natural logarithm of the inter-banking links BLSi,j between bank i and j. BLSi,j is
used as a proxy to indicate the link strength of each bank pair. For example, if there is no



































TABLE 3.8: Pair model: first stage regression
Dependent variable:
bond.deposit bond.loan bond.SH cash.deposit cash.loan reserve.loan reserve.deposit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(assets) 0.043 0.171∗∗∗ 1.436∗∗∗ 0.026 0.187 0.007 0.066
(0.026) (0.049) (0.268) (0.028) (0.129) (0.012) (0.045)
RoE −0.576∗∗∗ −1.053∗∗∗ −1.457 0.102 −0.257 −0.004 −0.078
(0.140) (0.261) (1.416) (0.145) (0.669) (0.062) (0.228)
#cities −0.00004 0.001 0.011 −0.001 −0.001 0.0003 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.001) (0.004) (0.0003) (0.001)
board size 0.011∗∗ 0.012 0.026 −0.002 −0.007 −0.002 −0.002
(0.005) (0.009) (0.049) (0.004) (0.021) (0.002) (0.007)
ln(total expenditure) −0.016 0.042 0.208 −0.031 0.047 −0.016 0.021
(0.028) (0.052) (0.284) (0.031) (0.143) (0.015) (0.056)
ln(total income) 0.039 −0.003 −0.470 0.051 −0.029 0.045∗∗∗ 0.071
(0.034) (0.063) (0.344) (0.038) (0.173) (0.017) (0.062)
ln(fixed assets)−0.001 0.022 −0.005 −0.008
(0.009) (0.017) (0.095) (0.010) (0.046) (0.004) (0.016)
if.connected −0.013 −0.003 0.230 −0.030 −0.021 −0.004 −0.025
(0.029) (0.054) (0.294) (0.029) (0.135) (0.013) (0.047)
ln(#staff) −0.056∗ −0.092∗ −0.225 −0.040 −0.255∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.171∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.055) (0.298) (0.032) (0.146) (0.014) (0.051)
Constant −151.381∗∗ −329.141∗∗∗ −2,025.206∗∗∗ 39.892 −30.035 −3.690 −65.627
(67.266) (125.415) (680.798) (73.662) (339.099) (30.802) (114.253)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 374 374 374 409 409 382 382
Adjusted R2 0.563 0.377 0.665 0.748 0.265 0.625 0.659
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table presents the empirical results of the first stage with different dependent variables, which are shown in the header line.
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three directors sit on the boards of both banks. Mathematically, I define the model as:
ln(1 + | 4 εi,j,t|) = β0 + β1ln(1 + BLSi,j,t−1) + XP,i,j,t−1 + ηi,j,t (3.3)
I take the suggestion of Fracassi (2017), adding XP,i,j,t−1 as lagged pair-wise control in the
second-stage specification, even though determinants of firm policy are already controlled
for in the first stage. A benefit of doing this is that it controls for potential heteroskedasticity
that may lead to a biased result. For instance, if banks of a particular type have greater pol-
icy dispersion across pairs than other bank types (i.e. heteroskedasticity in the error term),
then belonging to that bank type may still influence the similarity in policies across bank
pairs. The extra control setting includes the combination of factors over the two banks,
covering different aspects of the attributes of the pair. Panel B of Table 3.7 provides a sum-
mary statistics of the variables for reference, and the detailed definition of them is given in
Appendix A.1.
3.4.2 The main results
Table 3.9 reports the estimation of the relationship between bond policies and inter-bank
links via shared directors according to equation 3.3. I use three major policy indicators as
dependent variables, namely, bond-deposit ratio, bond-loan ratio, and bond-shareholder
equity ratio with each outcome estimation including three columns for various specifica-
tions. First, columns (1), (4) and (7) present the baseline regressions that only include link
strength with no further controls. Theoretically, the second stage regressions do not need
extra controls as profitability, bank and pair characteristics, year are controlled at the first
stage. I find a strong and negative impact of inter-bank connections on the bond policy
dissimilarities, measured by all those three indicators, which should be considered as firm
evidence supporting the hypothesis that banks use interlocking directorates as a channel to
coordinate their operational policies.
In columns (2), (5) and (8) of Table 3.9, I add several control variables across the three
different policies. First, I add the differences in assets, cities covered, staff number, and
RoE, between the paired banks to rule out that similarity in bond policy is driven by simi-
larity in bank size and profitability. As Figure 3.1 illustrates, board connections tended to be







































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
BLS −0.018∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.014 −0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
agg.dir −0.00004 0.001∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0004)
agg.staff −0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00001∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001)
agg.city −0.00001 −0.00002 0.00004
(0.00002) (0.00004) (0.0001)
diff.asset 0.001∗∗ 0.0002 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.009∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
diff.city −0.00002 0.00000 0.00002 0.00002 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
diff.staff −0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00000 0.00001 0.00002∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
diff.RoE 0.134∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.400∗∗∗ 0.406∗∗∗ 1.220∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.018) (0.018)
same.type −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Constant 0.074∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.419∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pair FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848 22,848
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.056 0.057 0.002 0.148 0.149 0.0005 0.191 0.203
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table presents the empirical results of the second stage with bond related policy dissimilarities as dependent variables. Definitions of
the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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linked across the sample years. To consider such heteroskedasticity, I also add a bank type
dummy that takes the value of 1 if both banks in a pair belong to the same bank type. For the
same reason, a year dummy is added in the specifications to control for idiosyncratic differ-
ence in the second stage regression across years. The sign of dependent variable bond/SH
is negative, but loses its significance. Overall, the empirical result remains unchanged af-
ter the controls — the coefficients on BLS stay negative and statistically significant for both
bond/deposit and bond/loan ratio.
In columns (3), (6) and (9) of Table 3.9, I add more controls to allow for the fact that
larger and more experienced financial institutions tended to have more board connections.
The add.dir, agg.staff, and agg city variables are the number of total directors, staff, branch
cities covered, respectively for each bank pair. I also consider a pair fixed effect in the
regression models. Again, the empirical outcomes confirm the main hypothesis, and are
consistent with the results above. In general, I find strong evidence that BLS affected the
banks’ dissimilarity of bond-related operational policies negatively during my sample pe-
riod, i.e. a bank pair tended to adopt similar policy if they were connected via interlocking
directorates.
Next, I interpret the economic magnitude of the results. Recall that in the second stage
of the pair model, as defined in Equation 3.3, both the dependent variable and BLS are in
terms of logs. Consequently, the empirical outcomes of (1) to (3) imply that two board-
linked banks had bond/deposit ratios that were on average 1.5% more similar than those
of an unconnected pair In addition, the economic magnitude is even greater (between 2.5%
and 4%) for bond/loan and bond/shareholder equity ratios. These are lower bound esti-
mates of the real effects of board ties on corporate policies, given the noise in the definition
of inter-bank connections. The results are robust and persistent across all bond-related de-
pendent variables. So the presence of board connection strikingly reduced policy dissimi-
larity among linked banks, suggesting modern Chinese banks coordinated their operational
decisions with interlocking directorates as an important information exchange channel.
Tables 3.10 and 3.11 show the second stage regressions for cash and reserve fund related
policies based on the same empirical strategy. I find that the intensity of ties still predicts
similar cash and reserve policies even for firm pairs. Furthermore, the economic magni-
tudes of the effects of cash and reserve related policies are similar to the estimate for bond







































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLS −0.006∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ −0.050∗∗∗







diff.asset −0.0004 0.0003 −0.002∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
diff.city 0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00004) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.0001)
diff.staff 0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00001∗∗∗ 0.00001∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001)
diff.RoE −0.057∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.185∗∗∗ −0.278∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.013)
same.type −0.022∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.056∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Constant 0.065∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pair FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 27,952 27,952 27,952 27,952 27,952 27,952
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.030 0.066 0.001 0.025 0.061
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table presents the empirical results of the second stage with cash policy dissimilarities as dependent variables. Definitions of the










TABLE 3.11: 2nd. stage regression : reserve fund policy dissimilarities
Dependent variable:
reserve fund policy dissimilarity
reserve.deposit reserve.loan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLS −0.019∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗







diff.asset −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
diff.city 0.00000 0.0001 −0.00001 0.0001∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00003)
diff.staff −0.00000 −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00000∗∗ −0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
diff.RoE −0.109∗∗∗ −0.118∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
same.type 0.004∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.047∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
Year FE No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Pair FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 23,536 23,536 23,536 23,536 23,536 23,536
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.013 0.014 0.004 0.037 0.029
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table presents the empirical results of the second stage with reserve fund related policy dissimilarities as dependent variables.
Definitions of the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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or reserve policy that are 1% to 2% (Table 3.11) more similar than for two unconnected firms.
3.5 Endogeneity and further tests
3.5.1 Controlling for homogeneity
In the main regression I find that bank pairs behaved similarly in terms of operational de-
cisions if they were linked though interlock directorates, and that this similarity was pos-
itively related to the number of shared directors. However, the result could be biased if
director tended to sit on the boards of banks with analogous characteristics, so that the out-
come is only a reflection of the likeness of the bank pair. I address this endogenous concern
with two strategies. In section 3.5.1, I carry out an analysis of the the connections among
bank pairs, showing that the inter-bank linkages were more likely to be established among
banks with divergent characteristics rather than similar ones. This suggests that relevant
interlocks were formed on a heterogeneous basis. Second, section 3.5.1 considers region
effects by restricting firm pairs to those with different headquarter locations. The results re-
main significant for pairs without geographical proximity, indicating that shared directors
had a separate impact from interactions between banks and their directors due to physical
closeness.
The pattern of board connection
This section provides a detailed examination of the attributes of banks linked through in-
terlocks. The intention is to compare banks across each company pair to evaluate whether
their traits differ from each other in any significant way. I focus on a bank’s asset (size) and
established year (age), as these two variables were correlated with the firm’s other major
characteristics and may reflect a bank’s governance and maturity to some extent25.
Table 3.12 presents a statistical summary of these values for the sample period. Panel A
lists the average size and age of the bank pairs on average, while panel B shows the distri-
bution of trait differences over pairs26. The pair structure becomes clearer when the results
from both panels are combined. From panel A, the average size of bank pairs remained
25Nguyen, Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2015) uses the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets to
control for bank size. Acheson et al. (2016a) suggests the establishment year of a company to capture the
maturity of the firm.
26For example, suppose a bank pair is comprised of Bank A and B, mathematically, the size on average =
log( assetA+assetB2 ), and the age on average =
age A+age B
2 . With the same logic, the banks pair in difference
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TABLE 3.12: Bank pair size and age statistics
1933 1934 1935 1936
size est.year size est.year size est.year size est.year
Panel A: bank pair data on average
Mean 17.3 1924 17.3 1926 17.5 1927 17.8 1927
Panel B: bank pair data in difference
Mean 2.12 8.08 2.18 8.36 2.26 8.06 2.37 7.98
S.D. 1.62 6.65 1.69 6.96 1.74 6.68 1.79 6.51
Min 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P25 0.82 3 0.81 3 0.88 2 0.9 2
Median 1.78 7 1.81 7 1.88 6 2 6
P75 3.11 12 3.22 12 3.29 12 3.4 12
Max 9.43 37 9.59 37 10.26 28 11 29
Notes: The table shows the bank pair summary statistics and comparison with regard to natural logarithm of
asset size as well as the year of establish. Panel A lists the size and est.year on average of all possible bank pairs
in my sample, whereas Panel B presents the difference-in-mean summary.
stable in the sample years. The mean of the natural logarithm of total assets is about 17.5.
In contrast, the mean size difference of bank pairs fluctuates around 2.2 across four years,
with a standard deviation between 1.6 to 1.8. The result shows that, while the average size
of bank pair (real value without natural logarithm) is $CSD 39,824,784, one bank of a pair
is statistically 9 times larger than than the other. I observe a similar pattern in terms of age
as well — the average establishment year of the bank pairs is around 1926 with the dif-
ference being 8 years on average. This implies that for most bank pairs it is the case that
one bank was established before 1928 — a critical year to distinguish old and new financial
institutions27, while the counterpart was founded afterwards .
I also find narrative evidence connected to my data to support my inference. For in-
stance, The Bank of Greater Asia, Ltd, a commercial bank (大亚银行), was established in
Shanghai by Jusun YOU (尤菊荪) , a successful merchant with an industrial background.
Initially, the total number of staff was 60, with a shareholder equity of $CSD 500,000 in
1934. Using his social connections he invited the business elite to sit on the board . These
people include Yuesheng DU (杜月笙) and Jinsan WEI (魏晋三) — the most prestigious
businessmen in China, particularly in the banking sector. By sharing these directors with
calculates the difference in size and age between Bank A and B, namely, size in di f f = |ln(assetA)− ln(assetB)|
and age in di f f = |age A− age B|.
27 A brief background information about the Chinese political and economic environments is introduced in
section 3.2.
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other financial institutions, the Bank of Greater Asia set up connections with the largest
state-owned institution, the Bank of China (中国银行), and the Shanghai Citizen’s Com-
mercial and Savings Bank , Ltd. (上海国民商业储蓄银行), one of the most renowned
commercial banks, from scratch. In this case, it turns out that the founder of the small
young bank chose deliberately, rather than randomly, key directors from other institutions
who can bring economic advantages to enhance the reputation and position of the bank in
the financial sector28.
Overall, connected pairs exhibit a heterogeneous linking pattern — individual banks
tend to link with divergent counterparts differing in major characteristics. This outcome
mitigates my concern that the main empirical results are driven by the endogeneity that di-
rectors tended to sit on boards of similar banks. Banks were actually more likely to interlock
with heterogeneous banks as complements rather than sharing directors with similar peers.
Controlling for region effects
Ma (2016) highlights that modern Chinese banks were heavily concentrated in major metropoli-
tan areas, like Shanghai and Tianjing. The geographical proximity of their headquarters
could potentially have influenced the corporate decision making of banks in the same re-
gion. For example, financial institutions in Shanghai might have been influenced by mem-
bership or interaction with a sector-wide industry association, the Shanghai Bankers’ As-
sociation (SBA) (Xu 2000). Such interactions enabled by geographic proximity could be a
factor that affected an individual bank’s operational decision making.
I investigate the impact of region effects to confirm that my main empirical result is not
driven by regionally homogeneous banks. The underlying assumption is that banks from
different regions, for example Peking and Shanghai, were not conducting operations in a
coordinated fashion so that the tendency of being the same with regard to business practice
and firm traits is small. I do this by restricting the sample to bank pairs with headquarters
in different cities. In this way, I evaluate bank pairs that were shaped by different economic
environments without a possible coordinating effect of geographic proximity.
28In the narrative, bank information are excerpted from Economic Research Office (1936), the directors infor-
mation are from individual biography database — The Modern and Contemporary Persons Integrated Infor-
mation System. For detail of the database, see http://mhdb.mh.sinica.edu.tw/mhpeople/index.php .
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BLS −0.027∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.036∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020)
agg.dir 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0005)
agg.staff −0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00002)
agg.city −0.00002 −0.00003 −0.00001
(0.00003) (0.0001) (0.0001)
diff.asset 0.0001 −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.002 0.008∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
diff.city −0.0001 −0.00005 −0.00003 −0.0001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
diff.staff −0.00000 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.00001∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002)
diff.RoE 0.146∗∗∗ 0.151∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.436∗∗∗ 1.243∗∗∗ 1.182∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.020) (0.020)
same.type −0.014∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 17,318 17,318 17,318 17,318 17,318 17,318
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.063 0.190 0.160 0.244 0.212
F Statistic 244.711∗∗∗ 131.192∗∗∗ 509.718∗∗∗ 368.009∗∗∗ 701.021∗∗∗ 518.038∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table reports the results of the BLS impact on three bond related
policies for the sample of bank pairs with different headquarter locations. Definitions of the variables are



































TABLE 3.14: cash and reserve policy dissimilarities of bank pairs with different headquarter locations
Dependent variable:
cash and reserve policy dissimilarities
cash.deposit cash.loan reserve.deposit reserve.loan
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BLS −0.011∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
agg.dir −0.003∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0001)
agg.staff 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0003∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00002∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00000)
agg.city −0.00002 −0.00000 −0.00004 −0.00004∗∗
(0.00003) (0.0001) (0.00004) (0.00002)
diff.asset −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.006∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003)
diff.city 0.0001 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ −0.00002 0.0001 −0.0001∗ 0.00001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00004)
diff.staff 0.00002∗∗∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00003∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.00001∗ −0.00003∗∗∗ 0.00000 −0.00001∗∗∗
(0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00000) (0.00001) (0.00000) (0.00000)
diff.RoE −0.069∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.220∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗ −0.068∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005) (0.015) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
same.type −0.020∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.001 −0.011∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.065∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.006) (0.003) (0.001)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 22,294 22,294 22,294 22,294 19,160 19,160 19,160 19,160
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.056 0.032 0.062 0.021 0.011 0.041 0.029
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table reports the results of the BLS impact on cash and bank reserve-related policies for the sample of bank pairs with different
headquarter locations. Definitions of the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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Table 3.13 reports the results of the BLS impact on three bond-related policies for the
sample of bank pairs with different headquarter locations. Despite the reduction in obser-
vations, I find BLS still predicts similar corporate policies for bank pairs connected over
interlock directorates. Interestingly, the economic magnitude of the effect is larger in the
reduced sample when compared to the fixed effect specifications from Table 3.9 (between
50% and 200% larger). Further, the coefficient of BLS in column (5) become statistically sig-
nificant in contrast to the unrestricted sample regression in Table 3.9, because it rules out the
concern that the estimate including pairs in the same city could be driven by unobserved
factors that lead to a biased result29. Once the specification excludes the sample pairs within
the same region, the coefficient of BLS becomes statistically significant. Table 3.14 displays
the empirical results of the BLS impact on cash and reserve related policies. The coefficients
of BLS are statistically significant across all specifications, and they are consistent with the
facts reported in Table 3.13.
Overall, this outcome exhibits that boardroom connections through interlocks were more
prominent as channels of information transmission and coordination between banks which
were located in different regions. This is consistent with the existing literature on inter-
lock directorates claiming that director sharing serves the inter-firm collusion, cooptation
and intentional (unintentional) transmission of knowledge (Mizruchi 1996; Haunschild and
Beckman 1998; Helmers, Patnam, and Rau 2017).
3.5.2 Inter-bank cooperation or corporate control?
Another plausible alternative causal explanation of the policy co-movement over interlock
directorates is corporate control. Interlocks have been viewed by observers as a means of
corporate control as early as Mariolis (1975). He argues that banks might be able to con-
trol a corporation, through such mechanisms as stock ownership or board representation.
In my context, the extent to which banks are linked with each other may simply highlight
the presence of power of one bank over another as primary shareholder. If so, the policy
similarity of bank pairs may be a reflection of decisions implemented by one bank under
orders from the parent institute (Mizruchi 1996). This alternative interpretation may lead to
a biased estimation of my analysis. For example, my measure of the inter-bank connections
29For instance, financial institutions located in metropolises could be heavily impacted by the local authori-
ties. The policy may be driven by the regional regulations.
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(BLS) could be correlated with some unobserved or omitted firm characteristics that are as-
sociated with shareholding between the bank pair. If an individual bank, which was a major
stock holder of the other one, was able to exercise control over the other through board rep-
resentation, my finding may simply capture an explicit imposition of policies rather than
the effect of information diffusion through interlocks.
Due to data constraints neither the relevant shareholders nor a strictly exogenous vari-
able to rule out the underlying biased estimate30 are available. However, I can carry out
a series of tests to explore whether my findings are likely to be driven by the alternative
hypothesis by restricting the sample to bank pairs that consist of young banks only. The un-
derlying assumption is that the corporate control is less likely to happen among immature
financial institutions as they are much more likely to be controlled than to control another
bank. In this sense, the subset of bank pairs restricts the sample as much as possible so
that policy co-movement over bank pairs was not driven by corporate control. I begin by
estimating the pair model introduced in section 3.4.1 with a subsample of bank pairs which
consist only of young banks. I classify a bank as young if it was established after 1928 — a
key year to distinguish old and new financial institutions in the Chinese context31, but since
my findings may be sensitive to this definition, I check the robustness of my results using
1929 and 1930 as alternative thresholds as well.
Table 3.15 reports the second stage estimation of the pair model for selective policy mea-
sures from each policy group32. Compared to the full sample regressions in section 3.4.2,
the restriction causes the sample size to drop from over 20000 to a range from 1800 to 6000
bank-pair-year observations.
The coefficients of interest (BLS) are negative across all specifications with various def-
inition of young banks while remaining statistically significant at 5% to 10% levels. Except
for column (8), the magnitude of the coefficients increases as I raise the restriction of the
immaturity definition. It suggests that boardroom connections lead to more similar corpo-
rate policies and that the peer impact on their own decisions was even stronger over bank
pairs in which banks had been established after 1930 — a stricter definition of immaturity
30The endogeneity of social networks and data limitation is a broad issue for all empirical work in this body
of literature. This point of view is admitted and supported by existing studies, such as Braggion (2011) and
Larcker, So, and Wang (2013). This paper is no exception.
31 A brief background information about the Chinese political and economic environments is introduced in
section 3.2.
32The empirical outcomes are persistent over all seven measures, however, due to the space limitation, I only











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
bank pairs >1928 >1929 >1930 >1928 >1929 >1930 >1928 >1929 >1930
BLS −0.016∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.018∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.017∗∗ −0.022∗ −0.010∗∗ −0.009∗ −0.010∗
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
agg.dir −0.001∗∗∗ −0.002∗∗∗ 0.0002 −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.0005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
agg.staff −0.00004 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.00001 −0.00003 −0.00005 −0.00003 0.00004∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00004) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00002) (0.00003)
agg.city −0.0003 −0.0003 0.0003 −0.0001 −0.00001 0.00003 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003)
diff.asset 0.005∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ −0.008∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.012∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
diff.city −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.0003 −0.0004 0.0002
(0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001)
diff.staff 0.00003 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.00003 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001∗ −0.00003∗ −0.0001∗∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
(0.00003) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.0001) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00004)
same.type −0.010∗∗∗ −0.007∗ 0.018∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
diff.RoE 0.154∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ −0.088∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.040∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,172 3,070 1,880 6,070 4,684 3,176 4,196 3,050 1,862
Adjusted R2 0.060 0.111 0.105 0.065 0.075 0.104 0.031 0.035 0.055
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table reports the second stage estimation of the pair model for selective policy measure from each policy group with subsample of
young banks. As robustness, alternative definitions of young bank are used in the regressions (1928, 1929, and 1930). Dependent variable are displayed in header. Definitions
of the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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under which the alternative hypothesis is even more likely to be excluded. Taken together,
this evidence is consistent with individual banks having been influenced in their corporate
policies from their peers at board level rather than through a direct control structure.
3.6 Bank network and operational policies
I show above that inter-banking connections had an reciprocal influence on corporate poli-
cies, when examined on a bank pair basis. However, as Figure 3.1 shows, an individual
bank was not only linked with another bank, but embedded in the boardroom network of
the whole sector. If banks had an impact on each other, the logical next step is that the
global position of an individual bank in the network also influences its corporate policy.
Based on this idea, I carry out an analysis to confirm whether and how that global position
of an individual bank in the boardroom network influenced its corporate policy making.
3.6.1 Analysis framework
The analysis in this section is inspired by the literature on information diffusion in corpo-
rate networks. Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) argues that directors on a board possess a
wealth of information on industry trends, market conditions, and extra key data if they are
well-connected through social networks. Thus, someone in a central position in an inter-
firm network may have better access to such information and therefore have a comparative
advantage in corporate decision making (Mol 2001), especially as central players are more
exposed to word-of-mouth and internal information (Fracassi 2017). Based on these argu-
ments, I expect that banks’ strategic decisions reflect private information from their peers
more strongly if they were connected with more banks. On the opposite side, this postu-
lates that isolated banks lack access to these resources from the network conduit, and thus
are expected to behave in a more idiosyncratic way.
This section examines the idea that the corporate policy decisions of the modern Chi-
nese banks were affected by the location of the corporation in the inter-firm network. Ac-
cording to the mechanism above, banks located in a central position of the network were
capable of collecting signals from their social peers33. The received signals then shaped an
individual bank’s adoption of corporate strategies. The actual decision of a corporation,
33This point of view is support by an extensive literature, for example, Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou (2017).
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consequently, should reflect the extent to which a bank received information from its peers
— in other words its corporate policy partly reveals partly the position of a bank in the net-
work. I therefore expect that more central banks had less unique policies compared to less
connected ones.
I follow Fracassi (2017) in using a two-stage econometric model to examine the relation-
ship between corporate policy decisions and network location in the Chinese context. My
estimating equation takes the form:
First stage : Policy measurei,t = α0 + α1ControlPi,t + FEi + FEt + εi,t; (3.4)
Second stage : log(1 + |εi,t|) = β0 + β1Connectednessi,t + β2ControlCi,t + ηi,t. (3.5)
I use the corporate policies from section 3.3.2 as dependent variables at the first stage.
The Policy measurei,t is regressed on common controls, e.g., bank age, size, board character-
istics including the time and individual fixed effects. This first stage is similar to the one in-
troduced in section 3.4.1. I then define an indicator to measure the idiosyncratic behavior of
bank i at time t, which is the natural logarithm of (1+ |εi,t|) in equation 3.5. Connectednessi,t
stands for the connectedness measure of an individual bank, which evaluates how central
a bank is in a network; this is described in more detail later on.
Equation 3.5 investigates the correlation between a bank’s network position and its id-
iosyncratic behavior. Based on the hypothesis mentioned above, I expect the coefficient β1
to be negative, indicating that a more centrally located bank exhibited less idiosyncratic
behavior as the result of more access to signals and information from its peers.
3.6.2 Bank connectedness measure
I adopt two centrality indicators commonly used in the social network literature to measure
the position of a bank in the boardroom network34. The most basic measure of centrality is
called Degree. It is the number of links a node has with other nodes. Degree illuminates
the relative importance of actors, banks, within the network. This can have practical con-
sequences: for example, in term of information contagion, an actor who is linked with a
34The existing literature on social network often use four measures to indicate the centrality of the players, for
instance, Jackson (2009) and Larcker, So, and Wang (2013). The four centrality measures are: degree, closeness,
betweenness, and eigenvector. For a detail description of the measure, see Jackson (2010). In my data, however,
I do find a high correlation among these measures, therefore I only utilize two of them.
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larger number of other actors is likely to receive external messages differently, potentially
more frequently and faster, than actors that are relatively isolated in the network through
a lower number of links (Lamberson 2016). In a network of interlocking directorates the
degree measure shows for each bank with how many other banks it shares a director, so has
an interlocking directorate. A bank may be well-connected if it possesses more channels of
communications or resource exchange.
In addition to examining the direct connections of the nodes I am also interested in how
close each one is to every other node in the network. This idea leads to the second concept
of Closeness centrality. The Closeness centrality measure attempts to capture the notion
that a node is "central" if it is "close" to many other nodes. In the corporate context, if an
actor has comparatively closer ties to more boards, it facilitates better information diffusion
and exchange to this node(Larcker, So, and Wang 2013). As more central actors can quickly
interact with many other boards across the network these nodes find it easier to profit from
the benefits of these connections. Banks with higher Closeness values are engaging in more
exchange of information, which allows them to operate more profitably as well as develop
a better understanding of the outside environment. This easier information access implies
an advantage for these banks also in the way they are able to react to changes in an unstable
political and economic environment 35.
In Appendix A.2, I provide the mathematical definition of both measures and calcula-
tion examples that help readers to capture the concept.
3.6.3 Empirical outcomes
The empirical results do not provide any statistical evidence regarding the relationship be-
tween bond-related policies and corporate idiosyncratic behavior. One possible reason is a
noisy measurement of idiosyncratic behavior in these policies. However, I do find strong
evidence when I replace bond-related policies with cash and reserve policies of banks, con-
sequently this section focuses36 on these particular outcomes.
Table 3.16 reports the econometric results of the second stage. The dependent variable is
the idiosyncratic behavior of a corporation across all columns, as defined in equation 3.5. I
35Recent studies confirm the information spillover of boardroom network as well as other social connections
among firms, for example, Helmers, Patnam, and Rau (2017), Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu (2007) and Gao
et al. (2012).
36For brevity, the section also skips listing the result of the first stage regression, since it resembles the first








TABLE 3.16: Bank board connectedness and idiosyncratic policies
Dependent variable:
corporate idiosyncratic behavior
cash.deposit cash.loan reserve.loan reserve.deposit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
degree −0.001∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001
(0.0004) (0.001) (0.0003) (0.001)
closeness −2.506∗∗ −9.441∗∗∗ −1.376∗∗ −0.327
(1.151) (3.214) (0.593) (1.537)
ln(assets) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000∗∗ 0.000∗∗ 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(assetsˆ2) 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
board size −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001∗∗∗ −0.0002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001)
#staff 0.00003 0.00003 0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00002∗ −0.00002∗∗ −0.00001 −0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.00001) (0.00001) (0.00003) (0.00003)
#city −0.0004 −0.0004 −0.001 −0.001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005)
if.connected −0.004 0.010 0.025 0.064∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.009 0.006
(0.008) (0.011) (0.022) (0.031) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.015)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 433 433 433 433 405 405 405 405
R2 0.107 0.112 0.111 0.105 0.093 0.072 0.015 0.012
F Statistic 6.292∗∗∗ 6.621∗∗∗ 6.573∗∗∗ 6.149∗∗∗ 5.044∗∗∗ 3.791∗∗∗ 0.768 0.576
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table reports the regression result of the idiosyncratic behavior model. Two network centrality measures are used in the analysis,
namely, degree and closeness. Details of the network centrality measure refer to Section 3.6.2. Definitions of the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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control for firm size and common characteristics of the banks, as in the prior pair model. In
particular, previous literature suggests the relationship between performance and corporate
variables may be non-linear (McConnell and Servaes 1990; Acheson et al. 2016a). As the
centrality measures I use in the regression could be correlated with firm’s performance,
this implies that the relationship between my main variables (degree and closeness) and the
dependent variable (corporate idiosyncratic behavior) could be non-linear as well. I include
a squared term — ln(assets2) to address this.
The connectedness coefficient (coefficient of degree and closeness) is negative across all
specifications and statistically significant except for the last two columns concerning the
reserve.deposit policy. Overall, I find strong evidence that banks with more connections had
less unique or idiosyncratic cash and reserve fund policies, even if the reserve.deposit spec-
ifications remain insignificant. These results provide at least some support for my hypothe-
sis that inter-bank connections influenced banks not only locally at an individual level, but
also at the network level. The empirical results are consistent with Fracassi (2017), suggest-
ing that companies have less idiosyncratic corporate policies once they retain more social
ties.
The econometric framework was not designed to prove causality. Consequently, there
may be unobserved factors that jointly caused an individual bank’s position in the network
and its idiosyncratic strategies. For instance, a bank that choose to establish connections
with peers may select a major metropolis, like Shanghai, in which to locate its headquar-
ters37. Giving a higher level of information sharing in that location, especially through the
local industry association, Shanghai Bankers’ Association (SBA) (Xu 2000), that decision
could have had a joint impact on both network position and the idiosyncratic behavior.
There may also be issue in whether the connectedness measure used in the analysis is the
appropriate proxy to capture the centrality of a bank. These issues mean to indicate ulti-
mately, the most that I can say about any relationships is that they are correlations, and do
not necessarily imply causality.
37Kong and Ploeckl (2018a) offers an discussion of the factors driving establishment of connections.
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3.7 Why did banks coordinate their corporate policy?
Above I demonstrated that interlocking directorates were linked with the co-movement of
corporate policies between pairs of banks, suggesting that board connections between two
banks leads to the transfer of internal information and results in more similar operational
strategies. However, this does not address the incentives or benefits of this seeming coor-
dination. This section explores the benefits and implications of banks’ social connections
through the board network, and investigates whether being in a central position in the net-
work was linked not only with less idiosyncratic, but also better decisions.
3.7.1 The profitability effect of being connected
A natural extension is to examine whether the corporate policies I test were associated with
banks’ profitability. If that is the case, the co-movement of these strategic choices is an
indication that the implicit coordination of banks’ operational policies through board con-
nections was another mechanism through which banks enhanced their profitability.
Consequently, I investigate the correlation between the economic performance of a firm,
measured by RoE and profit per capita, and the corporate policies I use in the prior analysis.
I define the the return on equity as the ratio of annual net profit over total assets, and the
profit per capita as the ratio of the net profit over the staff number of the individual bank.
Table 3.17 and Table 3.18 highlight the main results of the regressions of RoE and profit
per capita over various corporate policies after controlling for common factors used in the
existing literature38. In terms of bond-related policies, I find a positive and significant cor-
relation with RoE. All of the three bond measures demonstrate a high level of co-movement
with RoE, statistically, as shown in columns (1) to (3) of Table 3.17. In contrast, the relation-
ship is not that high between bond policy and profit per capita. However, the coefficient
of bond/deposit ratio remains highly significant in the regression on profit per capita, as
shown in Column (1) of Table 3.18. With regard to cash and reserve policies, I do not ob-
serve any statistical correlations between the measures and RoE (column (4) to (7) of Table
3.17). This implies that the coordination of cash and reserve operations among bank pairs
may not have been motivated by pursuing a higher RoE. Yet column (4) to (6) of Table 3.18



































TABLE 3.17: Correlation between corporate policies and RoE
Dependent variable:
RoE















ln(assets) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.037∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
board size −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
#staff −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.00002) (0.00002) (0.00002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
#cities 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
if.connected 0.002 0.004 −0.005 −0.082∗ −0.082∗ −0.083 −0.082
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.048) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 433 433 405 405
Adjusted R2 0.110 0.112 0.168 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.022
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table demonstrates the correlations between the bank profitability measured by RoE and different policy indicators in each column.











TABLE 3.18: Correlation between corporate policies and profit per capita
Dependent variable:
Ln(profit per capita)















ln(assets) 0.342∗∗∗ 0.333∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.366∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
board size 0.019 0.021 0.021 0.022∗ 0.021∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
#staff −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
#cities −0.012∗ −0.011∗ −0.011∗ −0.010∗ −0.011∗ −0.012∗∗ −0.012∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
if.connected −0.075 −0.029 0.019 −0.001 −0.051 −0.041 −0.052
(0.138) (0.137) (0.139) (0.123) (0.122) (0.126) (0.127)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pair FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 396 396 396 433 433 405 405
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.159 0.158 0.222 0.212 0.221 0.211
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table demonstrates the correlations between the bank profitability measured by natural logarithm of profit per capita (in Chinese
dollar) and different policy indicators in each column. Definitions of the variables are provides in Appendix A.1.
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demonstrate strong relationships of these policy measures with profit per capita, suggest-
ing again that the cash and reserve decisions of individual banks, like their bond policies,
had strong ties to their profitability.
Overall, I find positive and significant relationships between my policy measures and
banks’ economic performance. This finding provides a reasonable motivation for the cor-
porate policy co-movement among bank pairs — that modern Chinese banks coordinated
or imitated the bond/cash/reserve related corporate policies of their peers to achieve better
performance, which I call the profitability effect of the board ties. It is well worth stressing
that the empirical result is only suggestive of a relationship between my policy measures
and profitability, but is not proof of a causal relation between the two39. I, therefore, can
not conclude that the policy measures I use in the article caused any change of banks’ RoA
and profit per capita. But the test provides a potential mechanism to explain the causality
between network centrality and banks’ economic performance discussed in Chapter 4.
3.7.2 The insurance effect of being connected
China experienced political and economic turbulence during the 1930s. The banking sector,
which usually relies strongly on the security of property rights and contract enforcement
(Ma 2016), was particular sensitive to an uncertain environment. In this part, I therefore
follow a similar two-stage model introduced in Section 3.6 to investigate whether being
connected results from banks’ intention to seek assurance and eliminate risk.
In the first step of the model, a bank i’s profitability measure at time t is regressed on
the conventional control variables ControlPi,t with time and individual fixed effects. I con-
struct an indicator, as log(1 + |εi,t|), to measure the excess fluctuation of profitability that
can not be explained by controls or the predictor variables. This Profitability measure incor-
porates RoE and the natural logarithm of profit per capita. The second stage of the model
tests whether a correlation exists between the connectedness of an individual bank i and its
excess fluctuation. As network connectedness indicators, I adopt the same measures, namely
degree and closeness, as introduced above in Section 3.6.2. This two-stage model can be
39Chapter 4 offers an insight into the investigation that higher centrality was connected to a higher profitabil-
ity.
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described mathematically as:
First stage : Pro f itability measurei,t = α0 + α1ControlPi,t + FEi + FEt + εi,t; (3.6)
Second stage : log(1 + |εi,t|) = β0 + β1Connectednessi,t + β2ControlCi,t + ηi,t. (3.7)
The idea is that the model compares the profitability excess fluctuation of banks with more
board connections to those with less links. If a statistically significant difference of excess
fluctuation is observed between the two groups, that suggests that the connectedness of a
bank had an impact on the fluctuation of its profitability, which, in turn, indicates that the
motivation of a financial institution to establish board connections was influenced by risk
concerns.
Equation 3.6 illustrates the idea mathematically: the profitability volatility of individual
bank i can be predicted by factors included in control plus the random part stocked in the
residual εi. By eliminating the unpredicted part in the residual, banks could potentially
minimize the profitability volatility risk from uncertainty.
Table 3.19 presents the results of the second stage regression40. I break down the results
by profitability measure using RoE (columns 1 and 2) and the natural logarithm of profit per
capita (columns 3 and 4) in the first stage. In all specifications, the coefficients of interest,
bank centrality measure degree and closeness, are negative, indicating that stronger board
connections leads to a less fluctuation than was indicated by the residuals from the first
stage.
A possible economic interpretation of the results is that the inter-bank board connections
helped reduce the risk and, in turn, weakened the excess fluctuation of profitability. Estab-
lishing board connections was therefore likely influenced and motivated by banks seeking
less volatility in their profitability, which resembles an insurance effect.
To illustrate this, I confirm this insurance argument by demonstrating the first stage
residual distribution of regressions (namely, εi,t in Equation 3.6 ) using ln(profit per capita)
as predicted variable in Figure 3.2. Banks with degree greater than 8 are classified as ones
with high connections41. Corporations without any board ties are shown as comparison.
The residual distributions of regressions in both categories show a significant difference in
40Due to the space limitation, the empirical outcome of the first stage is not listed and can be provided on
request.
41Banks with degree of 8 or more cover approximately 30% of the full sample. Alternative classifications did
not significantly change the final results.
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TABLE 3.19: The second stage regression of the profitability excess fluctuation
Dependent variable:
Excess fluctuation
RoE ln(profit per capita)





ln(assets) 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.00004 −0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
board size −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.0003
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.004) (0.004)
#staff −0.00000 −0.00001 −0.00000 −0.00004
(0.00001) (0.00001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
#city 0.0003 0.0003 0.001 0.001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.002) (0.002)
If.connected −0.007 0.004 0.008 0.056
(0.005) (0.007) (0.040) (0.057)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 289 289 289 289
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.098 0.015 0.014
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. This table shows the empirical result of the second stage regression of the











Bank connection level: high connections without  connection
FIGURE 3.2: Residual distribution of the profit per capita regression
Notes: The density plot demonstrates the residual of the first stage regression derived from Equation 3.6. The
plot in red represents the residual density distribution of banks with board connections greater than 8. In
contrast. the blue colored plot highlights the residual distribution of banks without any board connection.
shape, though both peak at zero. For banks with more connections, the value of residuals
is more stacked at zero, showing less profitability volatility risk from uncertainty. Corre-
spondingly, the excess fluctuation is smaller. In contrast, the group without links presents
a broader residual distribution, or in other words, banks without board connections experi-
enced a higher excess fluctuation with regard to profit per capita.
Overall, the visual evidence is consistent with the argument that being connected was
associated with banks’ intentions to seek assurance and eliminate risk in terms of profitabil-
ity. "Staying connected" is likely to help the modern Chinese banks reduce the idiosyncratic
risk derived from an uncertain environment.
3.8 Conclusion
Social and economic networks are one of the central features in corporate finance (Larcker,
So, and Wang 2013; Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou 2017). I explore how the board connections
of a bank within the inter-bank network affected its corporate policy decisions in a historical
context. The results show that corporate decisions of banks were influenced by their social
peers in that the more directors two banks shared with each other, the more similar were
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their corporate strategies. After establishing that firm policies were influenced by imme-
diate network neighbors, I investigate further whether the global position of an individual
bank in the network had any impact on its strategic decision makings. The analysis shows
that banks with a central position in the boardroom network made corporate decisions more
in line with the sector at large. The result highlights that peer behavior affects firms’ own
decisions not only at the bilateral level but network-wide.
In addition, the empirical outcome shows that co-moving corporate policies were pos-
itively related with banks’ economic performance, suggesting that banks acted in a seem-
ingly coordinated fashion with each other at the board level to achieve better performance
and interlocking directorates were a critical channel for sharing managerial practices. Be-
sides the level of performance the coordinating effect of these connections was also linked to
a lower volatility of bank profitability, indicating an insurance effect reducing idiosyncratic
risk for banks.
My findings yield important implications for understanding social networking in cor-
porate finance. I clearly show that the boardroom network can be an essential conduit of
influence and information flows that affect the strategic decision making of firms in the
network. By utilizing modern Chinese bank data in the 1930s, the analysis also suggests
that social connections are likely to be a useful tool to coordinate firms in politically and
economically risky environments. Further research on China that explores social connec-
tions between financial institutions and industries can potentially provide insights into the
mechanism of information passing through social networks and the role played by mod-




Connections and Performance: The
Impact of Interlocking Directorates
Abstract
The Chinese modern banking industry had become the vanguard of growth in the Repub-
lican time period (1910-1949), in which property rights and contract enforcement were a
luxury. I examine whether one type of inter-banking connections, namely interlocking di-
rectorate, contributed to the overall performance of Chinese modern banks by utilizing the
social network tools. I find characteristics of banks, which share directors with other banks,
are significantly different compared to those of unconnected counterparts. The empirical
results elucidate a high positive correlation between bank’s profitability and its connections
with rivals through interlocking directors. The outcome provides a reasonable explanation
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4.1 Introduction
The modern Chinese banking industry became the vanguard of growth in the so-called
Nanjing decade (1927-1937), a time of political and economic turbulence. This external
uncertainty led the sector to be characterized by cooperation rather than competition as
discussed in Chapter 2. A formal inter-bank network, based on sharing directors, reflected
the strong social connections among bankers, who formed an elite social group of Chinese
society driving economic development1. But did the relationships between banks serve
more than just defensive purposes and actually positively impact the involved banks’ per-
formance? The question remains unanswered in the existing studies on Chinese financial
history.
This paper, consequently, contributes to current research by examining whether inter-
locking directorates, as an explicit form of inter-bank linkages, were an important force
leading to an improved performance of modern banks during the height of the Nanjing
decade from 1933 to 1936. I assert that these prevalent connections among banks served
as a network of inter-banking cooperation, that positively impacted the financial perfor-
mance of the involved enterprises. The shape of the network highlights differences in the
importance and centrality of the involved banks. Directors of banks with a more central
position in this network could get more access to relevant information and resources and
consequently were able to improve their banks’ daily operations2. Bankers closer to the
core of the network could use their social status and capital, expertise, and connections to
influence corporate policies and board decisions and therefore enhance the performance of
their well-connected banks (Fracassi 2017).
I build annual inter-bank networks based on interlocking directorates from 1933 to 1936
to examine the relationship between board connections and cooperation performance. In
these networks the nodes represent individual banks while the edges are boardroom con-
nections based on shared directors. For each year I then calculate measures of each bank’s
1 Bergère (1989) analyzes the effects of the rising Chinese bourgeoisie, and summarizes that bankers, as an
elite class, were a leading group driving Chinese society’s changes in general. Cheng (2003) confirms this as-
sertion and argues that the success of banking sector was attributed to a group of "entrepreneurs with Chinese
characteristics. These bankers, as an elite social group, were the main force driving the expansion of mod-
ern Chinese banks. Consequently, Lan (2014) highlights the interrelations among bankers, formed in various
ways like common location of origin, education, employment or entrepreneurial activity, promoted cooperation
between banks.
2Existing literature as early as Mizruchi (1996) highlighted the importance of social connections in corporate
operation and their impact on economic outcome. Recent studies, e.g. Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), Nguyen,
Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2015), provide convincing econometric evidence to support the point of view.
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well-connectedness in the corresponding boardroom network and test their relationships
with the economic performance as reflected by Return on Assets (RoE) and Profit per staff
member.
I use four centrality measures derived from social network analysis (SNA) to capture an
individual bank’s position in the boardroom network. The first and most basic indicator is
degree centrality. The degree of a node is the number of direct connections that involve that
node. The idea of degree centrality is that a bank may be well-connected if it possesses more
channels of communications and resource exchange. This measure offers a basic starting
point of how to measure the board ties of an individual bank. Next, a board may be well
connected if it keeps closer relations with other banks throughout the whole sector. This is
captured by the closeness centrality measure. Similarly, a bank is located in a more central
position if it sits in an intermediary position between other banks, thereby serving as a
communications conduit between other boards. This is measured by betweenness centrality.
Lastly, I use eigenvector centrality to capture the point that a node is more important if it is
linked to other important nodes.
The annual inter-bank networks from 1933 to 1936, which are used in the empirical
analysis, are based on the board compositions of 209 Chinese banks involving 3,060 indi-
viduals. This information has been collected from the Bank Annual (1934-1937), an official
record of annual financial statistics. This is also the main source for the banks’ accounting
data used in the analysis. Further director level data, such as middle name, birthplace, and
age, which are used to help identify individual managers, have been collected from various
biographies and related sources3.
The empirical analysis initially exhibits an ambiguous results for estimations linking
performance and centrality measures. Closeness centrality was statistically correlated with
banks’ performance, for both RoA and profit per staff measures. In contrast, however, I
find no significant relationship between network location and performance of banks once
I replace closeness centrality with degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality as alternative
network position indicators. To better understand this differentiation between closeness and
the other network centrality measures, I conduct a principal component analysis (PCA) on
3The main biographical source I use in this study is an online open database called the Mod-
ern and Contemporary Persons Integrated Information System. This database contains various bi-
ographies of individuals who worked in the banking sector. For detail of the database, see
http://mhdb.mh.sinica.edu.tw/mhpeople/index.php .
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the centrality measures. The purpose of PCA is to look at the relative appropriateness and
explanatory power of these centrality measures, and the underlying relationships between
the four network indicators. The outcome of the analysis suggests that closeness did indeed
significantly differ from the other three indicators in measuring individual banks’ positions,
suggesting that this measure reflected certain structures that had a substantial relevance for
the performance of modern Chinese banks.
Overall, the empirical outcome offers evidence that a more central location within the
sector as measured by the closeness centrality network measure was associated with a bet-
ter financial performance. Economically, my results imply that it were domestic Chinese
banks with relatively closer links to outside boards all over the sector, rather than the num-
ber of links or intermediary role, that profited from more information and faster resource
exchange, associated with higher returns and profits.
I provide additional support for these results with set of robust tests and further explo-
ration of the data. First, I start by documenting a basic statistical correlation between “con-
nectedness” and profitability of financial institutions with a difference-in-means test be-
tween banks with and without busy directors, those that were members of multiple boards.
The outcome shows profit per staff for banks with at least one busy directors was statistically
and economically greater than that of banks without. The result holds after a propensity-
score matching (PSM), which avoids the issue of bank heterogeneity in the comparison.
Next, I use an alternative measure of board well-connectedness, namely board busyness,
which is defined as the ratio between the number of directors in an interlocking directorate
and overall board size of an individual bank. I test whether board connectedness measure
in this way and bank performance were related. The econometric results are consistent
with the results of the main analysis, showing that a higher share of interlocking directors
in a board leads to greater profitability, both in RoA and profit per staff member. This
result, again, supports the prediction that busy directors acted as conduits to facilitate the
exchange of resources and information, thereby contributing further value to their financial
institutions.
Further, I carry out a network neighborhood analysis to explore the pattern of an indi-
vidual bank’s links. Specifically, I measure the attributes of network neighborhood banks,
the other banks to which an individual financial institution was linked, and evaluate whether
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a systematic linkage pattern existed. The analysis shows that the most-connected banks sta-
tistically tended to be connected with banks who held more assets, and neighbor banks are
more likely those with higher leverage and lower liquidity. The results implies that in-
terlocking with bigger and stronger institutions likely offered potential economic benefits,
which sheds light on the functions of interlocking directorates in an uncertain environment.
As the final point, I conduct a test to explore the potential endogeneity issues for the
main econometric analysis. I restrict the sample to banks whose board composition re-
mained unchanged from the previous period to the current year and examine the correla-
tion between their board centrality and future economic consequences. The resulting evi-
dence from these tests shows that it is unlikely that the main results are driven by interlock-
ing directors being attracted to banks that were performing better in the future, providing
indicative evidence against a potential endogeneity effect.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 4.2 offers the historical back-
ground. Section 4.3 presents the modelling approach, describes the construction of the data
set, conducts the main empirical analysis and discusses the main findings. In Section 4.4 I
conduct several robust tests and further data explorations as well as an investigation into
potential endogeneity. Section 4.5 concludes the paper.
4.2 Historical background
4.2.1 The modern Chinese banking industry in the Republican period
The first Chinese modern domestic bank was established in 1897, more than half a century
after a British bank had set up its first branch in China.From the fall of the Qing Dynasty
in 1911 forwards, China was caught in the period of the warlords. During the time span of
political turbulence from 1912 to 1927, a total of 266 new banks opened for business, around
eighteen each year. Almost half of them, however, went out of business during the same
period4.
After the warlord era ended with the establishment of the Nationalist government in
Nanjing in 1927, the so-called Nanjing decade (1927-37) began, which has been described
4Based on the study of Cheng (2003).
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by some scholars5 as a "golden decade" for China’s modernization and lasted until the out-
break of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. China’s political unification under the Nationalist
government provided the modern Chinese economy with a good opportunity for develop-
ment, particularly for the modern banking sector.
Indeed, the total paid-up capital of Chinese banks increased from C$167 6 million in
1927 to C$403 million in 1936. From 1927 to 1936, modern Chinese banks more than dou-
bled their capital and reserve funds, tripled their loans and total assets, and quadrupled
their deposits7. Table 4.1 presents the Chinese modern bank statistics from 1896 to 1937.
The number of banks raised rapidly, particularly after the establishment of the Nationalist
government in Nanjing in 1927. By June. 1937, the total quantity of Chinese modern banks
crept up to 164.





founded bankrupt net surviving founded bankrupt net surviving
1896 1 0 1 1924 7 5 55
1902 1 1 1 1926 7 7 57
1906 2 2 1 1928 16 5 69
1908 4 3 5 1930 18 6 89
1910 1 0 6 1932 13 4 108
1912 14 10 11 1933 15 3 120
1914 3 1 14 1934 22 4 138
1918 10 6 22 1935 18 0 156
1920 16 14 31 1936 5 0 161
1922 27 19 48 by Jun.1937 3 0 164
Source: The department of economic research of China: Quanguo yinhang nianjian (The national yearbook of banks[1937]),
A7-A8, A24-A25.
Figure 4.1 further documents the development of the Chinese modern banks in the Re-
public period. Since the first domestic bank was established in 1897, the scale of banking
sector had not changed significantly until 1911, the year when the Qing dynasty collapsed.
There were two periods, in which the banking business flourished. The first was around
1920s with the total number of modern Chinese banks soaring from 22 in 1918 to 55 in 1924,
yet with a high rate of bankruptcy. The Nanjing decade (1927-37) provided another "golden
decade" for China’s economy and the number of newly established financial institutions
maintained momentum while the bankrupt rate declined sharply with no insolvency from
1935 to Jun.1937.
5For example, Bergère (1989) and Xu (2000).
6C$= Chinese yuan
7These figures are from Bank of China, National banking year book, 1937. and Cheng (2003).
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FIGURE 4.1: Bank statistics
Notes: The figure shows the total number of the Chinese modern banks in the Republic period. Blue, green, and
red line indicates the total number of banks, newly established banks and banks went bankrupt, respectively.
The two vertical dashed lines demonstrate the collapse of Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the beginning of Nanjing
decade in 1928. Source: The department of economic research of China: Quanguo yinhang nianjian (The national
yearbook of banks[1937]), A7-A8, A24-A25.
One of the important features of the banking sector during this time period was the
business cooperation among the major banks. For instance, The Shanghai Bankers’ Asso-
ciation (SBA), a financial organization that helps promote the welfare and coordinate the
banks’ strategic plans, was established in 1918, and by 1931, its members had increased to
29 from the original seven. Leader of the major banks appear to have believed that only by
cooperating their banks would survive the fierce competition and expand further.8
4.2.2 Relation with the traditional financial institution and foreign banks
The Chinese financial market during the last few decades of the Qing dynasty was dom-
inated by native financial institutions and foreign banks. “Piaohao” and “Qianzhuang”,
the main native financial institutions, controlled the domestic remittance business and the
credit markets for domestic trade, while foreign banks had monopolized the financing of
8This saying is a summary of the leader’s views of the major banks in China by author. Details see Twenty
years of history of Shanghai Commercial and Saving Bank, 1936, 1st ed. .
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China’s import and export trade 9. However, “native bank resources were inadequate , and
their personal manner of dealing did not fit into the progressive modernization ”, so that
“ they failed to keep pace with the changes of the country ” 10. Meanwhile, foreign banks
lost the control of the ball in this match, since they were forced to give up some of their
privileges in China in the course of the period. Tamagna (1942, P. 118) concludes that the
position of the foreign banks by 1937 was one of “necessary cooperation” with , rather than
“control” of, the Chinese official financial policy.
By contrast, with expansions and concentration, modern Chinese banks held 81% of
China’s capital power by 1936 and become the dominant role in Nanjing decade (1927-37).
Table 2.2 goes into the detail about the power balance among native financial institutions,
foreign banks and the modern Chinese banks.
Given the historical context I describe above, I choose the Nanjing decades (1927-37) to
conduct my analysis. The reasons are as follows. Firstly, traditional financial institutions
(i.e Piaohao and Qianzhuang) and foreign banks had been un-ignored power in Chinese
financial market. Together with Chinese modern banks, they are considered as “three king-
doms”by some historians. As native banks and foreign banks become supporting roles in
the 1930s as table 4.2 illustrates, I am able to concentrate on the modern banking indus-
try with less considering the side effects that native and foreign banks may bring into the
analysis.
TABLE 4.2: Capital power in the Chinese financial market (1936)
Name/Items
Chinese Banks Foreign Banks Native Institutions
Amount % Amount % Amount % Total
Note 1,946.7 87 284.7 13 0.0 0 2,231
Deposits 4,551.3 79 511.2 9 673.6 12 5,736
Capital 402.7 67 113.7 19 84.2 14 600.6
Total 6,900.7 81 909.6 11 757.8 9 8,568
Unit: C$ 1,000,000.
Source: Cheng (2003, P.78)
Next, Nanjing decade began with the end of warlord era and featured the establishment
of the Nationalist government. In the course of years preceding the Sino-Japanese war
(1937), China was united, and thanks to the relative stable political environment, modern
9 See Tamagna (1942) and Ji (2003) for a comprehensive introduction of Chinese financial system in the early
20th century.
10Tamagna (1942, P. 80).
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Chinese Banks underwent their greatest expansion 11. I avoided, by nature, some main
factors that previous research suffered (e.g. precluding the impact of political turmoil and
social turbulence), when I perform the empirical study.
Thirdly, recent research has been emphasis the political connections of financial insti-
tutions in the Republic time period. Yet, in this paper, the judicious choosing of the time
period prevents my results from interference of governmental linkage to a certain extent, as
Cheng (2003, P.92) highlights that albeit the government tired greatly to control the banking
business, its efforts had a minimal impact upon the operation of Chinese banks until 1935.
In sum, aside from traditional financial institutions and foreign banks, modern Chinese
banks were the absolute mainstream with respect to the domestic business and trade in the
Nanjing decades, where political impact remained at the lowest level. The empirical study
I perform below prevents the interference of factors (e.g. political turmoil, interplay with
other financial institutions and social instability) to some extent by focusing on the Nanjing
decades.
4.3 The relationship between board-connectedness and performance
This section investigates the relationship between board level connections and the economic
performance of banks. I provide a comprehensive description of the dataset, showing the
main details and characteristics used in the empirical analysis, and introduce an economet-
ric model to examine potential correlations.
4.3.1 Data and variables
My study is based on a full sample of modern Chinese banks (so excluding traditional fi-
nancial institutions and foreign banks) during the period of 1933-1936. I collect accounting
data of banks and the names and positions of their board members from The National Year-
book of Banks (1934-1937), which was published by the department of economic research of
the Bank of China as an annual statistical overview about the banking sector. Additional
data on the board of directors of each bank has been collected from the prospectus of banks
contained in the The National Yearbook of Banks (1934-1937), which is used to identify board
composition and corporate governance structures of individual banks. The data I collect on
11 Cheng (2003, P.68).
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each director includes name, the position she/he holds in the respective institution, the city,
and bank branch, for which she/he worked. Due to the structure of the traditional Chinese
names, the data does not really suffer from duplicate names. But to avoid any doubts, I
complement the information of individual directors with their mid-name, birthplace, and
age collected from various biographies and other sources.
On average, my dataset consists of 157 banks, resulting in an unbalanced panel of 628
bank-year observations for the four-year period from 1933 to 193612. The resulting data
does cover all relevant Chinese modern banks which operated in China during the time
period in question.
4.3.2 Empirical framework
I examine the relationship between bank board well-connectedness and financial perfor-
mance with a regression setup. My estimating equation takes the form
Per f ormancei,t = β0 + β1Board_connectednessi,t + Bank_Characteristicsi,t + ε i,t (4.1)
where the subscripts i, t indicate individual banks and time periods. Per f ormance is a vector
that measures the financial institution’s profitability, Board_connectedness and Bank_Characteristics
stand for the connectedness measures and firm-level characteristics, respectively.






and Profit per capita is calculated as follows:




where Profits = net profits of a bank; Assets = total assets and #staff = number of total staff
of a bank. Detailed variable descriptions are given in appendix B.1. Using Return of Assets
(RoA) as a performance measure is consistent with related studies such as Larcker, So, and
Wang (2013) and Dass et al. (2014), which is the main reason RoA rather than RoE is used
12Our sample suffers from an issue of accounting data availability: Accounting entries are either missing or
not given, particular for small and rural banks. Therefore, the number of banks in the summary statistics, e.g.
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5, decrease dramatically in some case.
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here. In addition, I utilize a relative variable, i.e. profit per staff member, to complement
the focus on financial size with a measure on operational size. Both dependent variables are
specified as the natural logarithm of these measures to reduce skewness.
The main independent variables in my models are first board variables measuring the
board well-connectedness and second firm characteristic controls. Additionally, I control
for year and bank fixed effects in these regressions. The measures for board connectedness
and bank characteristics are further discussed in the following subsections.
4.3.3 Board connectedness measures: a network approach
The focus in the empirical analysis on the impact of board connectedness on bank perfor-
mance and profitability builds on social network analysis (SNA). Analytic tools from social
network theory are applied to annual inter-bank networks from 1933 to 1936 based on in-
terlocking directorates between banks. The social network 13 consist of nodes, individual
banks, and links, interlocking directorates between two banks, so banks form and adjust
the network by allowing or ending the presence of directors on multiple bank boards . A
vast literature emphasis the potential benefits of being well-connected in a social network
even in the general case. Among them, Jackson (2005) suggests that well-connected indi-
viduals may be better positioned for information access because links serve as a conduit for
diffusion and El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015) highlights their advantage in bargaining
and negotiation, because the high position in the network provides more opportunities and
reduces constraint.
Follow the pioneering ideas of Padgett and Ansell (1993), I use four central SNA mea-
sures to describe well-connectedness or network centrality of the individual bank in the
social network: Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality [Larcker, So,
and Wang (2013) and El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2015)]. Degree measures how many
links an actor has with others in the network. Closeness keeps track of the ease of reaching
other actors throughout the whole network. Betweenness describes the importance of an
actor as an intermediary between other actors in the network. And eigenvector centrality
is an indicator for the importance of an actor’s direct connections through looking at the
pattern of links of those connections. Appendix B.2 provides a brief introduction of these
network measures and examples to illustrate the calculations.
13For a typical network construction and description, see Jackson, Rogers, and Zenou (2016)
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TABLE 4.3: Summary statistics of bank network characteristics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics bank network
1933 1934 1935 1936
#Banks 142 159 164 163
#Links 329 458 424 416
#Isolated Banks 41 45 54 58
Network density 0.033 0.036 0.033 0.032
Panel B: Summary statistics of central component
#Banks 88 89 102 94
Avg. path length 3.026 2.512 3.396 2.903
Diameter 9 8 12 9
Clustering coeff. 0.41 0.40 0.41 0.41
Panel A demonstrates annual summary statistics of aggregate bank Network from 1933 to 1936. A component
in network is a subset of the network that all its vertexes are inter-connected. Isolated banks are those nodes,
which have no connections to other vertexes in the network. Density is the proportion of observed ties (also
called edges, arcs, or relations) in a network to the maximum number of possible ties. Thus, density is a ratio
that can range from 0 to 1. The closer to 1 the density is, the more interconnected is the network. Panel B
contains statistics summary for the primary component of our bank network. Average path length indicates
the average shortest number of steps among two arbitrary banks (nodes). Diameter is an indicator shows
the longest number of steps between any two nodes in the network, and clustering coefficient describes an
enumeration of the proportion of vertex triples that form triangles, i.e., all three nodes pairs are connected by
edges.
These measures are derived for a set of inter-bank networks. Table 4.3 reports annual
summary statistics for these networks. On average, I identify 157 unique banks across ex-
ample years, among which I see an 13.2 % increase in the number of banks from 144 to
163. Additionally, isolated vertexes, which are banks do not share any board members with
other banks in the dataset, increased from 41 to 58 simultaneously as well. The fact partly
reflects that shared directorates are not formed at random, and more likely to be an out-
come of strategic decisions14 within certain parts of the sector. The last row of panel A
presents the proportion of isolated banks in the whole network setting each year. Although
the number of non-connected banks did increase significantly during the sample years, the
set of connected banks remained a substantial majority of the whole sector.
To further characterize the structure of the inter-banking networks, I tabulate the net-
work characteristics of the largest component only (i.e. the biggest sub-network in which
all nodes/banks are connected15 ). The average path length is the mean of the shortest
number of steps separating any two actors in the component. The values span from 2.4
14My finding is in line with Larcker, So, and Wang (2013), which studies the boardroom centrality in the US.
15That is, any banks in the sub-network can reach any other vertex in the component through board links.
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to 2.9, which indicates there are around 3 steps of separation between any two banks in
the central component of the banking network. The value is far smaller than the "six de-
gree of separation" widely documented in a numbber of different literatures [e.g. Gurevitch
(1961), Travers and Milgram (1969) and Bakhshandeh et al. 2011], which again supports the
"intentional formulation of inter-banking ties" point of view mentioned above. The diam-
eter of the central component is the longest degree of separation between any two firms. I
observe an average diameter of 8, exhibiting features of “small worlds” s(Travers and Mil-
gram 1967). The clustering coefficient is 0.418, denoting that 42.8% of the time two banks
connected with another particular bank are also linked with each other. These additional
measures further reinforce the impression that inter-bank networks were not random but
developed with a purpose. Consequently, I examine whether the pattern of network con-
nections was related to financial performance, the most obvious purpose of strategic firm
decisions.
To understand that potential relationship I utilize four centrality measures (i.e. degree,
closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality), which are actor-specific measures, so
are calculated for each bank separetely rather than for the network as a whole. Table 4.4
illustrates the values of these network measures for the full sample of banks.
4.3.4 Bank characteristics
Based on similar research [e.g. Deloof and Vermoesen (2016), Acheson et al. (2016b), Nguyen,
Hagendorff, and Eshraghi (2015)], I include as controls a set of characteristics and potential
determinants for the financial performance of each bank: firm size, age , board size, num-
ber of cities in which a bank has branch, total staff number, liquidity ((reserve fund + cash
on hand)/total deposits), leverage (total deposits/total assets), and investment volume in
securities (the sum of investment in securities of a bank, including stocks, real estate and
government bonds).
I control for bank size by including the natural logarithm of total assets (Size) and the to-
tal number of employees (#staff ). Similarly, the number of cities (#city), in which banks carry
on their business, is also included to test for a systematic difference due to geographic scale
of operations. I use the number of years in operation, as measured by the number of years
since establishment, to track the maturity of the firm (operation year). A first operational
4.3. The relationship between board-connectedness and performance 107
TABLE 4.4: Summary statistics of bank network measures by year
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 1933
N Mean S.D. Min P25th P75th Max
Degree 92 5.391 6.177 0 0 9 29
Closeness 92 0.026 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.033 0.034
Betweenness 92 0.011 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.098
Eigenvector 92 0.132 0.209 0.000 0.023 0.161 1.000
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics 1934
N Mean S.D. Min P25th P75th Max
Degree 123 6.683 7.997 0 1 11 49
Closeness 123 0.022 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.027 0.027
Betweenness 123 0.007 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.125
Eigenvector 123 0.088 0.163 0.000 0.009 0.111 1.000
Panel C: Descriptive Statistics 1935
N Mean S.D. Min P25th P75th Max
Degree 130 5.231 6.350 0 0 9 31
Closeness 130 0.016 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.020 0.020
Betweenness 130 0.006 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.087
Eigenvector 130 0.084 0.169 0.000 0.009 0.089 1.000
Panel D: Descriptive Statistics 1936
N Mean S.D. Min P25th P75th Max
Degree 126 4.159 5.782 0 0 6 24
Closeness 126 0.012 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.016 0.016
Betweenness 126 0.003 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.046
Eigenvector 126 0.081 0.180 0.000 0.007 0.059 1.000
Notes: Panel A to D provides the number of banks and network measures for each year from 1933 to 1936.
Network measures (Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, Eigenvector) are detailed in appendix B.2.
variable included is the leverage ratio (leverage), while I capture the liquidity of a bank’s as-
sets by introducing a ratio (Liquidity) of how well a bank manages to match the maturity of
its deposit with cash and financing instruments. Following Acheson et al. (2016b), I also in-
clude board size(#board members),which ranged from 1 to 39 with a mean of 12.7, to capture
governance and control effects. Since the profitability of modern Chinese banks is likely
dependent on speculation in government securities (Cheng 2003), I extract security invest-
ment information (investment in securities) from balance sheets and include it. Furthermore,
Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) suggests that the profitability of a firm is correlated with its
prior performance, I therefore follow the idea by attaching the one-year-ahead profitability
indicators to the regression (lag(RoA) and Lag(Profit per capita)).
Descriptive statistics of relevant bank characteristics are reported in Table 4.5. The banks
in my sample tend to be young firms: they were on average only operational for 10 years
with the highest value of 29 years for the Bank of China.
108 Chapter 4. Connections and Performance: The Impact of Interlocking Directorates
TABLE 4.5: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics from 1933 to 1936
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
RoA 471 0.016 0.014 0.0002 0.108
net profit (in millions) 471 0.31 1.18 0 17.1
total assets (in millions) 471 42.13 155.15 0.0058 1803
#board members 470 12.736 4.701 1 39
#city 469 5.537 12.200 1 156
Age 360 10.211 7.423 1 29
#Staff 471 180.431 392.840 5 3,505
liquidity 431 0.212 0.368 0.004 4.755
investment in securities (in millions) 413 4.28 16.28 0 252.1
leverage 470 0.642 0.467 0.032 7.160
Notes: This table provides a descriptive statistics of the bank main characteristics. The corresponding sample
observations (obs.), mean, and standard deviation (s.d.), minimum and maximum of the values are reported.
Refer to the main text for detail. Variable definitions are provided in appendix B.1.
4.3.5 Empirical Results
Columns 1 to 4 of table 4.6 present the results from regressing RoA on the set of bank control
variables and each of the four network measures. The t-values are shown in parentheses
and are based on cluster robust standard errors. In the regression, I also include bank and
time (two-way) fixed effects to account for both cross-sectional as well as time series depen-
dence in the residuals. The results demonstrate that closeness centrality, as one measure of
network connectedness, was significantly related to the firm’s return on assets. The coeffi-
cient is 0.007 with a standard error of 0.003, showing that the improvement of closeness in
network connection enhances the agent’s annual RoA by 0.7%.
Columns 5 to 8 reports the regression results when I use the other dependent variable
i.e. profit per staff member. The results are consistent with the outcomes for RoA. Again,
closeness is the only measure that shows a statistically significant association with a bank’s
profitability. Given the robust correlation between the network measure and returns of a
bank, the econometric results indicate that the inter-bank network had to positive impact
on the operations of involved banks. However, the other three measures of network charac-
teristics appear insignificant in both regressions, which indicates that they did not capture
any relevant linkage between firms.
The empirical results raise the question whether Closeness, as a network centrality mea-
sure, is really substantially different from the other three measures, as it seems to be only
one that captured a relationship between the network structure and bank performance. To


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































110 Chapter 4. Connections and Performance: The Impact of Interlocking Directorates
TABLE 4.7: Principle components analysis of network measures
Importance of components:
Comp.1 Comp.2 Comp.3 Comp.4
Standard deviation 1.644 0.849 0.679 0.340
Proportion of Variance 0.675 0.180 0.115 0.028
Cumulative Proportion 0.6753 0.855 0.971 1.000
Notes: This table shows the summary information of the principle components analysis of network measures.
Refer to the main text for details.







































FIGURE 4.2: A variables map of the principal component analysis
explore the variation between the four network measures, table 4.7 reports a principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) of these four centrality measures. The first and second components
16 capture together 85.5% of the variation in Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigen-
vector. Using the information of both components, I reframe the original network measures
along new dimensions of components to demonstrate the underlying structure in the data.
Figure 4.2 highlights the resulting factor map of the network measures. While Degree, Be-
tweenness, and Eigenvector measure the network centrality along dimension 1, Closeness
is significantly differed from other indicators, explaining more variation along dimension
2. The results clearly suggest that Closeness carried substantially different centrality infor-
mation in comparison to the other measures, and that centrality position seems to reflect
16The first component is with an eigenvector greater than one. I can interpret the first component as an
aggregate measure capturing the overall well-connectedness of a bank.
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a financially relevant network structure in the Chinese context in contrast to the other net-
work indicators.
In sum, the econometric outcomes suggest that Closeness, as a measurement represent-
ing how easily a bank linked through interlocking directors to other boards across the sector,
contributed positively to the financial performance of a bank. This implies that it was not
just information from a small set of partners that improved a bank’s profitability, but the
ability to receive information and exchange resources throughout larger parts of the sector.
4.4 Robustness and further tests
In this section, I provide further tests and explorations to find indication and evidence that
are consistent with the main results above. First, I highlight the prevalence and impor-
tance of interlocking directors in the modern banking sector by carrying out a "difference-
in-mean" analysis, statistically comparing bank characteristics between banks with board
links and banks without social ties. Then, I define an indicator, board busyness, to measure
the extent to which an individual board connected with other financial institutions. Using
this alternative measure of board links, I revisit the relationship between board links and
banks’ economic performance. Additionally, I provide a network neighborhood analysis
to investigate the linking patterns among Chinese modern institutions and the channels
through which social links contributed to the overall performance. Finally, I provide some
explorations to address the potential endogeneity issue.
4.4.1 The prevalence of connected directors
In this paper, I define a director as connected (or busy) when one affiliates with more than
one financial institution simultaneously (interlock director). Similarly, I consider a bank
with (without) a busy director as connected (unconnected), and the corresponding board is
likewise identified as a busy (non-busy) board 17.
Table 4.8 presents the annual summary statistics of director connections and the pro-
portion of banks with connected directors. Overall, the number of connected directors re-
mained stable between 123 and 150 across the time period with an exception in 1934. Busy
17I refer to abundant literature to define the connectedness of directors. Similar definitions are used by Lar-
cker, So, and Wang (2013), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), Field, Lowry, and Mkrtchyan (2013) and El-Khatib,
Fogel, and Jandik (2015).
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directors were spread over four fifth of the principal banks in my dataset, with 344 bank-
year observations being connected and 127 unconnected. This suggests that banks did have
a strong proclivity to appoint connected individuals to their boards. It also reflects the
ubiquity of interlocking directorates in the whole banking system, with each linked board
having had 2 connected directors on average.
TABLE 4.8: Summary statistics of connected directors and banks
Year
# Director # Banks
avg. # busy dirs/bankconnected unconnected connected unconnected
1933 148 1267 101 41 1.04
1934 199 1429 114 45 1.25
1935 243 1459 108 54 1.5
1936 169 1530 104 58 1.04
This table presents a summary statistic of the connected director and banks of the data. Directors
are considered as connected if they affiliate with more than one bank. Column 2 - 3, and 4 - 5
report the number of banks with connected and unconnected director, separately. Avg. # busy
dirs/bank refers to the the number of connected directors each bank on average. See text for the
detailed data source.
TABLE 4.9: Difference in bank Characteristics between connected and uncon-
nected banks
Panel A: Statistic comparison
Variable Bank-year obs. Mean Bank-year obs. Mean Mean diff(unconnected) (unconnected) (connected) (connected) connected - unconnected
Size 127 14.28 344 15.98 1.7∗∗∗
Age 127 10.55 344 10.10 0.45
# City 127 3.15 344 6.41 3.26∗∗∗
# Staff 127 74.01 344 219.72 145.71∗∗∗
RoA 127 0.02 344 0.01 -0.006∗∗∗
RoE 127 0.15 344 0.12 -0.021
Profit per capita 127 6.44 344 6.97 0.53∗∗∗
Panel B: Propensity-Score Matching (PSM)
RoA 72 0.019 72 0.017 -0.003
RoE 72 0.15 72 0.12 -0.02
Profit per capita 72 6.62 72 6.99 0.3724∗
The sample in Panel A consists Banks are categorized as connected if they have directors who affiliate with
more than one bank. The board compositions and bank performance data are collected separately. For the
bank board data, the sample covers 625 bank-years, with an average of 156 annual observations from 1933
to 1936 as Table 4.8. On the other hand, I have only collected the performance and firm characteristics data
of 471 bank-year observations in total for the same time period.
To further explore the statistical correlation between “connectedness” and profitability
of financial institutions, I begin with a difference-in-means test between banks with and
without busy directors. Panel A of table 4.9 reports the comparison results of return on
assets (RoA), return on equity (RoE) and profit per staff member, as profitability indicators,
and variables describing firm characteristics. All variable definitions and descriptions are
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detailed in appendix B.1. Profit per staff member for banks with at least one busy director
was statistically and economically greater than that of banks without. However, the dif-
ference in RoA and RoE surprisingly remain negative. In other words, unconnected banks
had a higher profitability as measured by RoA. One potential explanation for the result is
that in the 1930s period, when investor protection was weak and firms were hit by eco-
nomic uncertainty, business expansion to peripheral cities had a negative impact on banks’
financial performance (Tong-na 2014). The difference of the number of the bank’s opera-
tional cites between connected and unconnected banks, as captured by #City, is consistent
with this point. I find linked banks covered three more cities on average than their uncon-
nected counterparts. In other words, principle and connected banks operating in peripheral
cities had lowered their economic performance while most unconnected banks were con-
centrated in the major metropolises where businesses were likely to deliver a higher profit
margin. However, the result is not statistically significant after we control the banks char-
acteristics using the propensity-score matching (PSM) approach. Overall, the comparison
highlights that banks with connected directors were more profitable as measured by profit
per staff member, bigger as seen by asset size, with more staff, and operated in more cities.
As these correlations with RoA demonstrate, heterogeneity in bank characteristics poses
a confounding problem for the simple comparison between banks in the two categories.
To account for these effects of individual bank characteristics, I adopt a propensity-score
matching (PSM) approach to select banks in the two categories. The matching is based on
a set of bank characteristics, which are listed in table 4.9 18. Panel B of table 4.9 shows the
differences in average returns (again measured by RoA and profit per staff member) after
applying the matching to adjust the set of included banks. My sample size becomes smaller,
reducing to 72 observations for both groups. The gap in profits per staff members remains
statistically significant with the same sign, again consistent with a positive impact of being
connected on profitability. The difference in RoA and RoE, however, is now statistically
insignificant between connected and unconnected banks after accounting for bank differ-
ences with the PSM approach. These two results indicate that the potential information and
resource exchange through interlocking directorates might have had more of an impact on
profitability through improving practical, operational efficiency of the banks than through
their financial choices. The empirical outcome is partly support the point of view of Chapter
18A specified analysis of the PSM and the matching results are detailed in appendix B.4
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3 that interlocking directorates serving as a conduit for practical management knowledge
and a defensive, insuring effect on strategic, financial choices.
4.4.2 Board composition and connectedness
The results of the SNA-based analysis above is consistent with the argument that busy di-
rectors and interlocking directorates facilitated an exchange of information or resources
with positive consequences for these banks.This, however, only looks at banks as closed en-
tities, it does not take into account arrangements within a bank. A natural question is now
whether the composition of a bank board, in particular the share of busy directors involved
in an interlocking directorate, mattered for the performance of the bank? My expectation is
that a higher proportion of busy directors on the board of a modern Chinese bank was ben-
eficial for that bank. Consequently, I investigate that hypothesis with financial performance
as outcome measure. More precisely, I capture the board busyness by using the number






The denominator is the total number of directors sitting on the board. This variable ranges
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating the extend to which a board reach an external
board.
I estimate the model based on equation 4.1, introduced above, by replacing the network
characteristic variable with the board busyness measure. As above, all of the panel regres-
sions, control for bank fixed effects and year fixed effects, and standard errors are clustered
at the bank level. The regression results are reported in table 4.10.
Odd-numbered columns report prediction results, which control only for bank fixed
effects and year fixed effects; even-numbered columns include a large set of control vari-
ables. Column 1 and 3 report the baseline regressions without considering any charac-
teristics of banks. Potentially, both outcomes suffer from an omitted variable issue. The
coefficients of specifications (columns 2 and 4) are statistically significant and positive, sug-
gesting board busyness was positively associated with bank performance. The estimated
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coefficients show that a bank with a 1% increase in board busyness increases the bank per-
formance measured by RoA and Profit per capita, by about 0.47% and 0.54%, separately.
The control variables have expected signs. Interestingly, the bank size (natural log of
total assets) is positively related with profit per staff member but negatively with RoA. This
potentially reflects that marginal return on capital was declining in the banking sector in the
1930s, yet larger banks were still able to maintain greater profitability in average net income
per staff. Some bank characteristic variables are not statistically significant (e.g. liquidity,
leverage and securities investment), presumably because they did not vary enough over
the time span and thus their impacts are captured by bank fixed effects. In addition, the
significant outcome of bank age shows that equity returns tended to decline over a bank’s
lifetime, elucidating that banks became less dynamic as they aged.
In summary, the evidence supports the hypothesis, that the higher the share of board
members of a modern Chinese bank that were involved in an interlocking directorate, the
better the performance of that bank. In connection with the results above, including the
absence of a direct effect of the degree measure as well as the differentiation between RoA
and profit per staff member for the basic board connections, this points towards interlocking
directorates as a conduit to improve the practical management know-how of board mem-
bers. The exposure to multiple boards and the increase in the number of fellow bank di-
rectors point seemingly improved the management capabilities of involved bankers. While
Chapter 3 demonstrates that a bank’s financial choices were influenced through interlock-
ing directorates, the indication of the results here suggest that practical management and
operational efficiency also profited through banker’s involvement in an interlocking direc-
torate.
4.4.3 Network neighborhood analysis
Colvin, Jong, and Fliers (2015) suggests that interlocking directorates measure the relative
independence of a bank, since banks with more interlocking directors are potentially more
powerful in terms of financial and industrial dominance. This implies that a bank’s network
neighbors, the other banks with which a bank is connected, may contribute to the overall
performance, and further impact the bank’s profitability. Based on this idea, I posit the
hypothesis that a bank residing higher in the ’hierarchy’ (i.e. positioning more central and
thus having higher profitability) did possess more connections to well-performing banks.
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I test this by comparing a summary measure of banks’ network neighborhood, neigh-
borhood quality, based on the rank of banks’ centrality. To capture neighborhood quality, I
use the same measures as Colvin, Jong, and Fliers (2015). Specifically, I measure the average
values cross interlocks of asset size, leverage, RoA, and liquidity of all neighborhood banks,
to which an individual financial institution connects, to capture the characteristics of neigh-
borhood banks. I also calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) to measure the level










where si/S indicates each interlock’s total assets relative to the sum of total assets of all
interlocked banks19.
To rank banks’ network centrality, I use Closeness and the principal component score
(PCA) developed in section 4.3.5. Based on the empirical resultsin table 4.6, Closeness is the
most appropriate measure to capture relevant network centrality information while PCA
catches the overall variation (nearly 70% of the overall variation as shown in table 4.7) in
the Degree, Closeness, Betweenness, and Eigenvector centrality measures.
Panel A of table 4.11 classifies banks into quintiles based on Closeness. Quintile 1 rep-
resents those banks which are the least connected in the network I constructed in section
4.3.3, while quintile 5 stands for those banks with the highest Closeness score. Except for
the average neighbor bank’s liquidity, I, indeed, find a significant difference of neighbor-
hood characteristics between most and least central banks. On average, most-connected
banks had network neighbors with a lower RoA20,but higher liquidity and more concen-
trated assets structure. In panel B of table 4.11, I use an alternative centrality measure,
namely PCA, to calculate the quintile in the comparison. A minor difference to the panel
A is that, due to the nature of PCA, firms that fall in quintile 5 (least connected banks) are
mostly those without interlocking directors and thus without neighbours in the network. I
therefore compare the means between quintile 1 and 4. The outcome is unsurprisingly con-
sistent with the result in panel A. For the least connected banks, their network neighbors
19 Assume, for instance, firm A shares board directors with firm B and firm C, both with a size of $1 million
in assets. The HHI index will equal (1/2)2 + (1/2)2, so 0.5.
20The lower RoA reflects the decreasing marginal income of capital, since the well-connected firms in general
associates with greater equipped capital. The finding is in line with the empirical analysis shown in table 4.6
and table 4.10.
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TABLE 4.11: The comparison of network neighbor characteristics based on
centrality
Panel A: Means for neigbourhood quintiles, based on Closeness centrality
Quintile by Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg.
Closeness assets RoA leverage liquidity HHI
Quintile 1 6,925,188.833 0.024 0.540 0.148 0.062
(least connected)
Quintile 2 56,875,911.554 0.017 0.546 0.395 0.319
Quintile 3 169,604,518.875 0.011 0.642 0.160 0.509
Quintile 4 130,217,977.884 0.012 0.683 0.152 0.587
Quintile 5 123,982,030.498∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.709∗ 0.123 0.452∗∗∗
(most connected)
Panel B: Means for neighborhood quintiles, based on PCA
Quintile by Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg. Neighbor avg.
PCA assets RoA leverage liquidity HHI
Quintile 1 142,555,776.682 0.011 0.711 0.146 0.359
(most connected)
Quintile 2 160,909,891.107 0.012 0.682 0.129 0.520
Quintile 3 123,465,523.131 0.012 0.639 0.163 0.674
Quintile 4 42,108,724.909∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.547∗∗∗ 0.359∗ 0.355
Quintile 5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(least connected)
The table presents descriptive statistics of means on the main characteristics of the bank’s network neigh-
bours from 1933 to 1936. Columns 2 to 6 measure the average cross interlocks of asset size, leverage, RoA,
and liquidity of all neighborhood banks, to which an individual financial institution related, and the HHI. In
panel A , banks are sorted into quintiles based on the Closeness while they are sorted into PCA. The symbols
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote significant difference in means of Quintile 1 and Quintile 5 (In panel B, Quintile 1 and
Quintile 4) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
did possess less assets, had a lower leverage but a higher RoA and average liquidity.
To summary, most-connected banks tended to be on average more connected with banks
who held larger assets. However, due to the increased firm size, the return on assets had
faded reflecting the decreasing marginal return to capital in the banking sector. On the other
hand, neighborhood banks were more likely to have had on average a higher leverage and
lower liquidity. Contrary to modern settings, this suggests that banks were more confident
to face uncertainty and dealing with risk.
4.4.4 Additional analysis of endogenous concern
One potentially significant problem for my empirical study is the question of reverse causal-
ity. There could be plausible alternative explanations of the positive relationship between
network connectedness and firm’s performance. Further, the measures I introduce abvove
in the empirical study could be correlated with unobserved or omitted bank characteristics
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which were correlated with economic performances. For instance, if busy directors, who
had social connections and management expertise, were more likely to accept offers to join
a board from well-performing banks, my results may reflect predominantly the matching
between high-quality managers and banks rather than an effect of interlocking directorates.
TABLE 4.12: Change of well-connectedness and future performance
Dependent variable:
Profit1 RoA1 Profit1 RoA1 Profit1 RoA1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ Betweenness 0.433∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.126)
∆ Closeness 0.948∗∗∗ −0.157
(0.284) (0.137)
∆ Eigenvector −0.042 0.098∗
(0.073) (0.055)
Constant 11.778∗∗∗ −4.370∗∗∗ 12.279∗∗∗ −4.682∗∗∗ 10.708∗∗∗ −4.517∗∗∗
(0.212) (0.126) (0.438) (0.213) (0.200) (0.100)
Observations 71 71 138 138 125 125
R2 0.566 0.398 0.401 0.315 0.104 0.188
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.389 0.396 0.310 0.097 0.181
F Statistic 89.577∗∗∗ 40.192∗∗∗ 90.199∗∗∗ 60.248∗∗∗ −1.120 27.855∗∗∗
∆ Betweenness, ∆ Closeness, and ∆ Eigenvector refer to the change ratio of respective network measure from previous
year to current year. Profit1 and RoA1 indicate the bank’s future one-year-ahead profitability. Year and individual
fixed effects are included. Robust standard error are reported in parentheses. The symbols ***, **, and * denote
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
I conduct a basic test to explore this potential endogeneity issues for my context. Specif-
ically, in order to keep the change in board centrality exogenous, I restrict the sample of
banks to those whose board composition remained unchanged from last period to the cur-
rent period and examine the correlation between the banks’s centrality and its future eco-
nomic performance (1-year-ahead). This implies that any change to the bank’s centrality
measures were independent of the dependent performance variables.
Table 4.12 presents the results of conducting that estimation. ∆ Betweenness, ∆ Close-
ness, and ∆ Eigenvector refer to the change ratio of respective network measure from previ-
ous year to current year. Profit1 and RoA1 indicate the bank’s future one-year-ahead prof-
itability. Except the measure of Degree, I document a positive and statistically significant
(at the 1% level of ∆ Betweenness, ∆ Closeness, and at 10% level of ∆ Eigenvector ) associa-
tion between changes in the network measures and future bank profitability. This outcome
provides some indication that this alternative explanation, busy directors preferred to sit on
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the board of well-performing banks, is not as consistent with the observed developments.
However, the restriction of the sample leads to drop in observations from 334 to 71, which
might potentially be cause of some concern.
4.5 Conclusion
This study shows that modern Chinese banks were not isolated islands within the sector
during the Nanjing decade. Board interlocks were prevalent among these financial in-
stitutions, which leads to the conjection that this network provided an invisible channel
for exchanging resources, information and management know-who. As these direct flows
are unobservable, this paper offers SNA-based analysis to trace, explore and examine the
implications of these inter-banking connections. The empirical outcomes highlight a high
positive correlation between banks’ profitability and its board connections throughout the
sector.
The study also confirms the recent literature on interlocking directorates, by offering
the evidence that inter-firms social connections play an essential role in the daily opera-
tion, particular in the environment where firms are facing instability both politically and
economically.
However, this paper also points to more unexplored aspects, in particular corporate
governance and the acquisition of management skills, of pre-communist Chinese bank-
ing. My hope is that this paper inspires future work to better understand the underlying
economics driving the strong inter-dependencies among interlocking networks. Further-
more, the study partly explains the rapid development of Chinese financial institution in
the 1930s. I hope that my findings contribute to point the direction of modern Chinese
banking research towards models beyond the traditional historical paradigm, both theoret-
ical and empirical, and demonstrate the usefulness of the social-network-based approach.
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Chapter 5
The Evolution of the Interlocking
Directorate Network
Abstract
The domestic Chinese banking sector flourished during the Republican Era, especially in
the Nanjing Government period of the 1930s. The unstable environment, however, led
banks in this sector to cooperate strongly with each other, building a dense web of interlock-
ing directorates between them. While the literature has addressed the impact of interlock-
ing directorates on firm performance, not much attention has been paid on the evolution of
such networks of connections in general. I investigate the development of the interlocking
directorate network between domestic Chinese banks from 1933 to 1936 to understand how
financial institutions structure cooperation within the sector in response to unstable exter-
nal environments and weak property rights. This paper uses a dynamic network simulation
approach to address the inflection problem between bank performance and network forma-
tion, illuminating what factors underlay the network evolution and shaped the structure of
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5.1 Introduction
Chinese banks patterned on western example saw a dramatic rise during the interwar Re-
publican era (Kong and Ploeckl 2018c). As this growth happened during a period of in-
stability the sector reacted through a strong level of cooperation in the sector. This is seen
institutionally through strong linkages of bank personal, which goes far beyond simple
clique relationships (Sheehan 2005). This paper investigates the business logic underlying
the pattern of institutional ties between these Chinese banks during the last years of the
Nanjing decade, the height of Chinese economic prosperity in the interwar period.
There is a large literature that focuses on the impact of institutional ties between com-
panies on their economic performance. The most relevant such ties are interlocking direc-
torates, the practice of directors or other executives exercising important roles in multiple
companies at the same time. Such interlocking directorates have been shown to influence
firms performance. This has been demonstrated in a wide range of settings, from modern
firms (Larcker, So, and Wang 2013) to Victorian stock companies (Braggion and Moore 2011),
Dutch Banks (Colvin, Jong, and Fliers 2015), British interwar steel companies (Holmes and
Ploeckl 2014) to the nascent domestic banking sector of China’s republican era (Kong and
Ploeckl 2018b). These studies however focus predominantly on the impact of these inter-
locks, financial and otherwise, but largely shy away from analysing the pattern and dy-
namics of the utilized networks between firms. This study fills this gap by quantitatively
analysing the main drivers behind the evolution of the interlocking network between do-
mestic Chinese banks during 1933 to 1936, the height of the Chinese Republican era.
The domestic banking sector arose with the end of the Imperial era and flourished
throughout the Republican era until the Japanese invasion. By the mid 1930s more than
150 banks were active, eclipsing foreign banks as well as the traditional financial sector
by controlling about 80% of bank capital in China. These banks formed an interest asso-
ciation, the Shanghai Bankers Association. One of its activities was the publication of an
annual yearbook, which for a number of years contains extensive statistical information
about these domestic Chinese banks. In particular for the years 1933 to 1936 a wide range
of financial performance indicators like total assets, profits, and liquidity are available be-
sides more general information like headquarter location, the number of cities served, the
main focus of activities (real estate, etc) and the names of directors and executives. The
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latter allows the identification of directors in the employ of two or more banks, which I use
to create a network of interlocking directorates between these banks
Mizruchi (1996) categories potential reasons for such a tie between firms as collusion, co-
optation and monitoring, legitimacy, career advancement, and social cohesion. This paper
focuses on the motives of the firm, rather than the individual director, therefore exploring
in particular collusion and co-optation patterns between these banks.
The evolution of the network is analysed with a Stochastic Actor oriented Network
model, the SIENA methodology. This method focuses on understanding the dynamic evo-
lution of a network, where actors like banks, make decisions about ties with each other as
well as other characteristics. The main intention is to illuminate the precise nature of in-
flection phenomena, so how networks and certain behaviour characteristics influence each
other in their development. Practically, this approach specifies an objective function for each
actor, consisting of a set of mechanisms. Each mechanism models a particular factor that
potentially could affect the formation or dissolution of particular ties. The estimation then
simulates the evolution of the model using this objective function and through compari-
son of the simulation outcomes with the actual observed network evolution data derives a
parameter value for each mechanism, including statistical significance of these parameters.
The exact nature of these mechanisms is fairly unconstrained, from the usual independent
covariates of regular regression setups to characteristics of the existing network to interac-
tions between multiple covariates and network structures.
A particular aspect of this situation is that the success of the sector happened within an
environment with weak contract enforcement and property rights. This leads to the ques-
tion how the structure of the emerging banking sector developed. Weak contract enforce-
ment could lead to a strong clustering and polarization effects with banks forming tight
bonds to protect and insure each other within distinct groups, or ties could be widespread
rather than clustered to facilitate more limited transactions over the whole sector rather
than creating strongly competing groups of banks. This can be included through including
mechanisms that reflect the effect of particular network structures like the tendency to form
triplets or the impact of the number of existing ties on new ones.
Although the national government wasn’t fully able to achieve strong institutions, in-
cluding meaningful banking regulation, it nevertheless was involved in the banking sector
through stakes and outright ownership of a number of important banks. As shown by
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Kong and Ploeckl (2018c), these public banks had a strong network of interlocking direc-
torates with private institutions. I test whether the nature of certain institutions as public
banks had a particular influence on the network development and contrast banks owned by
the national government with municipal and provincial institutions. Further I test whether
the potential role of national level public banks remained constant over the time or changed
with the monetary reforms of 1935.
Results show that there were network effects, with a tendency to form triads and a
decentralization effect due to a negative effect of the existing number of ties. A number
of operational effects mattered, including the types and ages of two potential partner banks
. Similarly, financial characteristics mattered, in particular the relative ratio of two banks’
assets, while size on its own did not have an effect. The involvement of national public
banks mattered, with the pattern showing a strong swing from positive to negative effect
with the 1935 financial reforms. Finally, the bank’s financial performance, its levels of RoE
and RoE growth, mattered for its tendency to expand its interlocking directorate network.
An important issue for analyzing the impact of these interlocking directorates is the
question of possible endogeneity between the network and the financial performance of
the involved firms. This is explored through expanding the model with including the Re-
turn on Assets as a second dependent variable. This leads to modeling the co-evolution of
networks (interlocking directorates) and behavior (financial performance) within the same
estimation and the inclusion of explicit interaction effects as mechanisms driving the two
outcomes. Results confirm the outcomes found in the network-only estimation but do not
clearly support a strong impact of interlocking directorates on the financial performance of
the banks. The final section will discuss the inconsistency between them and the results of
the preceding chapter. We believe that the effect is more likely obscured by the constraints
of the estimation method rather than actually being absent.
5.2 The modern Chinese banking industry during the Nanjing Decade
This paper builds upon the data and historical information presented by Kong and Ploeckl
(2018c), the following section, which introduces and describes the rise of the modern do-
mestic Chinese banking sector, is therefore a lightly adapted version of the historical back-
ground presented by Kong and Ploeckl (2018c).
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The first Chinese modern domestic bank was established in 1897, more than half a cen-
tury after a British bank had set up its first branch in China. The number of banks slowly
increased until the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and then accelerated during the period
of the warlords. From 1912 to 1927, despite the political turbulence of this time, a total of 266
new banks opened for business, around eighteen each year. However, almost half as many
went out of business during the same period shown in table 5.1. Although the historical
statistics have sufficient details to illustrate trends, the exact numbers are somewhat uncer-
tain as the source already was unable to determine exact founding or bankruptcy years for
a certain number of banks.
The Nanjing decade (1927-37), China’s "golden decade" of modernization, saw another
period of strong growth in the number of banks established, though in contrast to the
warlord era the number of bankruptcies remained considerably lower — total of 124 new
modern-style private Chinese banks was established and 23 liquidated from 1928 to 1937
according to the statistics of Young (1971, p. 264). Overall, I present the numerical de-
velopment of Chinese modern banks from 1896 to 1937 in table 5.1. It clearly highlights
periods, in which the banking business flourished. While the mid 1920s saw a high rate of
bankruptcy, the number of failed institutions stay low during the Nanjing decade.
However, not only the number of modern Chinese banks increased. Total paid-up capi-
tal of Chinese banks rose from C$167 1 million in 1927 to C$403 million in 1936. From 1927
to 1936, these banks more than doubled their capital and reserve funds, tripled their loans
and total assets, and quadrupled their deposits as reported by Economic Research Office
(1937) and Cheng (2003).
The growth of the modern Chinese banks during this decade was unmatched by either
traditional institutions or foreign banks and consequently the sector became the dominant
player in China’s "Three Kingdom " financial structure. As table 5.2 illustrates, by 1936 the
total assets of modern Chinese banks surpassed those of native banks and foreign institu-
tions combined.
Although the emerging modern Chinese banks differed from institutions in the other
two sectors in its focus of operations, they followed their western counterparts by differen-
tiating further along other dimensions. Following a contemporary classification from the
1C$= Chinese yuan
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TABLE 5.1: Chinese modern bank statistics from 1896 to 1937
year founded bankrupt net change year founded bankrupt net change
1894 1 1 1921 27 18 9
1902 1 1 1922 27 19 8
1905 1 1 1923 25 20 5
1906 2 2 1924 7 5 2
1907 3 3 1925 9 7 2
1908 4 3 1 1926 7 7
1909 1 1 1927 2 1 1
1910 1 1 1928 16 5 11
1911 3 2 1 1929 11 3 8
1912 14 10 4 1930 18 6 12
1913 2 1 1 1931 16 6 10
1914 3 1 2 1932 13 4 9
1915 7 5 2 1933 15 3 12
1916 4 3 1 1934 22 4 18
1917 10 9 1 1935 18 15 3
1918 10 6 4 1936 5 7 -2
1919 16 9 7 1937 3 4 -1
1920 16 14 2 unknown 50 24 26
Total 390 226 164
Source: The department of economic research of China: Quanguo yinhang nianjian (The national yearbook
of banks[1937]), A7-A8, A24-A25.
TABLE 5.2: Capital power in the Chinese financial market (1936)
Name/Items
Chinese Banks Foreign Banks Native Institutions
Amount % Amount % Amount % Total
Note 1,946.7 87 284.7 13 0.0 0 2,231
Deposits 4,551.3 79 511.2 9 673.6 12 5,736
Capital 402.7 67 113.7 19 84.2 14 600.6
Total 6,900.7 81 909.6 11 757.8 9 8,568
Unit: C$ 1,000,000.
Source: Cheng (2003, P.78)
Bank Year Book 1936 the modern Chinese banking sector was comprised of the following
subgroups of banks:
• Central banking group. These were large public banks under the direction and control
of the central government2. They only took on direct central banking functions as
commonly understood with the "Fabi reforms" in 1935. There were four public banks
2These institutions were not consistently fully owned by the governments before 1935 the currency reform,
but it had always retained a substantial stake in them.
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forming the group, namely, the central Banks of China, the Bank of China, the Bank
of Communications and the Farmer Bank of China.
• Commercial and saving banks. The daily operations of these banks covered commer-
cial and general banking, including savings and investment business. These banks
tended to have a wider branch network while having their headquarters in one of the
major metropolitan areas. Banks in this category comprised the biggest proportion of
modern Chinese banks.
• Province and city banks. These were established by local authorities as a consequence
of political decentralization after the fall of Qing empire in 1911. Their autonomy
from the central government varied with the degree of political control of the KMT
over local governments. Main functions included, but were not limited to, handling
and coordinating monetary transactions at a local level such as tax collection and the
issuing of legal tender notes.
• Farmer and industry bank. Financial institutions categorized into this group were
banks whose business focused on agricultural and industrial loans. The origins of
many banks in this group had a government background, in same cases these had
been established by local authorities with the express purpose of supporting the local
economy.
• Specialized banks. Although the business spectrum of these banks overlapped with
that of commercial and saving banks, they had a special focus on specific fields like
silk, mining, or salt.
• Oversea Chinese banks. This refers to those banks, whose owners were ethnically
Chinese, yet the headquarters were located outside of mainland China, in particular
the British colony of Hong Kong. Given their position they also functioned as inter-
mediaries between foreign and domestic Chinese banks.
Modern Chinese banks not only differed in their business model but also geographic
locations. Nevertheless, they did show a strong geographic concentration, though some of
them had extensive networks of branches covering substantially more location (Tamagna
1942, p121). This becomes visible in table 2.3 which provides summary statistics about
headquarters and corresponding capitalization. According to Tamagna (1942) Shanghai
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was by far the most prominent financial center of China; while Tianjin, a major part in prox-
imity to Beijing, was the regional center in northern China and Chongqing a counterpart in
the south-west. Hong Kong was a leading financial market in southern China, although it
was not territorially part of China. Banks located in other metropolitan areas are classified
into the "Others" category.




Shanghai Tianjin Chongqing Hongkong others
Central and chartered banks 3 0 0 0 1
Commercial & Savings Bank 62 5 5 6 33
Province & City Bank 2 1 2 0 22
Farmers & Industry Bank 8 1 0 0 25
Specialized banks 5 3 3 0 4
Oversea-Chinese Bank 0 0 0 4 4
Total numbers: 80 10 10 10 89
Total assets (in million C$): 4,264.1 Mil 438.6 Mil 78.3 Mil 228 Mil 1,058 Mil
Avg. assets (in C$): 76,149,984 54,830,870 11,185,961 75,996,639 13,924,984
All figures are based on authors’ calculation and summary.
Shanghai clearly dominated this banking sector with 80 banks having their operations
headquartered there. The number was substantially greater than the regional centers in
Tianjin, Chongqing and Hong Kong. The aggregate assets controlled by Shanghai banks
were over 4 billion Chinese yuan, an amount almost tenfold greater than that held by banks
in Tianjin, the most significant financial hub in Northern China. The average bank size in
Shanghai was also relatively larger with average assets of C$ 76,149,984.
The table also demonstrates that the type of bank influenced the level of their geographic
concentration. Three of four banks out of the central banking group were located in Shang-
hai, which despite not being the official capital was the dominant economic, commercial
and population center. This is also reflected in the locations of Commercial bank headquar-
ters, more than half of which were located in the city. Banks with a more focused agricul-
tural or specialist focus were also more likely to be located there, but with shares of a third
(Specialized banks) to a quarter (Farmers & Industry banks) the concentration was sub-
stantially less strong. However, none of the other major centers had anywhere as strong a
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concentration in any of these categories. This difference of strength in concentration points
towards the importance of agglomeration forces in the banking sector. Banks with a pre-
dominantly financial focus were strongly clustered while banks with a specialized industry
or agriculture focus followed their customers more strongly in terms of geographical loca-
tion. Similarly, the Province & city banks clearly showed their origins and links to regional
locations as they were spread all over different metropolitan areas, while Oversea-Chinese
banks were primarily clustered in Hong Kong, the major foreign colony in China.
5.3 Bank network and characteristics
The interlocking directorate network between modern domestic Chinese banks has been
shown to link a large section of the whole sector tightly together (Kong and Ploeckl 2018c),
to have a coordination effect with regard to policies (Kong 2018) as well as affect the prof-
itability of these firms (Kong and Ploeckl 2018b). This study focuses on the evolution of that
network and does so by utilizing the data presented of those three studies. Consequently,
the following exposition of the utilized data is directly adapted from them as well.
The analysis of the network formation will be focused on banks as central actors rather
than the involved individuals. This implies that there are two main data requirements,
namely first the interlocking directorate network between the banks and second, character-
istics of the actors, so characteristics of the involved banks.
I look at the last years of the Nanjing decade, in particular 1933 to 1936, which implies
that the sector had been substantially established at that time, but is nevertheless still ad-
justing internal network structures over these years. This allows to illuminate the principles
driving this network evolution by focusing on this time period.
5.3.1 Interlocking Directorate Network
As indicated above, this study focuses on modern Chinese banks in the period 1933-1936,
the end of the Nanjing era before the Sino-Japanese war. This excludes traditional financial
institutions as well as foreign banks. While a number of Chinese banks did interact with
foreign financial institutions, the two banking sectors did remain clearly separated. This is
similar to the clear distinction of these institutions from the traditional financial institutions.
Besides, as I showed earlier in table 5.2 modern-style Chinese banks had risen to dominance
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by the 1930s with collective bank capital surpassing that of foreign and traditional institu-
tions combined. Consequently, I only look at domestic Chinese financial institutions that
were patterned on western banking institutions.
The main data source is The National Yearbook of Banks, which was published by the
department of economic research of the Bank of China. The annual issues for the years
from 1934 to 1937 contain summaries about the whole sector as well as accounting and op-
erational data about individual banks including names and positions of their directors and
managers. I construct the dataset of boardroom composition by extracting information from
the summary descriptions of the sector as well as the included annual reports of individual
banks.
This data, which includes names, positions, and branch locations, is used to identify
interlocking directorates by matching names of listed directors of all included banks. Due
to the structure of traditional Chinese names duplicate names are not a significant concern.
Nevertheless I address this by complementing the basic information about individual direc-
tors with information on middle name, birthplace, and age from various biographies and
other sources3.
For a very small number of institutions the recorded data is substantially incomplete
or inconsistent. I exclude these as they are very small, local institutions and account for
only a minuscule proportion of the full dataset. Consequently, my final sample consists of
an unbalanced panel of 628 bank-year observations for the four-year period from 1933 to
19364. While the coverage is complete for interlocking directorates, some of the operational
and other bank characteristics are missing for a small number of observations.
Table 5.4 presents annual counts of directors and banks involved in interlocking direc-
torates. Despite the unbalanced nature of the panel being responsible for a substantial share
of the fluctuations, a consistent picture emerges that a comparatively small number of di-
rectors were linking together a major share of the whole domestic Chinese banking sector.
Furthermore, the average number of directors per bank involved in interlocking direc-
torates is close to two, implying that many banks were linked in different directions rather
3The major data source is (Jiang 2014).
4Specifically, the dataset includes board information of 142,159,164, and 163 banks from 1933 to 1936 respec-
tively.
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TABLE 5.4: Summary statistics of connected directors and banks
Year
# Director # Banks
avg. # busy dirs/bankconnected unconnected connected unconnected
1933 148 1267 101 41 1.04
1934 199 1429 114 45 1.25
1935 243 1459 108 54 1.5
1936 169 1530 104 58 1.04
This table presents a summary statistic of the connected director and banks of the data. Directors
are considered as connected if they affiliate with more than one bank. Column 2 - 3, and 4 - 5
report the number of banks with connected and unconnected director, separately. Avg. # busy
dirs/bank refers to the the number of connected directors each bank on average. See text for the
detailed data source.
than just by a single link. 5. This is confirmed by figure 5.1, which shows the number of
links per bank in 1933. Although there is a substantial number of banks that are completely


























FIGURE 5.1: Bank network connection and assets cumulative distributions in
1933
5This also indicates that interlocking directorates are not just representing direct ownership and control by
a single owner, but point to at least multiple owners or other relationships between banks.
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As table 5.4 indicates the network of interlocking directorate was changing substan-
tially over the four years. Although a certain amount is due to the unbalanced nature of the
panel a good number of banks, according to table 5.5 about a quarter to a third, changed
their board composition during the course of a year. As interlocking directorates are de-
fined by board members, changes in board membership obviously has implications for the
persistence and stability of the interlocking directorate network. Consequently, the network
was clearly not a static, inert structure but was continually adjusted and modified by the
involved banks.
TABLE 5.5: Summary statistics of bank board composition change rate
Bank Type 1933 1934 1935 1936
All base year 0.273 0.293 0.325
Central banking group base year 0.410 0.155 0.221
Local official banking group base year 0.256 0.432 0.438
Ordinary banking group base year 0.272 0.264 0.301
This table provides the change rate of board directors over years with 1933 as the base year. Details refer to
the main text.
5.3.2 Bank Characteristics
The source material for the interlocking directorates (ID) network also contains information
about a number of bank characteristics as shown in table 5.6
TABLE 5.6: Descriptive statistics of bank characteristics from 1933 to 1936
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
RoA 471 0.016 0.014 0.0002 0.108
net profit (in millions) 471 0.31 1.18 0 17.1
total assets (in millions) 471 42.13 155.15 0.0058 1803
#board members 470 12.736 4.701 1 39
#city 469 5.537 12.200 1 156
Age 360 10.211 7.423 1 29
#Staff 471 180.431 392.840 5 3,505
liquidity 431 0.212 0.368 0.004 4.755
investment in securities (in millions) 413 4.28 16.28 0 252.1
leverage 470 0.642 0.467 0.032 7.160
5.4 Mechanisms and Simulations
Each interlocking directorate is a binary dyad between two actors. There are a number
of standard regression approaches, most notably logistic regressions, that can be used to
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analyse binary data with each dyad, so each pair of banks, as an observation . There are,
however, two main concerns in doing so. First, there is a potential endogeneity between an
interlocking directorate and other characteristics of the banks involved. And second, there
is potential violation of the independence between observations through a form of spatial
dependence, as the formation of an interlocking directorate might have depended on the
existing network links between other banks.
The main reasons that these two issues are of concern are that they distort the results
and are an obstacle for identifying a clean direction of causality. In response to this I choose
to utilise an approach that analyses the dynamic adjustment of the network, including the
particular shape of a reciprocal influence and the impact of the wider network structure.
Instead of correcting for endogeneity and dependence I essentially incorporate them as
potential factors affecting the evolution of the network. To achieve this I use the SIENA
methodology, which utilizes simulation methods to understand and identify factors driv-
ing the dynamic adjustment of network structures.
5.4.1 SIENA
The SIENA6 method has been recently developed7 in sociology, as illustrated by Steglich,
and Pearson (2010) and Snijders, Bunt, and Steglich (2010), and is slowly adopted in political
science (Manger and Pickup 2016) and economics (Esteves and Ploeckl 2016).
The main impetus for its development is to understand the dynamic evolution of actor
oriented networks. This treats network ties as outcomes and assumes that agency to de-
cide about ties rests with individual actors. Such actors can be individuals, who form for
example friendship networks with other individuals (Block and Grund 2014; Cheadle et al.
2013), firms and the cooperative networks between them (Balland, De Vaan, and Boschma
2012; Withers, Kim, and Howard 2018), or countries that form agreements and alliances
with each other (Manger and Pickup 2016; Esteves and Ploeckl 2016). Withers, Kim, and
Howard (2018) resembles the setup in this paper as it looks at interlocking directorates be-
tween US firms, supporting the application of this methodology to historical Chinese banks.
6SIENA stands for Simulation Investigation for Empirical Network Analysis.
7The practical implementation is done with a software package in R labelled RSiena.
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In any of these setups the actors’ decisions to change network ties potentially depends
on the state of the network, other networks or potential actor characteristics. Such poten-
tial dependency creates a number of problems for standard estimation methods as outlined
later in this section. While traditional estimation methods focus predominantly on the iden-
tification of causal effects, this is not the main concern of the SIENA approach. The focus is
to better understand the actual mechanisms at work, so to better understand how the dif-
ferent influence factors and channels shape the decisions. The method also offers the possi-
bility to include individual actor behaviour, so specific actor characteristics rather than ties
between actors, as outcome variables, but this carries substantial constraints and can only
be in combination with a network as outcome variable.
The main idea is to detect the relevance of particular mechanisms and channels by sim-
ulating the evolution of the network, and potentially behaviour, and match the simulation
outcomes against actually observed developments. This illuminates which factors improve
that match and thereby are closely linked to the particular shape, path and evolution of
networks and behaviours.
As the method isn’t really known in the economics or economics literature, this section
focuses on introducing and explaining its practical structure. The exposition is therefore
directly based on Esteves and Ploeckl (2016), which draws and builds upon the wider liter-
ature, in particular the fundamental works by by Steglich, and Pearson (2010) and Snijders,
Bunt, and Steglich (2010).
The method differs in its focus from standard regression approaches in three central
ways, first the potential endogeneity between two characteristics, second the standard as-
sumption of independence between network tie outcomes and third the appropriateness of
modelling events as a series of regular spaced, discrete steps.
The finance literature on interlocking directorate network effects, including Kong and
Ploeckl (2018b), argues that the relationship between interlocking directorates and a pos-
itive impact on financial profitability usually runs from the network to the financial out-
comes, rather than in the opposite direction. The evidence base for that claim, however,
is limited and usual approaches to account for this, for example the use of Instrumental
Variables, are not really feasible due to absence of suitable instruments.
Secondly, explaining the pattern of interlocking directorates, rather than their impact,
implies the use of ties, pairs of actors, as outcome variables. Network theoretic approaches
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can explain the status of ties conditional on the status of ties between other actors, but if
the outcome depends on status of other bank dyads the independence assumption of the
standard estimation approach is violated. There are some approaches to address this prob-
lem within standard econometric estimation approaches, for example Spatial Econometrics
or Conley Standard errors. These approaches however have drawbacks,like the required
a priori specification of a spatial weight matrix, which make them unsuitable here. In this
context the most obvious violation of the independence assumption is that individual direc-
tors are members of multiple boards, which implies that multiple interlocking directorates
between different bank pairs are directly related to each other as they are based on the same
underlying person.
Another conceptual issue is the the discrete nature of the observations used in the analy-
sis. Similar to most empirical analyses, many firm level approaches in economic history use
annual or even less frequent data points. This not only turns underlying continuous pro-
cesses into discrete steps, losing information in the process and creating the, likely strongly
misleading, impression that all changes within one period happened at the same time. The
order in which links between banks are created, or dissolved, within the same year, might
potentially contain substantial and relevant information lost through this standardization.
Also the volative environments implies that there might be more than one change happen-
ing over a year, with network links forming and dissolving fairly rapidly. Similarly estima-
tion usually requires discrete steps of equal length, potentially complicating the estimation
even further.
More practically, the following description of the methodology covers the co-evolution
of network and behaviour, however the network side of the description is fully applica-
ble to a network only analysis. The basic starting point is to incorporate a wide range of
mechanisms into the formation and development of the network structure to identify their
respective effects onto tie formation and dissolution. This is expanded by incorporating
behaviour changes to the set-up which adds a potential mutual dependence between ties
and behaviour. To address this endogeneity problem the approach shifts the conceptual
model from a series of discrete choices to a continuous process whose state is observed at
specific time points, with the recorded data taken as those observations. The network and
the behaviour of involved actors are therefore taken as evolving continuously over the time
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period in question and their simultaneous modelling allows to account for mutual depen-
dencies and multiple changes between the points of observations.
Structurally the modelling of mechanisms includes actor, dyadic and network structure
covariates. The first are particular characteristics of the actors, for example the opening year
or the number of branches of a bank, which makes them equivalent to regular explanatory
variables in a standard regression setup. Dyadic covariates are characteristics of pairs of ac-
tors. These can be direct tie variables, for example whether the headquarters of two banks
are located in the same location or they are the same type of bank, or interacted actor vari-
ables, for example the ratio of the assets of the two banks. Furthermore as pairs can be
ordered these dyadic variables can be directed and therefore asymmetric. Network struc-
ture covariates are variables stating the structural position of the actor within the network,
for example the number of other banks a bank is linked to through an intermediary bank
only.
Changes in the network as well as the behavioural status of individual actors are mod-
elled as the outcome of a two-step process comprising two sub-processes, the first governs
when the possibility to change the network or behaviour arises for an actor while the second
then consequently determines whether an actual change will happen once the opportunity
is given. The first is governed by rate function while the second is determined by an eval-
uation function. The rate function is similar to a hazard rate function in a survival analysis
set-up and determines the probability that the actor can make a change at any given point in
time. Again similar to a hazard rate this function can vary over time, between countries and
depend on covariates. Although they can be correlated due to this influence of covariates
the rate functions for network changes and behavioural changes are independent of each
other. Once the possibility of a change arises the evaluation function determines whether
that change increases the utility of the actor and will consequently be implemented. As the
rate functions are independent the opportunity to change a behaviour will never arise at
exactly the same time point as the opportunity to change the network. This implies that the
evaluation function in each case does take the state of network respective the behavioural
values as given. Once the opportunity arises the evaluation function is used to derive a
value for each possible action, with these values consequently used to determine relative
probabilities for each option to be taken.
Practically the set-up consists of a set of actors which are potentially linked to each other
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in a binary network. The analysis can focus exclusively on the development of the network
ties between the actors. Adding actor characteristics allows to focus on the development
of these behavioural values as well as the joint development of the network and the be-
havioural characteristics. Finally it is also possible to extend the system to add further
networks or behaviour characteristics. The further discussion focuses on the joint evolu-
tion of network and behaviour as it combines the two archetypical cases and represents the
commonly utilized explanatory system.
Returning to the formal description the rate functions, which determine the waiting
times until the next change opportunities, are modelled by an exponential distribution with
the following distribution function
gi(t) = λe−λt, t > 0 (5.1)
where λ = ∑i(λZi + λ
X




i as actor-and period-specific parameters for
the behaviour rate respective network rate functions. This formulation implies that the
probability that the next possible change actor i can make is a behavioural one is λZi /λ and
for a tie change λXi /λ.
Once an actor receives the opportunity to make a change the respective evaluation func-
tion determines if and if so what change is maximizing the utility of the actor. Starting with
the network structure the actor has three possible types of actions, initiate a new tie, dis-
solve an existing tie or retain the existing network without making a change. If there are
n actors then this implies n possible actions consisting of changes in (n − 1) ties to other
actors as well as the retention of the existing structure. Formally the network evaluation
function, which includes the mechanisms modelled by network structure, actor and dyadic
covariates, is given by







Following generalized linear statistical models this function is assumed to be a linear com-
bination of a set of effects, sik(x, z), which are functions defined on the state of the network
and behavioural variables. Particular examples will be discussed in a later section. Sta-
tistical parameters βk represent the importance of the respective effects so f Xi (β, x, z) is the
value of the evaluation function for actor i depending on the states x of the network and z of
the behavioural variables. Additionally a random component is added to represent factors
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not modelled and general inherent randomness.
Similar to a multinomial logistic regression this allows to calculate the probability of
any single tie change shifting the network status from x to x′. Given the parameters of the
evaluation functions this probability is:
P(x) =
exp( f Xi (β, x
′, z)
∑x′∈C exp( f Xi (β, x
′, z)
(5.3)
This probability is for a directed network with a behavioural variable so tie xij can take
the value 1 while xji is 0 (and vice versa). There are a number of possibilities to force the
symmetry between xij and xji such that the network is undirected and ties are simple link
between two actors. The options differ in their procedures about who proposes a change
to a tie and whose consent is sufficient for creation or dissolution. One particular approach
is ’unilateral initiative and reciprocal confirmation’ where it is the decision by one actor
(labelled as ’ego’ in this case) to initiate a tie with another (labelled as ’alter) who then has
to confirm the tie for it to be created. The probability that the tie is also in the interest of the
alter is the following:
P(x) =
exp( f Xi (β, x
′, z)
exp( f Xi (β, x, z) + exp(f
X
i (fi, x′, z)
(5.4)
This evaluation function only compares the value of the network with and without the
potential change, it does not distinguish whether that change is a creation or dissolution of
tie.
In case the potential change is to the behavioural value the actor has again the three
types of choices, namely increase, decrease or retain the value. As the behavioural variable
is required to be discrete the potential increase or decrease is limited to exactly one step up
or down. This restriction to a single step change is similar to the restriction to a single tie
change in the case of the network structure. Furthermore the network evaluation function
is also equivalent in its components to its network counterpart:







It is possible that the included effects sZik are the same as those in the network evaluation
function, but this implies that the same covariates drive the change in network ties and
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behaviour values. This is clearly not a reasonable assumption so correspondingly the sets
of included effects will normally differ between the evaluation functions. Although the
included effects differ the probability for a particular change is formulated in the same way:
P(z) =
exp( f Zi (β, x, z
′)
∑z′∈C exp( f Zi (β, x, z
′)
(5.6)
These functions are used in the simulation algorithm to execute the estimation. The idea
is to sample parameter values with the goal of matching the characteristics of the simulated
networks with those of the actual observed network. This estimation utilizes a Method
of Moments approach, although alternatively a Maximum Likelihood as well as Bayesian
approach are feasible as well. The algorithm results in an estimate for each parameter value
and associated standard error as well as a t-statistic for its convergence. The latter provides
a check whether the simulated values converged sufficiently close to the observed network
values.
The sign of the parameter values and the standard error indicate the direction of the ef-
fect of the associated mechanism as well as the statistical significance of that effect. The es-
timated parameters for each effect should be interpreted as log-odds ratio. The explanatory
covariate variables are centred on their mean, so if they are held at this rate the parameter
values allow the calculation of an one-unit change in the mechanisms on the probability of
an increase (or decrease) in the network (i.e. the number of ties) or the behavioural value.
This setup requires a number of assumptions to hold such that it is possible to inter-
pret the results causally, especially with regard to influence and selection, i.e. endogeneity.
Manger and Pickup (2016) summarizes them in the following:
• The observed network and behaviour are the outcomes of an underlying markov pro-
cess in continuous time.
• The actors act conditionally independent of each other at any point in time conditional
on the observed network, behaviour and covariates. This implies that there are no
simultaneous changes in the network8 or behaviour by two or more actors.
8The requirement of reciprocal agreement to form a tie does not violate this assumption.
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• The changes in the network are conditionally independent of the changes in behaviour,
which implies there cannot be simultaneous changes in network ties and actor be-
haviour.
• At any given time only one single tie can be changed and similarly behaviour can only
be increased or decreased by one unit.
The particular nature of the research questions in this paper fits extremely well within
the structure of SIENA methodology.
5.4.2 Mechanisms and Influence factors
The mechanisms in the evaluation functions represent the factors whose influence on the
evolution of the ID network is tested, similar to the role of independent observations in
a regression. To understand the evolution of the network I include a number of factors
categorized into network variables, operational characteristics, government links, financial
characteristics, and financial profitability. Some of these mechanisms are also included in
the behavioural extension, which looks at the development of profitability as an additional
outcome.
Network variables reflect the influence of the existing network structure on its evolution.
Practically I use the following mechanisms:
• Degree: This measures the number of interlocking directorates a bank already has.
• Transitive Triads: This indicates whether a particular link closes a link triad with a third
bank.
• Number of actors at distance 2: This counts the number of banks the bank is linked to
only indirectly through a third bank.
• Degree of alter: The number of interlocking directorates of the potential link partner.
• Assortativity: This tests whether the relative distribution of all their IDs between the
two potential partners matters.
Operational Characteristics contain variables that characterizes practical, operational (rather
than financial) aspects of a bank’s business. The mechanisms are specified such that it is the
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characteristic of the ’alter’ that is included, so practical it is in the first instance not the char-
acteristic of the bank that initiates the link but that of any potential partner. The type of
mechanism varies, some are derived for the characteristics of one bank only while others
use those of both banks involved in a potential interlocking directorate.
• Co-Location: This binary variable tests whether banks with headquarters in the same
location are more likely to link up.
• Same Bank Type: This binary variable tests whether banks are more likely to form links
with banks of the same type.
• Bank Opening: This variable contains the year the bank was established, consequently
testing whether its age matters.
• Bank Opening difference: This test whether the difference in age between two banks
matters.
• Branches: This variable contains the number of locations where the potential partner
bank maintained at least one branch.
• Staff: This variable measures the total number of staff the potential link partner em-
ploys.
• Execs: This tests whether the number of executives a potential partner has matters for
the likelihood of a link.
• Assets per Executive This variable contains the size of the assets per executive the po-
tential partner bank had. This gives an indication of the extent of the responsibilities
and experience of executives available for a potential link.
Government links are looking at the linkage between private and public banks.
• Central Link This variable indicates if a pair of banks contains one of the banks from
the Central banking group. This variable is also interacted with time dummies to test
whether its effect changed systematically over the included years.
• Local Link This variable indicates if a pair of banks contains one of the banks catego-
rized as Province and city banks. This is used to contrast the reach of the national
government with the engagement with local public banks.
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Financial Characteristics contain mechanisms that build upon financial aspects of banks’
operations and their strategic choices in that regard.
• Asset ratio: This is the ratio of two banks assets with the smaller divided by the larger
(so 0.5 indicates one bank is twice the other, while 1 indicates equal size)
• log Assets: These is the logarithmic value of a potential partner bank’s assets.
• Leverage: This measures how leveraged a potential partner is, calculated as (deposits
all kind)/total assets.
• Liquidity: This measures how liquid a potential partner is, calculated as (reserve fund
+ cash on hand)/deposits all kind.
• Bonds / Deposits: This measures the ratio of a potential partner bank’s investment in
securities, notably bonds, and its total deposits. The bonds in question were usually
government bonds issued by the national government
Profitability focuses on the financial results of banks, most importantly on their return on
equity. Some of these are used as mechanisms only in the analysis focusing on the evolution
of the network only and are not included in evaluation functions used to analyse behaviour
and network co-evolution.
• RoE ego: This contains the return on equity the bank achieves in the current year.
• RoE abs difference: This measures the absolute difference between the RoE of the two
partner banks.
• RoE growth ego: This contains the absolute growth of the return on equity the bank
sees during the current year, so the difference in RoE between two years.
• RoE growth abs difference: This variable measures the difference in RoE growth between
two banks in the current year.
Network and Behaviour co-evolution
The second part of the analysis focuses on the joint co-evolution of the Interlocking di-
rectorate network and the banks’ RoE. This requires a change to the mechanisms used to
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explore the network evolution and the construction of mechanisms for the behaviour evo-
lution.
The first difference is the introduction of a second outcome variable. Due to the con-
straints of the SIENA methodology it is currently not feasible to use RoE in its continuous
form as such. Consequently, I introduce the RoE band variable, which categorizes RoE val-
ues into 6 bins, each assigned a corresponding value from 1 to 6. The categories are in 5%
steps starting at zero with category 6 any RoE value above 25%. The simulations trace how
banks change from one bin into others.
The choice of six categories is a compromise between fine RoE gradations to catch any
impact and suitability of the data for the simulation. Shifting to a larger number of cate-
gories requires simulations to trace banks’ movements through a large number of categories
within a single period with larger RoE fluctuations, which creates substantial problems for
the convergence of simulations run. The consequence of larger bins is that the results are
much less likely to pick up smaller effects on RoE as they do not necessarily lead to a change
in the observed outcome value. As a result of that necessary compromise the analysis is sub-
stantially more suitable for the network side than the behaviour side and the discussion of
the results will take that into account.
Besides serving as an additional outcome variable, RoE Band is also included as a mech-
anism explaining the evolution of the interlocking directorate network. Additionally, RoE
band abs difference is also included. This measures the difference between the Roe band vari-
ables of the two banks. When these two mechanisms are included, the variables RoE ego
and RoE abs difference are dropped.
The modelling of the evolution of RoE also requires the inclusion of explanatory mecha-
nisms for this outcome variable. The list of included factors resembles that for the network
evolution with those mechanisms removed that were based on bank pair characteristics.
Consequently, the following mechanisms are used.
• Linear: This is the value of the RoE band the bank is currently in
• Squared: This is the square of the value of the RoE band the bank is currently in.
• Degree: This is the number of IDs the bank has at that point
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• Average alter by Alter Assets: This is the average RoE of all linked banks weighted by
the assets of these banks
• Bank Opening: This is the year the bank did open.
• Log Assets, leverage, liquidity, Bond / Deposits: These are the same variables as above
based on the bank in question.
• Branches, Assets per Executive Similarly, variables as above based on an individual
bank.
5.5 Results
The interpretation of the results differ based on the nature of the outcome, i.e. network or
behaviour, and the type of the variable, i.e. monadic or dyadic. In the case of network ties
monadic and dyadic variables lead to different effects. A monadic variable, so a charac-
teristic of the tie-initiating bank only, is associated with an effect on all network ties. The
resulting value compares the likelihoods to add any tie for two situations where the only
difference is in that particular variable for this bank. The result for a dyadic variable, so
a variable involving the characteristics of the potential partner, compares the likelihoods
for the initiating bank to form that particular tie when the potential partner differs in that
particular characteristic only. In the case of behaviour, the effect looks at the likelihood to
increase the ROE by one category in comparison the status quo, so remaining in the bank’s
current category.
5.5.1 Network Development
Table 5.7 presents the results for the analysis of the network dynamics only, which indicate
that there were a number of factors driving the evolution of the interlocking directorate
network between modern Chinese banks.
In terms of network effects, the degree, so the number of IDs, of both potential part-
ners matter, so the more IDs a bank already had the less likely it was to add another one.
Similarly, the more IDs a bank already had, the less likely it was to be the target of a new
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TABLE 5.7: Evolution of the Interlocking Directorate Network
Degree (density) -1.992 (0.390) *** -1.659 (0.411) ***
Transitive triads 0.194 (0.027) *** 0.202 (0.025) ***
Distance 2 pairs -0.001 (0.015) 0.202 (0.025)
Degree of alter -0.059 (0.019) *** -0.049 (0.019) ***
Degree^(1/2) assortativity 0.096 (0.016) *** 0.089 (0.015) ***
Central Link 0.191 (0.119) 0.261 (0.124) **
Central Link (period 2) -0.862 (0.229) *** -0.767 (0.227) ***
Central Link (period 3) -0.380 (0.251) -0.408 (0.261)
Local Link 0.011 (0.048) -0.062 (0.054)
Asset ratio 0.302 (0.098) *** 0.274 (0.100) ***
Co-Location 0.061 (0.054) 0.050 (0.056)
same Bank Type 0.180 (0.043) *** 0.177 (0.045) ***
Bank age alter -0.001 (0.005) -0.003 (0.005)
Bank age difference -0.007 (0.004) * -0.011 (0.004) ***
Staff alter 0.061 (0.172) -0.139 (0.191)
Execs alter -0.016 (0.009) * -0.006 (0.010)
Branches alter 0.005 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004)
Asset/Execs alter 0.000 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001)
log(Assets) alter 0.001 (0.015) -0.006 (0.016)
Leverage alter 0.066 (0.251) -0.247 (0.289)
Liquidity alter 0.109 (0.239) 0.182 (0.242)
Bond.Deposits alter -0.296 (0.306) -0.372 (0.341)
RoE ego 0.028 (0.007) ***
RoE abs. difference -0.002 (0.001) **
RoE_growth ego 0.055 (0.008) ***
RoE_growth abs. difference -0.004 (0.002) **
rate (period 1) 42.078 (6.926) 33.726 (5.208)
rate (period 2) 10.594 (0.899) 10.790 (0.999)
rate (period 3) 22.499 (2.997) 24.343 (2.747)
Standard errors in parentheses, All variables have a convergence ratio below 0.1
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ego refers to value of the proposing partner, alter| to that of the receiving partner
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partnership. If an ID closed a triad, the bank in question was 22% more likely to be se-
lected as a partner than an otherwise identical bank that did not close a triad. Assortativity
indicates that banks preferred a more even distribution of IDs between them.
Geographic proximity of headquarters has a strongly positive, however statistically in-
significant effect. Changing the definition of what constitutes the extent of Shanghai, the
core financial centre, might however change that. Banks were also 17% more likely to form
a partnership with a bank, if that bank is of the same type compared to if it is not but other-
wise identical. For example, banks fall into commercial and saving group were 17% more
likely to share directors with other commercial and saving banks than otherwise identical
farmers and industry banks.
While the actual age did not seem to matter, the age gap did. Banks were actually
more likely to form links with banks of a similar age, every year of the age gap reduced
the likelihood by 1%. The size of bank staff had a negative effect, though it is very small
with 100 additional employees reducing the relative probability by just 3%. In contrast, the
number of branch locations had a positive effect with every additional location increasing
the relative probability by a percentage point. While the number of executives didn’t matter,
the average size of assets each executive was responsible for, however, mattered.
While the total size of assets seemingly had no direct effect, did the ratio of the assets of
the two potential partner banks have an effect. Comparing a 2:1 ratio to even size increases
the relative probability by about 16%. The level of leverage and liquidity appear to not have
had an effect, while banks with a larger investment in securities were less likely to be the
target of an interlocking directorate.
The last set of factors concerns the impact of financial profitability in the form of return
on equity on the likelihood to form interlocking directorates. The results for RoE and RoE
growth indicate that more profitable firms as well as those with a higher profitability growth
are forming interlocking directorates faster. The coefficients for the difference between two
banks indicate that banks are slightly more likely to form interlocking directorates with
other banks that looked like them in terms of profitability.
5.5.2 Network and Performance Co-evolution
The second part of the analysis takes into account the potential endogeneity between inter-
locking directorates and financial profitability of the banks. As Kong and Ploeckl (2018b)
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shows, interlocking directorates between Chinese banks were related to an increase in the
banks’ profits, consequently I extend the analysis to allow for the reciprocal influence of
these two characteristics.
This is addressed by including RoE as a second outcome variable. The requirements
of the simulation methods are such that the outcome can’t be continuous but had to be an
ordinal variable. Consequently, RoE is transformed into 6 categories of 5% steps. Each bin
is then assigned a discrete integer value, ranging from 1 to 6 in ascending order of RoE.
Besides requiring such a particular outcome format, the method also focuses on explaining
changes in the outcome variable rather than its level. The simulation results therefore show
whether factors are influencing that a bank’s RoE moves from one bin into a neighbouring
one, so crossing one of the 5% thresholds rather than explaining which bin a bank is in.
The small number of bins, however, implies that the method is unlikely to pick up an ef-
fect of IDs on RoE if that effect is small in comparison to the 5% step size. Unfortunately,
increasing the number of bins substantially creates problems for the estimation procedure,
as substantial year to year fluctuations in RoE would require a large amount of changes
to be captured by the simulation. Consequently, convergence of the simulation algorithm
becomes problematic.
Table 5.8 contains the results for the analysis. The results for the network component of
the analysis are very consistent with those of the network-only estimation discussed above.
Noticeably, only the level of RoE growth and now the RoE bin mattered, while the differ-
ences between two banks no longer have statistically significant effects.
The results for the behaviour component, changes in RoE, show that as expected the ef-
fect of the number of IDs is statistically insignificant and close to zero. The only statistically
signficant effect of other factors are the impact of age, younger banks were more likely to
shift to higher RoE bands, while a higher share of investments into bonds was associated
with a negative effect, so a shift down into lower bands.
5.6 Conclusion
While there is a large literature on the impact of interlocking directorates, not much atten-
tion has been paid to the factors shaping the dynamics of the network itself. This paper
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TABLE 5.8: Co-evolution of the Interlocking Directorate Network and RoE
levels
Network Dynamics
Degree -2.890 (0.775) ***
Transitive triads 0.258 (0.043) ***
Distance 2 pairs 0.007 (0.033)
Degree of alter -0.101 (0.036) ***
Degree^(1/2) assortativity 0.175 (0.026)
Central Link 0.470 (0.202) **
Central Link (period 2) -1.408 (0.402) ***
Central Link (period 3) -0.605 (0.442)
Local Link -0.122 (0.113)
Asset ratio 0.490 (0.162) ***
Co-Location 0.143 (0.099)
same Bank Type 0.297 (0.080) ***
Bank age alter -0.004 (0.007)
Bank age difference -0.017 (0.007) **
log_Assets alter -0.018 (0.030)
Asset / Exec alter 0.002 (0.002)
Leverage alter -0.290 (0.471)
Liquidity alter 0.374 (0.400)
Bond.Deposits alter -0.616 (0.632)
Staff alter -0.476 (0.320)
Execs alter -0.005 (0.018)
Branches alter 0.013 (0.006) **
RoE_band ego 0.275 (0.063) ***
RoE_band difference -0.014 (0.036)
RoE growth ego 0.086 (0.025) ***
RoE growth difference -0.014 (0.020)
Behaviour Dynamics
RoE_band linear shape -0.591 (0.774)
RoE_band quadratic shape 0.074 (0.039) *
Degree -0.000 (0.057)
av. alters x alter’s Assets -0.553 (1.129)
Bank age 0.024 (0.011) **
Branches -0.022 (0.030)




Bond.Deposits -2.065 (1.106) *
Standard errors in parentheses, All variables have a convergence ratio below 0.1
The symbols ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
ego refers to value of the proposing partner, alter| to that of the receiving partner
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does so by in the context of modern Chinese banks during the Nanjing decade of the Chi-
nese republic.
Simulating the evolution of the network reveals that there were a number of effects
influencing the formation of links. These include network effects like triads, operational
characteristics like the number of branches, financial factors like the ratio of assets of two
banks, as well as the financial profitability of a bank. The relevance and impact of these
factors confirm that domestic Chinese banks not only formed links based on cliques but
clearly also due to business reasons.
An initial attempt is made to illuminate the endogeneity issue between interlocking
directorates and bank profitability, though further investigation is necessary to understand
whether the found result of no influence of directorates on RoE is due to method constraints
or really reflecting the actual economic effect.
The current analysis is a first step in understanding the evolution of the interlocking
directorate network. The flexibility of the utilized methodology allows, however, to further
by incorporating multiple networks and behaviour outcomes. The main extension possi-
bilities are the inclusion of other linkage networks, in particular social, informal and clique
networks as well as individual directors as actors. The evolution of the network can then be
analysed not only in reference to the evolution of interlocking directorates between banks




One cannot study the remarkable development of Chinese modern banking sector during
the Republican Era without understanding the financial elite community, which is distin-
guished by a culturally specific pattern of networking based on personal relations. This the-
sis, therefore, focuses on this important part of China’s historical financial system, namely
Chinese banks created following western examples, through the lens of board connections,
providing a systematic analysis on the structure of the inter-bank network, its implications
regarding corporate decision making as well as economic performance, and the network
evolution.
This work contributes to the larger literature in different aspects. First, it advances re-
search on board network. Existing studies of interlocking directorates and their implica-
tions have grown in volume (e.g. Ertimur, Ferri, and Maber 2012; Bouwman 2011; Kuang
and Lee 2017), however the literature has not yet reached a consensus whether these inter-
locks are a clear channel for exchanging resources and information among firms1. I provide
systematic empirical evidence to firmly support that interlocking directorates are a useful
channel to propagate managerial practices, which change how firms act in an economically
and politically risky environment.
Furthermore, my research design improves on prior studies of mechanisms for network
contagion. Theoretical research on social influence and peer effects highlights wide implica-
tions of social networks for specific topics related to contagion including learning, opinion
1For instance, Larcker, So, and Wang (2013) argues that shared directorates between two boards act as chan-
nels of information or resource exchange and that better-connected firms end up achieving better economic
results. Similar studies look at corporate governance spillover (Bouwman 2011), facilitating investments in cor-
porate innovation (Faleye, Kovacs, and Venkateswaran 2014),and information diffusion (Shropshire 2010). On
the other hand, however, the existing literature also highlights several reasons why having a well-connected
board may adversely affect firm performance (e.g. Kuang and Lee 2017; Chiu, Teoh, and Tian 2013; Fich and
Shivdasani 2006).
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formation, and financial contagion2. In contrast, empirical works in corporate finance on
this issue are relatively limited, though Leary and Roberts (2014) identifies whether, how,
and why peer firm behavior matters for corporate capital structures; Fracassi (2017) investi-
gates whether managers are influenced by their social peers when making corporate policy
decisions. Bouwman (2011) finds that firms interlocked with each other share similar gov-
ernance practices. My work supplements the network contagion study by exploring the
corporate policy diffusion and firm peer effect in a Chinese context, which presents a much
cleaner and clearer case to determine the influence of peer institutions that are also direct
competitors and peers in a strategic sense. In the Republican Era, banks had close links
and often shared directors with each other, ensuring that the shared directors were actively
involved in daily operations. In the empirical analysis, I identify policy similarities in a
number of strategic policy choices, which provides evidence that the influence was widely
pervasive throughout banks’ operational decision-making.
Importantly, my research also contributes to our knowledge of the financial history of
China. There is limited research on the development of modern Chinese banks in the pre-
communist era. Ma (2016), in vanguard work, looks to understand the successful develop-
ment of the modern Chinese financial sector in Republican China (1911 to 1937) from an
institutional perspective. Sheehan (2005) also adds to the body of literature by highlighting
the network of formal and personal relations in the modern domestic banking sector but
does not look quantitatively at their impact. Therefore, Sheehan (2005) calls on successive
studies to answer to what extent operations and capital holdings followed the structures of
interlocking directorships. I contribute to an answer by establishing comprehensive inter-
banking networks based on shared directors from 1933 to 1936 — the most critical period
in the Nanjing-Decade, and use methods derived from social network analysis (SNA) to
show the bank coordination and diffusion of corporate decisions through interlocking di-
rectorates.
2Lamberson (2016) and Jackson and Yariv (2011) offer detail surveys on network diffusion and contagion.
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Additional information on Chapter 3
A.1 Definitions of variables
A.1.1 Firm Characteristics
total assets: The total assets of an individual bank. The unit is in Chinese silver dollar
(CSD).
ln(assets): Natural logarithm of total assets.
board size: Total number of directors on the board.
#staff: Total number of staff in a bank.
#cities: The number of cities, in which a bank has a branch.
If.connected: A dummy variable indicating whether a bank has a shared director on its
board.
est.year: The year, in which the bank was established.
board link strength (BLS): BLS is a proxy to measure the extent of inter-board relations.
The value equals the natural logarithm of (1 + number o f shared directors) between two
firms.
RoE: Return on equity = net profit/shareholder’s equity
profit per capita: Profit per capita = net profit/the staff number of an individual bank.
net profit: The actual profit of an individual bank after working expenses not included
in the calculation of gross profit have been paid. The unit is in Chinese silver dollar (CSD).
reserve fund: A reserve fund is a savings account or other highly liquid asset set aside
by an individual bank to meet any future costs or financial obligations, especially those
arising unexpectedly.
deposit all kinds: The sum of deposit of a bank.
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loan all kinds: The sum of loan of a bank.
paid in capital: Paid-in capital is the amount of capital "paid in" by investors during
common or preferred stock issuances, including the par value of the shares themselves.
cash on hand: Total cash reserve of a bank.
total expenditure: Total expenditure of a bank.
total income: The sum of all money received by an individual bank.
investment in securities: The sum of investment in securities of a bank, including
stocks, real estate and government bonds.
fixed assets: Bank assets premises including funiture fixtures.
A.1.2 Corporate policy measures
bond.deposit: The ratio of bond value to the total deposit: bond valuetotal deposit o f individual bank
bond.loan: The ratio of bond value to the total loan: bond valuetotal loan o f individual bank
bond.SH :The ratio of bond value to the shareholders’ equity: bond valueshareholders′ equity o f individual bank
cash.deposit: The ratio of cash reserve to the total deposit of individual bank.
cash.loan: The ratio of cash reserve to the total loan of individual bank.
reserve.loan: The ratio of reserve fund of a bank to its total loan.
reserve.deposit: The ratio of reserve fund of a bank to its total deposit.
A.1.3 Bank-pair level controls
agg.dir : The sum of all directors on the board for each bank pair.
diff.dir: The absolute difference between the number of directors of the two banks.
same.type: If the bank pair belongs to the same type.
diff.asset: The natural logarithm of the absolute difference between the assets of the two
banks.
diff.RoE: The natural logarithm of the absolute difference between the RoE of the two
banks.
agg.staff: The sum of all staff for each bank pair.
diff.staff: The absolute difference between the number of staff of the two banks.
agg.city: The sum of cities in which the bank pair operated.
diff.city: The absolute difference of the number of cities in which the bank pair operated.
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same.type: If both banks in pair belong to the same type.
A.2 Network centrality measures
I begin with some definitions and terminology that will allow us to talk about network
structure and measures of the centrality of nodes in networks. The concept is multidimen-
sional. I focus on two primary dimensions for describing the structure and characteristics
of each agent in the network that are central to the social networks literature.
• Degree: The degree of a node a is the number of direct connections that involve that
node, which is the sum of A’s neighborhood in the network. Thus, a node’s degree in




where g(a, b) is an indicator that there is a direct link between node a and b. Practically,
degree measures how a bank is connected with other firms. A bank may be well-
connected if it possesses more channels of communication or resource exchange. Or
in the manager network, this measure give us a sense of the social capital/personal
connections an individual manager has in the bank sector.
• Closeness centrality: The second indicator keeps track of the ease of reaching other
nodes. It is defined as the inverse of the average distance between nodes:
closenessi(n) ≡
(n− 1)
∑i 6=j l(i, j)
(A.2)
where l(i, j) is the the number of connections in the shortest path between two nodes
i and j.
A.3 Data sample on bank boards, directors and balance sheets
This part presents excerpts of the data I used in this article from various archives. Figure
A.1 is extracted from the annual report of Sin-Hua Trust & Savings Bank, with detailed
information on board composition and bank characteristics.
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Figure A.2 is a screenshot from Modern and Contemporary Persons Integrated Informa-
tion System — a comprehensive biographical database issued by the Institute of Modern
History, Academia Sinica1. Figure A.3 shows an example of the balance sheet of the Bank
of China 1933 from Economic Research Office (1935, page B 92).
FIGURE A.1: Sample of bank annual introduction with board composition
Notes: The figure presents the annual report front page of Sin-Hua Trust & Savings Bank (red circle 1), with
detailed information on, for example, director list, branch coverage, and total staff numbers (ref circle 2).
1The database is available under http://mhdb.mh.sinica.edu.tw/mhpeople/index.php.
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FIGURE A.2: Sample piece of the biographical database
Notes: The screenshot is extracted from Modern and Contemporary Persons Integrated Information System — a
comprehensive biographical database issued by the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. The content
in red circle 1 represents a biographical entry, in which one finds the name, age, birthplace, and employment
chronicle.
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FIGURE A.3: Screenshot of the balance sheet of the Bank of China in 1933
Notes: The figure shows an example of the balance sheet of the Bank of China 1933 from Economic Research
Office (1935, page B 92).
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Additional information on Chapter 4
B.1 Variable definitions
RoA: Return on assets = net profit/total assets
profit per capita: Profit per capita = net profit/the staff number of an individual bank.
assets: The total assets of an individual bank. The unit is in Chinese silver dollar (CSD).
#board members: Total number of directors on the board.
#city: The number of cities, in which a bank has a branch.
age: The age of an individual bank.
#staff: Total number of staff in a bank.
liquidity: An indicator to measure how much liquid assets of a bank possess. liquidity =
(reserve f und + cash on hand)/deposits all kind.
investment in securities: The sum of investment in securities of a bank, including
stocks, real estate and government bonds.
leverage: leverage = (deposits all kind)/total assets.
D/S ratio: D/S ratio = #board members/#staff.
B.2 Network centrality measures
We begin with some definitions and terminology that will allow us to talk about network
structure and measures of the centrality of nodes in networks. The concept is multidimen-
sional. We focus on four primary dimensions of describing the structure and characteristics
of each agent in the network that are central to the social networks literature.
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• Degree: The degree of a node a is the number of direct connections that involve that
node, which is the sum of A’s neighborhood in the network. Thus, a node a’s degree




where g(a, b) is an indicator that there is a direct link between node a and b. Practi-
cally, degree measures how a bank connected with other firms. A bank may be well-
connected if it possesses more channels of communications or resource exchange. Or
in the manager network, this measure give us a sense of the social capital/personal
connections an individual manager own in the bank sector.
• Closeness centrality: The second indicator keeps track of the ease of reaching other
nodes. It is defined as the inverse of the average distance between nodes:
closenessi(n) ≡
(n− 1)
∑i 6=j l(i, j)
(B.2)
where l(i, j) is the the number of connections in the shortest path between two nodes
i and j.
• Betweenness centrality: This measure describes the role of a node as an intermediary
in the network. For instance, It shows us the average proportion of paths between
two outside banks on which a bank lies in the inter-bank network and represents how
important a firm is in connecting other ones to each other. It was first proposed by




(n− 1)(n− 2)/2 (B.3)
letting Pi(k, j) denote the total number of shortest paths between nodes k and j that i
lies on and P(k, j) denotes the total numbers of shortest paths between nodes k and j.
If this indicator close to 1, that means i lies on most of the shortest paths linking k to j,
while the node i is less significant if it is close to 0.
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• Eigenvector centrality: This network indicator elucidates that having more direct con-
nections is more influential when such connection can reach more nodes, i.e. a bank/manager
is well-connected when its direct contracts are also well-connected, or as the motto:
"Not what you know, but who you know." Eigenvector centrality measures the impor-
tance of the node i in a way that
λ · centralityi = ∑
j
gij · centralityj (B.4)
where λ is the proportion factor and gij = 1 if banks i and j are connected. One can
convert equation B.4 into vector form, then we see:
λ · Eigenvector = G · Eigenvector (B.5)
where G is a matrix known as adjacency matrix, in which contains element gij in po-
sition (i, j), and it equals 1 if nodes i and j are linked or 0 otherwise. This indicator
often demonstrates power or prestige of a node in social network, since the centrality
captured is proportional to the sum of neighbor’s centralities.
B.3 Representing and Measuring Networks
We use various measures and methods from network theory to present the network struc-
ture. Among them, some terminologies are particularly important to understand the net-
work pattern.
A component in the network is a subset of the network that its vertexes are inter-
connected. In contrast, isolated directors, which have been mentioned in section ??, are
those nodes, which have no connections to other directors in the network. Average path
length indicates the average shortest number of steps among two arbitrary directors (nodes).
Diameter is an indicator shows the longest number of steps between any two nodes in the
network, and clustering coefficient describes an enumeration of the proportion of vertex
triples that form triangles, i.e., all three nodes pairs are connected by edges.
For a further understanding regarding representing and measuring Networks, please
refer to Jackson (2010, Chap. 2).
162 Appendix B. Additional information on Chapter 4
B.4 A propensity-score matching (PSM) analysis of the difference
in performance between connected and isolated banks
To better neutralize the effects of bank characteristic from two groups of our difference-in-
means test in section 4.4.1, we introduce a propensity score matching based on the principal
characteristics of banks (i.e. the size of the bank, total operational years, business covered
cities, and total staff numbers) in the first stage probability model. Table B.1 demonstrates
the sample size after matching. The number of connected banks, as control group, declines
from 344 to 127 to match the treated group (banks without busy directors).






Figure B.1 highlights the estimated probability densities of matched and unmatched
units cross the sample. The overlapping assumption of the propensity score matching anal-
ysis is most valid.
FIGURE B.1: Distribution of propensity scores
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